Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Theses & Dissertations

Department of History

2016

The rhetoric of trade and decolonisation in Hong Kong, 1945-1984
James FELLOWS

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/his_etd
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Fellows, J. (2016). The rhetoric of trade and decolonisation in Hong Kong, 1945-1984 (Doctor's thesis,
Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://commons.ln.edu.hk/his_etd/9/

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at Digital Commons @
Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Terms of Use
The copyright of this thesis is owned by its
author. Any reproduction, adaptation,
distribution or dissemination of this thesis
without express authorization is strictly
prohibited.

All rights reserved.

THE RHETORIC OF TRADE AND
DECOLONISATION IN HONG KONG,
1945-1984

JAMES FELLOWS

PHD

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2016

THE RHETORIC OF TRADE AND DECOLONISATION IN HONG KONG, 1945-1984

by
James FELLOWS

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in History

Lingnan University

2016

ABSTRACT

The Rhetoric of Trade and Decolonisation in Hong Kong, 1945-1984

by

James FELLOWS

Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis is an exploration of how, in the late colonial period, Hong Kong’s government and
business groups sought to keep the colony’s channels of trade free from restriction, and the
colonial regime sought to keep Hong Kong’s free port status intact. Hong Kong’s colonial
history began with its founding as a free port in a period when Britain subscribed
wholeheartedly to free trade ideals, and the colony would remain broadly committed to free
trade even as the metropole’s own faith wavered. After the founding of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, however, the Chinese communist government placed
restrictions on certain imports from abroad. Further undermining Hong Kong’s re-export
trade with China was a UN-imposed economic embargo on the PRC following their
participation in the Korean War. Hong Kong’s subsequent reliance on light industry and
textile exports was met with protectionist responses from Western governments – including
the colony’s sovereign power – from the late 1950s onwards. Finally, the prospect of return
to China put in doubt Hong Kong’s future status as a free port and an exemplar of free
enterprise principles more widely.
As a colonial dependency with little economic leverage on the international stage, Hong
Kong’s government and business elites relied on appeals to the metropole, public relations
initiatives, and commercial diplomacy in attempts to reduce barriers to trade and maximise
access to export markets. Arguments for the preservation of Hong Kong’s right to free trade
involved a number of constructed narratives that led to certain conceptualised images of
Hong Kong. These narratives included the fundamental importance of free trade to Hong
Kong’s economic wellbeing and political stability, Hong Kong’s regional importance as a
bastion of free enterprise and democratic principles at the edge of the Sino-Soviet
communist bloc, the responsibility of imperial metropoles to their colonies and of developed
nations to the developing, and a commitment to free trade as part of a wider belief in
minimal government intervention as the basis of good governance.
These rhetorical strategies tell us much about how geopolitical changes and shifts in the
nature of the international economy shaped the trajectory of Hong Kong’s late colonial
history, and likewise, how the colony’s government and business elites conceived
instrumentalist ideals of Hong Kong. As a period beginning with Britain’s commitment to reestablishing British rule in Hong Kong after Japanese occupation, and ending with an
agreement that would transfer sovereignty to China, the implications of a gradual imperial
withdrawal are a paramount consideration. On one hand, the endurance of colonial status
into a post-colonial period had ramifications for Hong Kong’s capacity to defend its trading
rights on the international stage, whilst on the other, as imperial ties began to dissolve, the

colony’s emergence into an autonomous, global city with its own identity and ideals was
realised. This thesis, therefore, through an investigation of Hong Kong’s defence of its access
to free trade, provides new understandings of the postwar history of Hong Kong in imperial
and international contexts, and therefore of British imperialism and its interaction with other
global forces.
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Introduction

Hong Kong has been synonymous with free trade since the acquisition of Hong Kong Island
by Britain in 1841. This reputation has endured, and Hong Kong’s present commitment to
free trade policies is evidenced – and praised – in international rankings; the 2014 Global
Enabling Trade Report produced by the World Economic Forum calls Hong Kong ‘arguably
the world’s most open market: it does not levy any customs tariff on imports or exports.
There is also no tariff quota or surcharge, no value-added taxes or general services taxes.’1
Even those sceptical of Hong Kong’s designation as one of the world’s freest economies
overall, if not the freest, recognise that this holds true in matters of trade.2 In classic
accounts of Hong Kong’s fabled rise from sparsely-populated backwater to commercial
metropolis, free trade appears alongside other tenets of British liberalism and rule of law as
the foundation for its success.3 More recent histories of Hong Kong have problematised this
narrative as a colonial orthodoxy that understates both the paramount role played by Hong
Kong’s Chinese inhabitants in the colony’s development, and the aspects of British rule that
do not fit this characterisation.4 This founding myth survived into the late colonial period,
1

Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz, Thierry Geiger, Sean Doherty, ed., The Global Enabling Trade Report
2014 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2014), 19,
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalEnablingTrade_Report_2014.pdf, accessed 25 April 2016.
The report ranks Hong Kong 2nd overall, behind Singapore. The World Economic Forum is non-profit
organisation located in Geneva, which claims to ‘demonstrate entrepreneurship in the global public
interest while upholding the highest standards of governance,’ https://www.weforum.org/about/worldeconomic-forum, accessed 25 April 2016.
2
Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005). For an example of such rankings, see James Gwartney, Robert
Lawson, and Joshua Hall, Economic Freedom of the World: 2015 Annual Report (Fraser Institute,
2015), http://www.freetheworld.com/2015/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2015.pdf, accessed 25 May
2016. Hong Kong is ranked first in the world overall. The Fraser Institute is a Libertarian think tank
based in Canada.
3
E. J. Eitel, Europe in China: The History of Hongkong from the Beginning to the Year 1882 (Hong
Kong: Kelly & Welsh, 1895), reprint, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1983, iii; G. B. Endacott, A
History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1973). As chapter 2 will show, this
narrative was also propagated in promotional material produced by the Hong Kong government.
4
For deconstructions of this narrative, see: John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British
Colonials in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), 11-12, Mark Hampton,
Hong Kong and British Culture, 1945-97 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 42-44,
Tak-Wing Ngo, “Industrial History and the Artifice of Laissez-Faire Colonialism,” in Hong Kong’s
History: State and society under colonial rule, ed. Tak-Wing Ngo (London: Routledge, 1999), 119,
Law Wing Sang, Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 1. For examples that challenge the characterisation that Hong

1

but was incorporated into a projected image of Hong Kong as a modern Asian city, with its
own identity and ideals.

A policy of free trade in Hong Kong is often closely conflated with other aspects of the noninterventionism that defined the colonial government’s stance on economic and social
policy. In a contemporary account of the colony’s postwar economic growth, Hong Kongbased economist Edward Szczepanik notes that – in addition to factors such as a favourable
location, a quality labour supply, and the benefits bestowed by the imperial monetary and
trade bloc – ‘laissez-faire capitalism is another institutional datum of the utmost importance
for understanding the recent growth of Hong Kong’s economy’. He continues to state that:

The Colony was founded as a free port and this idea has remained almost unchanged.
Economic liberalism extends, of course, not only to foreign trade but also to all
internal economic activities: production, transport, exchange, and finance. The
economic development of Hong Kong has not been directed by an over-all national
plans.5

During the postwar period, the Hong Kong colonial government, therefore, remained broadly
committed to economic and social policies that were – until at least the last few decades of
the twentieth century – globally unfashionable. Different yet not incompatible explanations
for this phenomenon have been advanced and include: Hong Kong’s subjugation to
metropolitan interests, on the basis that minimal government expenditure was required to
maximise sterling reserves kept in London; that the colonial government’s allegiance was to
expatriate business interests; the influence and ideological commitment of the colony’s

Kong embodied British “liberalism”, see Christopher Munn, Anglo-China: Chinese People and British
Rule in Hong Kong, 1841-1880 (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), Mark Hampton, “British Legal Culture and
Colonial Governance: The Attack on Corruption in Hong Kong, 1968–1974,” Britain and the World 5,
no. 2 (2012): 223-239, Ray Yep, “‘Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong’: Emergency Powers,
Administration of Justice and the Turbulent Year of 1967,” Modern Asian Studies 46, no. 4 (2012):
1007-1032.
5
Edward Szczepanik, The Economic Growth of Hong Kong (London; New York: Oxford University
Press, 1958), reprint, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986, 7.
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financial secretaries, and finally, that it provided the government with a pretext to ‘resist the
pressures from competing interest groups’.6

The argument put forth by colonial officials themselves was that economic non-intervention
was the best fit for the particularities of the colony, and had been vindicated through
successful development. Sir Philip Haddon-Cave, Hong Kong’s financial secretary from 197181, believed that Hong Kong’s ‘externally-oriented’ economy meant that there was ‘little
scope for managing the economy so as to maintain income and employment levels over the
course of cyclical movements in our external trading performance,’ and thus the state should
‘leave the private sector as much room as possible to react to changing trading conditions’.
Nevertheless, he rejected the laissez-faire label and its implied passivity, and instead
preferred ‘positive non-interventionism’.7 Others have also suggested that laissez-faire is not
an accurate description, due to the fact that the government bestowed certain monopoly
privileges over public utilities, provided essential infrastructure and public services that the
market would otherwise not implement, and by the 1970s especially, had invested heavily in
housing and land development.8 As this thesis demonstrates, the colonial government, in
response to protectionism, also invested in trade promotion and commercial public relations
initiatives.

6

In order: Alex H. Choi, ‘State-business relations and industrial restructuring,’ in Hong Kong’s
History: State and society under colonial rule, ed. Tak-Wing Ngo (London: Routledge, 1999), 141-161,
Ngo, “Industrial History”; Stephen Chiu, “The Politics of Laissez-faire: Hong Kong’s Strategy for
Industrialization in Historical Perspective,” Occasional Paper No. 40 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute
of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994), see also Choi; Alvin Rabushka,
Hong Kong: A Study in Economic Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago, Graduate School of
Business, 1979), 40-43; Leo F. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners: The Conflict Between Public Interest and
Private Profit in Hong Kong, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 218.
7
Philip Haddon-Cave, “The Making of Some Aspects of Public Policy in Hong Kong,” in The
Business Environment in Hong Kong, Second Edition, ed. David G. Lethbridge (Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press, 1984), xiii-xiv.
8
A. J. Youngson, Hong Kong: Economic Growth and Policy (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1982), 119-136. The author concludes that ‘The answer seems obvious: Hong Kong and laisser-faire
have only an occasional acquaintance’, 132.
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Whilst the parameters of laissez-faire or positive non-interventionism in Hong Kong are
therefore a subject of debate, it is undoubtedly the case that a unilateral commitment to
free trade has been a consistent feature of policy in the colonial and post-colonial periods,
with a few duties on certain goods and controls for a short period immediately following the
Second World War the exception.9 This was not always supported by a consensus – there
were numerous occasions in which business interest groups, with the support of the
government’s Department of Commerce and Industry (DC&I), lobbied for tariffs or quotas
that could be used as a bargaining point with trading partners, or for protection from foreign
competition.10 Nevertheless, government policy persisted on the basis that free trade had
served the colony well.

Yet free trade needs to be reciprocated. Instead, from the 1950s onwards, Hong Kong’s
textile and clothing industries were subject to successive quota restrictions. That Hong
Kong’s industries were able to continually expand in spite of long-term quantitative
restrictions has been called ‘the Hong Kong paradox’.11 The colony’s government and
industry representatives were nevertheless adamantly opposed to the restrictions during
their implementation. Furthermore, when subjection to restraints became inevitable, they
sought to secure the most favourable terms possible. They therefore made appeals to the
metropole in public and private, sponsored public relations initiatives, and engaged in
commercial diplomacy in attempts to deter impediments to the colony’s trade.

Whereas, in the late eighteenth century, Adam Smith made a case for free trade in the face
of a mercantilist consensus, during the period under investigation free trade was, by and

9

There were some short-lived wartime controls in place. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners, 120.
Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners, 130.
11
Lawrence Mills, Protecting Free Trade: The Hong Kong Paradox, 1947-97 (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press, 2012).
10
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large, a prevailing economic doctrine.12 Despite the persistence of some old protectionisms
and the establishment of new ones – such as those inflicted on Hong Kong – the postwar
period was broadly one of trade liberalisation on a global scale. Within the framework of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, average international tariff levels fell from around
40 per cent at the close of the Second World War to 4 per cent by the end of the century.13
For these reasons, Hong Kong’s arguments for access to trade were not necessarily
arguments for the virtues of free trade per se, as these were now well understood. Instead, I
argue, they were context-specific and aimed at maximising the colony’s export opportunities
through whichever channels were available, and often in particular markets.

In many cases, multilateral, global free trade was not in Hong Kong’s interest, as the colony
instead sought to acquire or maintain preferential access to export markets. For example,
Hong Kong benefitted from both imperial preference and stricter restraints on its competitor
Japan; yet appeals to the virtues of free trade when faced with quantitative restrictions
naturally downplayed these advantages. Likewise, positing free trade and free enterprise in
general as fundamental principles of Hong Kong glossed over dissenting voices in the colony
– as referenced above, there were repeated demands for a move interventionist commercial
policy from certain quarters. As will be shown, the rhetoric employed often supported other
colonial orthodoxies, propagated by the Hong Kong administration. Whilst the business
community as a whole was not always convinced by these tenets, its representatives still cooperated in projecting these conceptualised images of Hong Kong for instrumentalist
purposes.

12

There was, and is, of course, consistent debate at both academic and political levels over free trade
vs. protectionism. Nevertheless, it had become something of an economic orthodoxy. Douglas A. Irwin,
Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996).
13
Leonard Gomes, The Economics and Ideology of Free Trade: A Historical Review (Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar Pub., 2003), 299.
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This thesis will therefore demonstrate how different rhetorical strategies were devised
depending on the circumstances that required them, and how their construction – in terms
of both provenance and content – provides a number of insights into the history of Hong
Kong in local, imperial and international contexts. In particular, as the following sections will
demonstrate, it will highlight how three overlapping geopolitical and geo-economic shifts
converged on Hong Kong during this period: British imperial decolonisation, China’s
economic transformations, and the organisation of international trade.

1. Decolonisation and Colonial Autonomy

As a period beginning with Britain’s commitment to re-establishing British rule in Hong Kong
after Japanese occupation, and ending with an agreement that would transfer sovereignty to
China, Hong Kong’s enduring colonial status in a period of gradual imperial withdrawal both
shaped the colony’s patterns of trade and its capacity to defend its trading rights on the
international stage. For the Hong Kong authorities, maintaining a policy of unfettered trade
was simply a preservation of the principles upon which the colony had been founded, and
had underpinned its success. Following China’s defeat in the first Opium War, Hong Kong
was formally ceded to Britain in 1842, with the intention of becoming an entrepôt through
which trade between China and the rest of the world could be conducted. Hong Kong’s
status as a free port was a founding principle espoused by the colony’s first administrator
Charles Elliot, and distinguished the colony from the highly regulated ports of China or the
nearby Portuguese colony Macao.14

Hong Kong’s acquisition by Britain was thus a consequence of the free trade zeal that
culminated in the Opium Wars and China’s forced trade liberalisation. The link between free
trade and British imperial expansion during the mid to late nineteenth century remains a

14

Munn, Anglo-China, 38.

6

subject of debate.15 Nevertheless, the Qing government’s attempts to halt the opium trade
in 1839 were met with a military response from the British, who upon reaching Nanjing,
were able to extract from the Chinese government the eponymous treaty of 1842. The
Treaty of Nanjing provided Britain with compensation, ceded Hong Kong to Britain, and
brought the Canton system to an end through the opening of five treaty ports. The
willingness of “free trade missionary” John Bowring, superintendent of trade in China before
becoming fourth governor of Hong Kong, to enforce the Treaty of Nanjing through military
means culminated in the Second Opium War.16 Chinese defeat led to the opening of further
treaty ports, and transferred Kowloon peninsula to Hong Kong in 1860.

Hong Kong’s acquisition thus paralleled free trade’s rise to prominence in Britain, symbolised
by the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. By the late nineteenth century free trade had
become, in the words of Frank Trentmann, ‘the closest modern Britain ever came to a
national ideology, as important as parliamentary liberty’.17 Its status as a popular ideal in
Britain waned after the First World War; balance of payments crises undermined the
attraction of unilateral free trade policies, whilst the ‘consumer nationalism’ embodied by
the “Buy British” and Empire Marketing Board campaigns of the inter-war period eroded
popular support for free trade.18 In response to global economic depression after 1929, the
British government reintroduced a general tariff. Free trade was replaced by imperial
preference with the 1932 Ottawa agreements, which provided members of the empire and
Commonwealth with duty-free access to their respective markets.

15

John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History
Review 6, no. 1 (1953): 1-15. For a good overview of debates over their influential thesis see, see Frank
Trentmann, Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 141-147; for how it fits into current historiography, see
Simon Potter, British Imperial History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 21-39.
16
Philip Bowring, Free Trade’s First Missionary: Sir John Bowring in Europe and Asia (Hong Kong,
Hong Kong University Press, 2014).
17
Trentmann, Free Trade Nation, 2.
18
Trentmann, Free Trade Nation, 228-229.
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Britain’s determination in 1945 to regain Hong Kong following its invasion and occupation by
Japan during the Second World War was part of a wider project of imperial reconstruction.
The colony was perceived as important for British prestige, and still a net gain in economic
terms, even if it ‘was more important to certain British business interests than to the British
economy’.19 According to one account, the importance of Britain’s colonies to the war effort,
and the fact that the ‘imperial option appeared to be far more promising than the
alternatives, especially in a war-torn Europe’, had meant that ‘a renewed commitment to
empire was as much a matter of calculation as it was of sentiment’.20 Following the 1956
Suez Crisis however, there was a shift in domestic and international opinion against the
British Empire. From 1957 there was, under Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, a
complete cost-benefit analysis of Empire in preparation for a period of managed
withdrawal.21 Meanwhile, an application to join the EEC in 1961 signified that Britain’s
economic focus was shifting and it was readjusting itself for a life after empire.

As Britain began its retreat from empire and withdrew militarily 'east of Suez' by 1971, Hong
Kong became a political outlier and thus holds an uneasy place in histories of the British
Empire and decolonisation. In attempting to reconcile Hong Kong’s history with the wider
trends of the period, historians have drawn upon the concept of “informal decolonisation,”
in which decolonisation is an erosion of imperial ties, rather than simply the moment
political independence begins.22 This has been investigated from political, economic and

19

David Clayton, Imperialism Revisited: Political and Economic Relations between Britain and China,
1950-54 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 99.
20
P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (New York: Longman, 2002), 628.
21
Ronald Hyam, Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 242-44.
22
A.G. Hopkins uses the example of Britain’s relationship with the dominions to conceptualise this
phenomenon: A.G. Hopkins, “Rethinking Decolonization,” Past and Present 200, no. 1 (2008): 211247.
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cultural perspectives; that the metropole displayed a lack of interest towards Hong Kong’s
internal affairs as imperial withdrawal accelerated has been widely asserted.23

The government of Hong Kong, a Crown Colony, were constitutionally subordinate to the
British government in London. Hong Kong’s governor was appointed according to the Letters
Patent – which also stipulated the creation of the Executive and Legislative Councils – and he
served as the crown’s representative in the colony. As Norman Miners explains:

The main emphasis of the Letters Patent is on the need to preserve all the rights of Her
Majesty’s government over the colony. In all the powers given to the Governor he is
reminded that they must only be exercised in accordance with any instructions he may
be given from London and the power of the Crown (i.e. the British government) to
make laws for the colony and to disallow any ordinances passed by the colonial
legislature is expressly reserved.24

In reality, the British government seldom exercised its extensive legal powers over Hong
Kong. They overruled the legislative council for the last time in 1913, and the colonial
government ran the everyday affairs of the colony with minimal metropolitan interference.25

The British Empire was vast and disparate, and the Colonial Office was in Whitehall was far
removed from the day-to-day affairs of colonial administration. Devolving power and
responsibility to colonial governments overcame the financial, monetary and information
demands that would be required for the centre to micromanage at a local level, and colonial
23

Though not all use the term “informal decolonisation,” all present arguments that are consistent with
this interpretation. Political perspectives include John Darwin, ‘Hong Kong in British Decolonisation,’
in Hong Kong’s Transitions, 1842-1997, eds. Judith M. Brown and Rosemary Foot (Hampshire:
MacMillan, 1997), Chi-kwan Mark, “Lack of Means or Loss of Will? The United Kingdom and the
Decolonization of Hong Kong, 1957-1967,” The International History Review 31, no. 1 (2009): 45-71,
and James T.H. Tang, “From Empire Defence to Imperial Retreat: Britain's Postwar China Policy and
the Decolonization of Hong Kong,” Modern Asian Studies 28, no. 2 (1994): 317-337; For economic,
see David Clayton, “A Withdrawal from Empire: Hong Kong-UK relations during the European
Economic Community enlargement negotiations, 1960-3”, in Britain’s Retreat from Empire in East
Asia, 1905-80, ed. Antony Best (Routledge, forthcoming, 2017); and for cultural, see Mark Hampton,
“Projecting Britishness to Hong Kong: the British Council and Hong Kong House, nineteen-fifties to
nineteen-seventies,” Historical Research 85, no. 230 (2012): 691-709.
24
Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1984), 49.
25
Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 70.
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governments were expected to be as self-reliant as possible. As “the man on the spot”,
colonial governors were respected for their knowledge of local conditions and trusted to act
in the metropole’s best interests. Gavin Ure states that this trust ‘was helped by leaders and
officials in both British and colonial governments coming from similar social backgrounds and
sharing common values. There was an intuitive dependence on the soundness of their
judgement and a belief that a Governor’s decisions would be made in Britain’s best
interests’.26

Nevertheless, the often distinct career paths of Colonial Office officials and colonial
administrators could engender differences in outlook. As Robert Bickers writes, ‘Colonial
Office staff were not Colonial Service staff: they were Whitehall home civil servants. There
was no rotation from London out to posts in Africa, Asia or the Caribbean, and then back.’
On the other hand, ‘Careers in the Colonial Service could be migratory, as men were rotated
from colony to colony, although many were geographically static’.27 Whilst officials in London
might be more responsive to domestic political pressures, colonial administrators paid
greater attention to local political considerations and public opinion in their colonies.

Many of Hong Kong’s governors had previous experience of the colony. During the period
under review, Alexander Grantham (1947-1957) had been a Hong Kong cadet in the prewar
years, whilst Robert Brown Black (1958-1964) and David Trench (1964-1971) had both held
previous posts in the Hong Kong colonial administration and returned following
governorships elsewhere. Hong Kong governors affiliated closely with the colony, and
frequently defended what they perceived to be Hong Kong’s political and economic
26

Gavin Ure, Governors, Politics and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918-58
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 2.
27
Robert Bickers, “Loose Ties that Bound: British Empire, Colonial Authority and Hong Kong,” in
Negotiating Autonomy in Greater China: Hong Kong and its Sovereign Before and After 1997, ed. Ray
Yep (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2013), 35.
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priorities, which could lead to friction in dealings with the Colonial Office. Murray MacLehose
(1971-1982) broke the mould, as although he had served in Hong Kong as a political advisor,
he had a background as diplomat rather than of colonial administration. Despite suggestions
he may be less rigorous in defending Hong Kong’s interests, MacLehose and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) differed in their designs for social reform in the colony, and the
governor resisted London’s demands for a greater pace of legislation.28

Hong Kong governors therefore tried to resist – with differing levels of success –interference
from the metropole they perceived as unwarranted, often in the form of pressure to
improve living and working conditions in the colony. On other occasions, the British
government sought to dictate certain policy in Hong Kong for the sake of relations with
China, which offered less leeway for resistance. Hong Kong governors opposed these actions
on the grounds that Whitehall had misunderstood local affairs, or would cause an
unacceptable compromise of Hong Kong’s judicial autonomy.29 When interviewed more than
ten years after his tenure had ended, Alexander Grantham was asked if his ‘loyalty to Hong
Kong and its interests’ ever brought him into serious conflict with Whitehall.’ Whilst he
denied there being ‘serious conflict,’ he stated that they had their ‘disagreements as I think
all Governors have had with the Colonial Office’. His ‘main objection to the Colonial Office as
a whole was that they didn’t really understand Hong Kong’s problems, so far as the
politicians – that is the Colonial Secretaries – were concerned’.30
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From around the 1930s, in response to numerous challenges to imperial rule, the Colonial
Office began to see the empire ‘more as a whole, and as a stage upon which more
interventionist and generally applicable policies might be evolved’.31 The postwar aspirations
of the Colonial Office were at odds with the ruling philosophy of Hong Kong’s government; in
the 1940s and 50s, Grantham resisted Colonial Office proposals to introduce a series of
political reforms in Hong Kong, with the rationale that there was little local demand.32
Grantham’s administration also opposed tax reforms proposed by the Colonial Office to fund
forms of social and economic intervention. The Hong Kong government’s hand was
strengthened by successive budget surpluses from this period onwards, which eroded the
colony’s financial dependency on the metropole. The colony’s financial autonomy also
included complete budgetary independence by 1958, and freedom from compulsory
investment in British government securities from 1959. Following the devaluation of sterling
in 1967, Hong Kong would also secure a guarantee on its reserves against further
devaluation, and gain a number of substantial monetary freedoms, such as the right to set its
own exchange rate.33

As a consequence of these developments, Hong Kong was able to retain an economic model
that was often under fire for not meeting the welfare requirements of the colony’s
inhabitants, or for proving Hong Kong with an unfair advantage over its competitors with
more stringently regulated industrial sectors. To some extent, these developments were the
result of Britain’s dwindling interest and inability to tightly control policy in Hong Kong. Hong
Kong’s isolation increased with the independence gained by Malaya and Singapore in 1957
and 1963 respectively, which left Hong Kong as Britain’s single remaining colony in the
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region. During a period of decolonisation, there was also a shrinking bureaucracy with which
to manage the empire: the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office merged in
1966, followed by a final merger with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the FCO. Yet these
freedoms were also deliberately pursued by a colonial government that sought to free itself
from serving political and economic interests in London, thus contributing to, Hong Kong’s
informal decolonisation.

This thesis will demonstrate that changing trade relations between Britain and Hong Kong,
and the discourse employed by the colony’s government and business groups in response,
adds to our understanding of decolonisation in the Hong Kong context. Firstly, Britain’s
successful attempts to obtain restrictions on Hong Kong’s textile exports from the late 1950s
indicated a divergence in their economic interests, as did Britain’s attempts to enter the EEC
from 1961. In Hong Kong, appeals were made on the basis of Britain’s responsibility as a
sovereign power to safeguard the colony’s economic wellbeing, and that special access to
the British market should be preserved. Failure to persuade ultimately contributed to
perceptions in Hong Kong that the colony could no longer rely on Britain to represent its
commercial interests. Secondly, this simultaneously adds to our understanding of the
development of Hong Kong’s autonomy. In response to a crisis of faith in the metropole, the
colony sought increased independence in the conduct of its commercial affairs.
Nevertheless, it will be shown that “informal decolonisation” in Hong Kong was not a linear
process. Although the colony sought to maximise its autonomy from Britain, there were
particular moments – such as British EEC entry and negotiations over Hong Kong’s future – in
which the colony’s policies were entirely at the will of the metropole.

Finally, the addition of the New Territories to Hong Kong with the signing of a ninety-nine
year lease in 1898 ensured that the colony’s political future would be a matter for
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negotiation between Britain and China when the deadline approached. In the subsequent
discussions from 1982, the importance of Hong Kong’s British connection was brought under
scrutiny. The British and Hong Kong governments claimed that British control was essential
to Hong Kong’s continued prosperity; but by this stage, Hong Kong’s economic future was
already bound up with China, and the level of autonomy obtained by the colony had
diminished the importance of British oversight. The Chinese leadership argued that
autonomy under Chinese rule would provide continuity, and once they had provided
sufficient guarantees, the handover agreement was met with little resistance in Hong Kong.

2. The China Factor

Hong Kong’s relation with the Chinese mainland is what most distinguished the colony from
other territories of the British Empire, as China’s claim to sovereignty over Hong Kong ruled
out the option of independence, thus helping to prolong British colonial rule. Furthermore,
Hong Kong’s proximity to China made the colony sensitive to domestic developments
underway on the mainland, as had been the case for the entirety of Hong Kong’s existence
under British rule. Political instability in China was often Hong Kong’s gain, as domestic crises
frequently triggered influxes of people and capital to the colony. In the words of John Carroll,
‘Hong Kong’s legendary economic success perhaps had less to [do] with its status as a British
colony than because, at least at crucial points in Chinese history, it was not part of China’.34
Other transformations relating to the adoption of a communist economy were less
favourable to Hong Kong as will be shown. Finally, the prospect of a future transfer of power
loomed large from at least the 1960s, but preparing for the possibility of return to China
acquired an urgency in the late 1970s. During the same period, the Chinese Communist
Party’s (CCP) embrace of market reforms from the late 1970s had another transformative
34
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impact on Hong Kong’s economy. A long view of Hong Kong’s trading experience in the late
colonial period therefore adds to an understanding of the colony’s economic
interdependence with China. This emerges in China’s paramount place in the discursive
strategies employed to defend the colony’s access to trade.

Following the Treaty of Nanjing, Britain’s naval security and the reassurances of British rule
of law had made Hong Kong an attractive site for merchant firms, most prominently Jardine
Matheson & Co. and Dent & Co., to conduct their trade in opium. These firms brought with
them their ‘social network’ – trade, finance and information links with London, India,
Southeast Asia and China – and were followed by a swell of other firms relocating to the
colony during the 1840s.35 Nevertheless, as historians of Hong Kong have shown, British rule
alone was not enough to make Hong Kong ‘the great emporium of the East’. The colony
initially failed to attract Chinese or other non-British merchants once the opening of the
treaty ports made an offshore entrepôt redundant. Likewise, Chinese merchants faced
regulatory barriers to trading in Hong Kong. Disease, piracy and crime further undermined
the colony’s attraction as a place to conduct business during the 1840s.36

From the 1850s, however, two fortuitous developments precipitated Hong Kong’s growth
into a successful entrepôt for both people and goods. The first was an increase in emigration
from Guangdong prompted by the lure of the California gold rush and a demand for Chinese
labour across the world. Hong Kong became the paramount transshipment point for Chinese
emigrants and an entrepôt for the supply of commodities from China to these overseas
communities. The second development related to domestic turmoil on the mainland; capital
flight from the Taiping Rebellion led to an influx of people and capital to nearby Hong Kong,
35
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and Chinese merchants brought with them their trade contacts both within China and in
overseas Chinese communities.37 Their relocation encouraged further capital investment in
the colony, whilst subsequence advances in the availability of port facilities and related
commercial services, such as banking and insurance, cemented Hong Kong’s place as the
premier hub of trade and finance in Asia until the Second World War.38

The three treaties ceding Hong Kong to Britain were a product of the significant power
imbalance between Qing China and Britain. John Darwin identifies the temporary passivity of
East Asia as a crucial contingent in the formation of a ‘British world system’; yet this passivity
transformed during the postwar period into an ‘uncontrollable vortex of anti-Western
imperialism’.39 The establishment of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 heralded
an end to foreign economic infiltration into China and a drive towards self-sufficiency in
order to break from its semi-colonised past and a “century of humiliation” and to pursue a
socialist economy. They sought to expunge foreign capital and the wider foreign presence
from China entirely, and by 1955 the continued operation of British businesses and
investments in China became untenable.40 As a British colony precariously positioned at the
edge of the Sino-Soviet Communist bloc, Hong Kong could not avoid the consequences of
policy-making on either side of the Cold War divide. China’s shift towards reliance on the
Soviet bloc for capital, and the introduction of new customs regulations, eroded the colony’s
supply of re-exports to the mainland. More significantly, in 1950, following China’s
intervention in the Korean War, the United Nations (UN) imposed a strategic embargo on the
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supply of goods to China, followed by a total economic embargo by the US on goods of
Chinese origin. The impact of the CCP’s economic policies after 1949, and attempts by the
West to isolate China economically during the 1950s, were drawn upon to make a
compelling case for the colony’s need to export manufactured goods.

These developments were often discussed as precipitating a necessary shift from the reexport trade to industrial manufacturing in the colony. Whilst re-exports to China certainly
suffered however, Hong Kong continued to be China’s most important export entrepôt.41
David Clayton has argued that, in restricting its trade with the outside world to the conduit of
Hong Kong, China had essentially reverted to the Canton system.42 Hong Kong’s importance
as a source of foreign exchange likewise explains the communist regime’s tolerance of British
rule in the colony. Furthermore, official and historiographical accounts have tended to
understate the presence of industry in Hong Kong before the Second World War.
Manufacturing had emerged in the colony from at least the late nineteenth century and
become a substantial component of Hong Kong’s economy by the 1930s, including in the
textile and footwear sectors.43

Nevertheless, the diminished opportunities offered by entrepôt trade, combined with an
influx of refugees from mainland China after 1945, contributed to rapid postwar industrial
growth. The population of Hong Kong increased from 1.8 million at the end of 1947 to over
3.2 million by 1961. In 1961, the manufacturing industry (composed of engineering, textiles,
and ‘other’) was reported to employ over 475,000 of the colony’s workers – the largest
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industry by far.44 Shanghai’s ‘emigrant entrepreneurs’ came to dominate the colony’s
spinning industry with the capital and expertise they brought with them.45 Whilst clothing
remained the dominant component of Hong Kong’s export trade during the 1960s and 70s,
non-clothing textile exports peaked in importance in mid-1960s. In contrast, the electronics
and precision instrument industries experienced consistent growth during the same period,
whilst plastics, toys and wigs were other important elements in Hong Kong’s export
diversification.46 Arguments against limiting the growth of this industrialisation through
restrictive measures drew upon its overall importance to the colony’s economy and its
stability. Hong Kong’s proximity to China featured centrally. On one hand, it was posited that
the refugees required both employment and a colony that could afford to provide essential
services. On the other, the rhetoric concerned Cold War geopolitics; Hong Kong was afforded
strategic importantance as a successful example of the capitalist development model on
China’s doorstep.

Despite the value of Hong Kong to China and the regime’s preoccupation with communist
reforms, the attitude of the Beijing authorities was understood to be conditional. The CCP
had made it known that any overt use of Hong Kong as a base of Cold War operations was
not to be tolerated.47 Likewise, the colonial government felt justified with minimal
democratic reform in Hong Kong, in part due to their perception – rightly or wrongly – that
there existed minimal local demand, but also on the premise that China would regard such
measures as advancement towards independence. In 1972, this position was vindicated
further, as China had written to the UN to oppose Hong Kong’s official designation as a
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colonial territory, on the basis that it was under Chinese sovereignty.48 Beijing’s stance
towards Hong Kong was most in doubt during the disturbances which rocked the colony in
1967. Chi-kwan Mark has argued that disturbances exposed the fundamental precariousness
of British rule in Hong Kong, and it subsequently became evident that discussions over Hong
Kong’s future with China must take place.49

Finally, Hong Kong’s relationship with China – and Sino-British relations – ultimately defined
the parameters of the colony’s autonomy, none more so than in the negotiations over Hong
Kong’s future, from which the colony was excluded.50 At the same time, developments on
the mainland continued to shape Hong Kong’s economic trajectory. China’s industrialisation
was first perceived as a threat to Hong Kong’s own industries – it stimulated further
demands for government intervention to aid the colony’s industry as a result – but was
eventually regarded as an opportunity. China’s emergence into the global capitalist economy
reinvigorated Hong Kong’s supply of re-exports to the mainland, and facilitated the colony’s
economic integration with Guangdong. The transfer of capital from Hong Kong was aided by
the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) from 1980, and facilitated Hong Kong’s
growth into a financial and service hub.

3. The Structure of International Trade

Finally, this thesis demonstrates how shifts in the organisation of the global economy in the
postwar period impacted on Hong Kong in multiple ways, and how these developments were
reflected in changing rhetorical strategies. In his important intervention into the scholarship
on decolonisation, A.G. Hopkins drew attention to ‘the changing character and accelerating
48
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pace of globalization after the Second World War’ as underpinning the dissolution of
imperial linkages during the period.51 Economic ties that Commonwealth members and
colonies held with Britain were diversified, and international and supranational institutions
began to shape the global economy. Attempts to regulate world trade, the creation of
regional trade blocs, attempts by developing countries to address inequalities, and new
trends in approaches to political economy, all impacted upon Hong Kong.

The trajectory of the postwar economy has been attributed to the economic power of the
US, which has often been discussed in imperial or hegemonic terms.52 Yet planning for the
structure of the postwar international economy, as discussions for the creation of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) indicates, was a matter of negotiation
between the US and Britain.53 The 1930s had witnessed a resurgence of protectionist policies
in response to the Great Depression. The US government, in order to stimulate global trade,
introduced the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, which allowed the US to pursue
bilateral tariff reductions with its trading partners. During the Second World War, US
Secretary of State Cordell Hull was an ardent proponent of a multilateral solution for the
postwar period, as a method of obtaining world peace. Although Britain shared with the US a
desire for a liberalisation of world trade, they were committed to preserving imperial
preference. US aid to Britain – first in the form of Land Lease and then the 1942 Mutual Aid
Agreement – was granted with the implication that Britain should eventually dismantle
imperial preference, though stopped short of making this is a condition. With the provision
of another aid package in 1945, the British and US governments agreed on principle to the
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desirability of multilateral tariff reductions, albeit one that did not threaten their balance of
payments positions or goals of obtaining full employment.54 Meanwhile, at Bretton Woods in
1944, an international monetary system conducive to free trade was devised; it came in the
form of pegged exchange rates and the creation of two international bodies: The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

The GATT was only intended to be a stand-in for an international organisation for trade
purposes comparable to the IMF. The proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) failed
to come to fruition however – it was rejected by a Republican-dominated US congress –
leaving the GATT the major instrument for international trade negotiations. Progress
towards the GATT had been made parallel to the ITO, in line with a Canadian proposal that
multilateral tariff reductions should first be enacted within a small “nuclear” of countries for
the sake of simplicity. The general premise of the ITO – the reduction of tariffs on a
reciprocal, most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis – formed the premise of the GATT charter
signed in 1947.55 For Hong Kong, the GATT had a number of significant implications. Firstly,
Hong Kong, as a dependent territory of a contracting member, became a member of the
GATT by default, and was therefore able to enjoy the benefits of MFN; other members could
not – in theory – subject the colony to discriminatory tariffs. Secondly, Britain had
maintained a steadfast defence of imperial preference during the negotiations, and the GATT
ultimately only prescribed against new preferential arrangements, leaving existing
arrangements intact. As a result, Hong Kong could continue to have duty-free access to the
British market, whilst enjoying tariff reductions elsewhere.56
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The GATT was therefore an instrument for trade liberalisation, and oversaw significant tariff
reductions in a number of ‘rounds’ – the first occurring parallel to the document’s signing in
1947 – and continuing as part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995.
Nevertheless, as the Hong Kong case demonstrates, the GATT could not prevent – and even
served to facilitate – protectionism. Duty-free access to the British market made the
metropole Hong Kong’s primary source of non-clothing textile exports until Britain joined the
EEC in 1973. Lobbying by the Lancashire textile industry resulted in the British government
eventually pressuring the Hong Kong industry to enter into a series of restrictions from 1959.
As the agreements were “voluntary”, they circumvented the GATT. Meanwhile, the US
became the most important market for Hong Kong’s clothing exports, in part due to their
restrictions on Japan, which were also outside of the gambit of the GATT. The US failed to
reach a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) with Hong Kong however, and instead turned
towards the GATT. The GATT contained a disruption clause, and became the arena in which
negotiations over quota restrictions on a bilateral basis were conducted. Vinod K. Aggarwal
has thus argued that the ‘evolution of international bargaining over the arrangements
developed in textile and apparel trade illustrates the competing forces of liberalism and
protectionism at work’.57

Whilst Hong Kong faced continual quota restrictions, the colony also feared the end of the
advantages the colony enjoyed as a member of the imperial and Commonwealth bloc, in the
form of imperial preference. Yet the period was one in which economic cooperation at a
regional level was becoming the norm. This was in part the product of Cold War divisions:
the Soviet Union and its satellites represented one form of economic interdependence.
When Britain decided in 1961 to apply for membership of the EEC, however, it was primarily
on the basis that Europe offered superior opportunities for future trade growth. Hong Kong
57
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sought associated membership to preserve imperial preference – duty-free access to EEC
markets was initially less important – but Britain’s convergence with EEC member’s quota
restrictions was also feared. By the time of Britain’s later applications in 1967 and 1971, tariff
reductions in the GATT had eroded the value of imperial preference, as had Hong Kong’s
diversification of export markets. The division of global economies into categories based on
levels of development instead provided a new opportunity. During the 1960s, developing
countries had mobilised in an effort to rebalance a system of international trade they
perceived as detrimental to their emerging industries. The outcome was a Generalised
System of Preferences (GSP) scheme, which granted tariff concessions to developing
countries, into which Hong Kong would be accepted.

The colony endured continual export restrictions during the 1970s through the Multi Fibre
Arrangement (MFA), yet weathered the protectionist storm. Through effective negotiation
and an efficient application of the quota system, Hong Kong was able to consistently
maximise its exports of textiles within the protectionist framework. During this period, oil
crises and stagflation in developed Western nations undermined confidence in their political
economies, precipitating a shift towards free market economic doctrine. The colonial
government in Hong Kong had remained broadly committed to economic non-intervention,
despite demands for the alternative from the industrial community. As a consequence, by
the late 1970s the colony was held up as example of successful free market principles in
action by proponents of neoliberalism, which from 1979 included the British government.

4. Chapter Summaries

Chapter one explores how Hong Kong’s industries faced pressure to agree to voluntary quota
restrictions, following the rapid growth of their textile exports to Britain. Hong Kong’s

23

officials and industrialists claimed that the colony was dependent on the trade due to
reasons beyond their control. In doing so, they provided a selective account of the
development of industrial manufacturing in the colony – one that would endure. The British
government, however, intervened to ensure Hong Kong’s compliance, leading to perceptions
in the colony that their interests were being neglected in the metropole. The agreement with
Britain was to be the start of a long saga of restraints on the colony’s trade in textiles.

Chapter two focuses on the response to protectionism in the colony. Although some in Hong
Kong believed that the colonial government needed to adjust its free trade policies to
increase bargaining strength and protect the colony’s industries, they were unable to
persuade. The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, meanwhile, surmised that
protectionist sentiment directed at Hong Kong in Britain and elsewhere was owed to the
colony’s poor image overseas, and widespread ignorance of its special circumstances. The
colonial government, though unwilling to abandon laissez-faire, were prepared to dedicate
public funds to trade promotion and public relations initiatives. The chapter will explore
media produced with the intention of deterring protectionist measures against Hong Kong,
which crafted narratives of Hong Kong that justified its economic model and emphasised the
importance of the colony’s ability to export unimpeded. The campaign was an effort by Hong
Kong’s representatives to take responsibility for safeguarding the colony’s independent
interests, and should therefore be understood as part of a decolonisation process.

Although Hong Kong’s commercial autonomy was expanding during this period, the British
market retained importance to the colony and imperial trade links were highly valued.
Chapter three deals with Britain’s attempts to enter the EEC, which threatened to end Hong
Kong’s preferential access to the British market. Britain first tried to reconcile its outstanding
imperial commitments – duty-free access to the British market for the empire and
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Commonwealth – with entry of the European trading bloc, but the first round of negotiations
collapsed. Hong Kong’s representatives argued that as a colonial dependency, Hong Kong
was entitled to a special economic relationship with Britain. Furthermore, they tried to
persuade the EEC that the colony was an important Cold War asset, and was dependent on
Britain as a substitute home market, but they failed to convince; they were told that in the
event membership was granted to Britain, imperial preference would end. Britain’s sustained
effort to enter the EEC had wider implications; it was part of a transition into a post-imperial
power. In 1967, the year of Britain’s second application, the Hong Kong government doubted
the metropole’s commitment to the colony. Nevertheless, preference was diminishing in
importance and the colony had diversified its trade links – entry into the EEC’s GSP scheme
was viewed therefore as suitable consolation.

Chapter four addresses representations of the 1970s in Hong Kong, and to what extent the
decade was one of continuity or change. The era is often associated with the reforms of
Murray MacLehose, which are posited as reflecting a new governing ethos in the colony.
Nevertheless, more recent assessments have suggested MacLehose was less inclined to
expand the role of the government than has been asserted in previous accounts. This
chapter will argue that non-intervention remained the fundamental ethos of the colonial
regime, and that the colony’s economic model acquired a new legitimacy by the close the
decade. The government had faced new pressures to assist Hong Kong’s industries in
response to worsening protectionism and other difficulties, but stood by their belief that
their commercial policy to date had served the colony well. Hong Kong’s spectacular growth
during most of the decade, in contrast to Britain and elsewhere, provided vindication, and
the colony was increasingly held up as an exemplary model of free market principles in
action. Relations between Britain and Hong Kong were at their lowest during the decade,
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owing to Britain’s role in subjecting Hong Kong to the Multi Fibre Arrangement, among other
disputes.

Nevertheless, uncertainty for the future gave renewed importance to Hong Kong’s political
dependence on Britain. With the lease set to expire in 1997, Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher sought to convince the Chinese government that Hong Kong’s prosperity was
dependent on continued British administration, whilst China’s leadership contended that
autonomy under China would offer the same results. The build up to the Sino-British
negotiations over Hong Kong therefore raised debates about the nature and importance of
Britain’s role in Hong Kong’s economic success. Ultimately, that Hong Kong’s achievements in
growth had been obtained alongside a high level of autonomy placed Britain in a weak
bargaining position. The Hong Kong elites consulted by the British government – the colony
was not directly represented in the negotiations – had no commitment to British
sovereignty. Once they felt assured that adequate provisions were in place for preserving
Hong Kong’s autonomy and its economic model, they accepted a transfer of power.
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Chapter 1

Empire Unravelling: Restricting Textile Exports from Hong Kong, 1955-59

Introduction

This chapter will explore the origins of how protectionism became a consistent challenge for
Hong Kong’s manufacturing industries – particularly in textiles – during the second half of the
twentieth century. It will show that threats to limit Hong Kong’s export growth had a
significant impact on how narratives of the colony’s industrial development were
constructed, and on the nature of Hong Kong’s image projected abroad. Furthermore, a case
study on how Britain obtained restrictions on Hong Kong’s textile exports in the late 1950s
reveals much about their relations as metropole and colony. Although the nature of the
restrictions was an effort to keep the system of imperial preference intact, the agreement
reached nevertheless represented a departure from the principles of inter-imperial free
trade and a prioritisation of national economic concerns – and political party interests – over
relations with the empire and Commonwealth. That the British government intervened to
ensure the agreement was reached made the episode a source of resentment in Hong Kong
towards the metropole, and engendered reflection on how Hong Kong’s interests were best
served.

The first section will provide some background on industrialisation in Hong Kong, and the
context in which protectionist sentiment directed at Hong Kong’s textile industry emerged. It
will also discuss some of the factors that accounted for Hong Kong’s export-led growth, and
how certain elements would become diminished in future narratives. The second section
describes how Hong Kong, along with India and Pakistan, became subject to significant
scrutiny and accusations of market disruption in Britain during the 1950s. Whilst the
Conservative British government recognised that appeasing the textile lobby was a necessity
27

given upcoming election concerns, they were not prepared to impose unilateral quotas given
that imperial preference still maintained some political value. Instead, the British
government suggested that representatives from the Lancashire textile industry visit the
three locations, in order to persuade the industries there to voluntarily limit their flow of
exports. Although India agreed, their offer was contingent on Hong Kong reaching a similar
agreement. The Hong Kong industry, however, was divided across multiple associations, and
with many inimical to the idea of restrictions, the mission left empty-handed.

As a result of this failure, the British government was under increased pressure to impose
controls unilaterally. The third section will show how Hong Kong’s colonial status made the
idea of imposing trade barriers – or any form of involvement by the British government in
the issue – highly problematic, making the matter a source of internal disagreement in
London. Furthermore, the unwillingness of the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate any
restrictions was indicative of the nature of relations between the colonial and metropolitan
governments. The Hong Kong government saw themselves as responsible to Hong Kong first
and foremost, and wished to avoid being regarded as Britain’s agents in the colony.
Nevertheless, Hong Kong’s autonomy – albeit considerable – was finite. As section four
explains, the British government began to play a greater role as the negotiations threatened
to break down. With the selection of a Board of Trade representative to visit the colony a
clear signal of the British government’s intent, priorities in the colony turned to obtaining the
best possible outcome in any agreement. To do so, an assembled negotiating committee
placed emphasis on Hong Kong’s “special circumstances” that differentiated it from India
and Pakistan, and they argued, entailed leniency. In addition to colonial status, these
included external and internal pressures, which purportedly necessitated the colony’s ability
to export textile goods unfettered.
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Finally, following an intervention by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, the Hong Kong
industry had little choice but to sign up to quantitative restrictions. As the first significant
voluntary export restriction on Hong Kong’s textiles, it proved a crucial moment. As the final
section will show, it was a precedent that helped unleash a protectionist onslaught against
Hong Kong, and both reflected and contributed to a sense of metropolitan disengagement
with the colony.

1. The Industrial Colony

Although the development of industrial manufacturing in Hong Kong is usually associated
with the postwar period, a diverse manufacturing sector had in fact emerged in the colony
from at least the late nineteenth century, and became a substantial component of Hong
Kong’s economy by the 1930s.1 The establishment of the Chinese Manufacturer’s Union
(later the Chinese Manufacturers' Association) of Hong Kong in 1934 is a clear indication of
the presence of industry in Hong Kong by this point in time. During this same decade,
however, China and other important markets in the region greatly increased their import
duties in a response to global depression; Hong Kong’s imports and exports saw a 40 per
cent decrease in value from 1931 to 1934 as a consequence.2 The introduction of imperial
preference was therefore a timely development for the colony. In a reaction to the economic
downturn of the early 1930s, the British government had reintroduced a general tariff,
bringing to an end its long-held commitment to free trade. At the 1932 Imperial Economic
Conference at Ottawa in August 1932, however, Britain and Commonwealth members
negotiated for reduced trade barriers within the empire and Commonwealth bloc, resulting
in what was in effect duty-free access to the British market. In addition, Britain and the
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Commonwealth also agreed to place quantitative restrictions on Japan, in order to protect
their own industries. As a result of the decisions made in Ottawa, Hong Kong was given a
substantial opportunity to boost its exports to Britain and other empire markets.3

Following the Second World War Hong Kong’s industrial production – particularly in clothing
and textiles – underwent rapid expansion. This is often attributed to external pressures; in
these accounts, China’s economic transformation following the establishment of the PRC in
1949 – through new customs regulations and a reorientation in trade matters towards the
Soviet Bloc – signified the necessity for Hong Kong’s economy to transform from one based
on entrepôt trade, to one based on industrial manufacturing.4 Furthermore, the imposition
by the US from 1950 of an economic embargo on China following their involvement in the
Korean War further deteriorated Hong Kong’s trade in re-exports to the PRC. Britain had
been unwilling to infringe on the colony’s free trade capabilities, not just because of the
potential economic impact on the colony itself, but also out of fear that should Hong Kong
lose its usefulness to China, British rule would be at risk. The new 1952 Conservative
government however, placing a higher priority on Anglo-American relations, accepted
shipping controls on strategic goods into China until 1957.5

As will be shown, these extenuating circumstances – in addition to others, such as an influx
of mainland refugees and barriers to other forms of enterprise in the colony – were
frequently upheld as reasons why Hong Kong was dependent on the export of manufactures,
and why the colony should not be inflicted with trade restrictions. Hong Kong’s prewar
industrial presence is minimised in these instances, in order to emphasise the extent to
which industrialisation was spawned from circumstances beyond the colony’s control. As
3
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Stephen Chiu and Tai-Lok Lui have pointed out, even if growth in industrial manufacturing
was necessitated by external constraints, this is not a sufficient explanation for the level of
success achieved in this sector. In addition to such factors as the influx of skills and capital
from the mainland, the supply and quality of a cheap and productive labour force, and the
availability of infrastructure, they also emphasise importance changes in the global
economy, which ‘entailed a spacial relocation of manufacturing production in the world
economy’.6

Often obscured in contemporary accounts, especially those employed in arguments against
Hong Kong’s subjection to trade barriers, was the active role the colonial government played
in reviving a struggling industrial sector in the immediate postwar years. As Catherine Schenk
outlines, in a series of emergency measures during the latter half of the 1940s and into the
early 1950s, the colonial government monopolised the import and distribution of not only
foodstuffs, but also raw materials. In her words, ‘the protection from Chinese competition
afforded by political events, combined with support from the Hong Kong government, might
be interpreted as the “import-substitution” phase of Hong Kong’s industrialisation’.7 The
Hong Kong government also banned cotton imports from Japan, and even imported and
rationed raw cotton – ten thousand bales between 1947 and 1949 –in order to assist the
colony’s industries.8 As will be discussed in chapter two, the absence of this stage in official
accounts of Hong Kong’s industrial history was in part due to the colonial government’s
posture that a policy of laissez-faire had facilitated postwar growth. Furthermore, presenting
Hong Kong’s rapid growth of light manufactures as an almost spontaneous response to
internal and external pressures, rather than a long-standing feature of the colony’s economy
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and revived with the assistance of the government, was perceived as more likely to generate
a sympathetic view of the colony in the eyes of those demanding protection from Hong
Kong’s industries. The advantages to Hong Kong conferred by imperial preference, and the
quantitative restrictions faced by the colony’s competitors – in the late 1950s and 1960s,
Britain also imposed quotas on China, Taiwan, and countries in southern Europe – were also
downplayed in narratives that emphasised Hong Kong’s self-reliance and depicted Hong
Kong’s economic model as one grounded in necessity rather than opportunity.9

As a result of its postwar industrial take-off, Hong Kong’s exports of textiles and clothing to
Britain increased rapidly during the mid-1950s; the amount of grey cloth alone increased
from 18.1 million square yards (msy) in 1954, to 56msy in 1956.10 Protests by British
manufacturers against the influx of Hong Kong goods had already occurred during the 1930s.
A committee formed from the Board of Trade and other relevant government departments
to address the complaints was not willing to impose import duties on Hong Kong or other
producers, as to do so would have represented a breach of imperial preference. The
committee instead recommended that labour reform and increased regulation in the
exporting territories could be encouraged to dampen their competitive advantage, but also
suggested that voluntary negotiations between industries for the creation of a quota system
to divide up market share could be held. Subsequent discussions between British and Hong
Kong industries to apply quota restrictions on rubber footwear failed to reach completion by
the outbreak of the Second World War. Furthermore, the Colonial Office also achieved a
great deal of success countering the protectionist impulses of the Board of Trade.11
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By the mid-1950s, however, the economic value of imperial preference to Britain had
declined due to inflation, and the ability for rivals to compete over the rate of preference in
Commonwealth markets.12 Imperial preference came to be viewed as increasingly outdated
as a result, and contemporary perceptions of British declinism were conflated with
interpretations of the economic impact of empire.13 The question of restricting exports from
India, Pakistan and Hong Kong therefore took place within the context of wider debates
about the nature of Commonwealth trade and its importance to Britain. Given the dwindling
value of the Commonwealth as a marketplace and source of manufactured goods, the
Cotton Board – an officially-appointed Industrial Development Council representing the
interests of Britain’s domestic textile industry and reporting to the Board of Trade –
maintained that Imperial Preference ‘was formulated under conditions existing in the early
1930’s, conditions which today clearly no longer obtain’.14

Yet for British Prime Ministers, imperial preference still held political importance, and would
not be too readily abandoned. Whilst imperial preference was an attempt by Britain and the
Commonwealth to revive their stuttering economies in the wake of global depression, as
Andrew Thompson has argued, it also owed its creation to a legacy of campaigning by
imperial reformers in Britain, who viewed imperial preference as a method of building a ‘selfsustaining’ empire and a way to foster closer ties with the dominions.15 According to Ronald
Hyam, Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan ‘retained a sentimental attachment to
his old Commonwealth relationships and was aware of the Commonwealth as a useful
12
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psychological cushion for the end of empire’.16 It also had a Cold War dimension, as by
maintaining ties with ex-colonial dependencies, it was seen as a valuable buffer against the
spread of communism.17 The Prime Minister was not yet willing to sacrifice imperial
preference because of the consequences the move would have for relations with the
Commonwealth. Instead, he would sanction a quota system, which despite leaving imperial
preference in place, was regarded in Hong Kong as a sign of imperial withdrawal
nonetheless.

2. The First Textile Mission

By the mid-1950s, the troubles of the Lancashire textile industry and increasing numbers of
imports from Asian producers led to growing agitation for government intervention. British
Members of Parliament (MP) representing constituencies in Lancashire and the surrounding
region drew attention to the impact of dwindling demand by identifying mill closures and
unemployment, and questioned the government on its intended response.18 Whilst not all
demanded protection, Ernest Thornton, MP for Farnworth in Greater Manchester for
instance asked what measures would be enacted by the Board of Trade ‘to limit or control
the imports of cotton textile fabrics from India, Japan and Hong Kong’.19 Restrictions against
Japan were already in place, following the signing of a treaty in 1954 (and renewed in 1955),
that set a limit on grey cloth at a level ‘below the quantities imported for 1950 and 1951’.20
India and Hong Kong, as a Commonwealth member and colony respectively, were a different
proposition entirely. In May 1955, Conservative Prime Minister Anthony Eden made it clear
16
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that ‘Her Majesty's Government are not prepared, at this time and in existing circumstances,
to depart from their long-established arrangements for duty-free entry from the
Commonwealth’.21 Instead, Eden delivered a speech in the small Lancashire town of Padiham
on 14 July the following year, which drew reference to the competition facing Lancashire
from foreign imports, and suggested that the local cotton industry there should hold
discussions with their Indian counterparts. He revealed that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru had seemed open to the prospect of inter-industry talks at the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Conference a month prior.22

The potential objectives of such a discussion were considered in a subsequent meeting
featuring Board of Trade President Peter Thorneycroft, Cotton Board Chairman Raymond
Streat, and Cuthbert Clegg, the Chairman of Combined English Mills Ltd and ex-Chairman of
the Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Association. Thorneycroft expressed the belief that
the mission could go with the intent of securing a ceiling on Indian imports, but thought that
this would have to be above the current level and might involve reaching a similar
agreement regarding British exports to India.23 Whilst the Prime Minister spoke of only
potential discussions with India, the Colonial Office were fully aware that Hong Kong would
likely be another target for any trade mission to India, and informed the colonial government
that the British government ‘could not raise objection to such a visit if the manufacturers
decided on their own initiative to continue their journey from India to Hong Kong’.24

At the abovementioned meeting, the point was also raised that India – the largest supplier of
textile goods to the British market – would likely accept an agreement only if it was extended
to their competitors. Angus Campbell, a Manchester textile merchant attending the meeting
21
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argued that India ‘would not be prepared to make an arrangement which would have the
effect of benefitting Hong Kong; still less would they be willing to do this if they thought it
would benefit Pakistan’. Streat felt ‘that it would be quite reasonable for the Mission to say
to the Indians on this point that they had decided to start the talks with India but hoped to
extend the arrangement to Hong Kong and Pakistan’.25

With this is mind, on 9 January 1957, a nine-man delegation of prominent industry figures
led by Clegg left for India.26 The assumption that India would only accept restraints if similar
agreements were made with Hong Kong and Pakistan would prove to be correct, as on 21
January 1957 the Commonwealth Relations Office received a telegram from the mission
informing them that a tentative agreement had been reached. The deal was that Indian
cotton imports into Britain would be limited to 150msy annually. As expected, the telegram
stated that ‘this understanding is subject to arrangements on the same basis being
concluded in respect to Pakistan and Hong Kong’.27 As will be demonstrated, the mission
discovered in their trip to Hong Kong the same month that there were significant barriers to
forging a similar agreement in the colony. Whereas in India the mission dealt with only a
small number of officials and industry representatives, in Hong Kong they had to deal with a
myriad of different organisations and individuals representing various sectional interests.
One report claimed that the mission ‘found themselves confronted with a multiplicity of
organisations claiming to represent the industry and it took them almost a week to sort out
the ones that were significant from the rest’. These included the Hong Kong Weavers’
Association which ‘is only a month old’, and the Chinese Manufacturers’ Union which
‘represents all sorts of industrialists’. It was eventually decided that:
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Amid this mushroom growth the Hong Kong Spinners’ Association was the best
approach to a representative body and even here one of the leading office bearers
was an exporter of ginger who confessed that he knew nothing about textiles but was
put on the Board because of his prestige in the commercial life in the city!28

The disorganised and disparate nature of industrial representation in Hong Kong was largely
a result of multiple associations being formed along racial and linguistic divides. Although the
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC) established in 1861, was intended to be
representative of the colony’s entire business community, it was largely dominated by British
and European firms. Commenting on the need for the establishment of the Chinese General
Chamber of Commerce (CGCCHK) in 1900, a commemorative album describes how during
the early development of Hong Kong ‘the Chinese community, at that time, was without any
kind of leading organization to safeguard its rights and interests or to voice its views on
government proposals and policies, particularly those that concern it most’.29 In contrast to
the HKGCC and CGCCHK, the Chinese Manufacturers’ Union was the first association ‘to
represent industrial as opposed to service sector interests,’ and would be prominently
involved in the dispute over textile restrictions.30 The influx of Shanghai capital after 1949
created a third group with its own interests and allegiances. Unlike the small Cantonese firms
that dominated the CMA, Shanghai firms operated large spinning mills and so had very
different interests – they also shunned the CGCCHK, which openly supported the CCP.31 The
trade commissioner in Hong Kong therefore noted that ‘the difficulty is not made any less by
the existence of two groups within the industry who do not even speak the same language.
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These are the Shanghainese, who own the big modern spinning and weaving factories and
the Cantonese who own the rest of the industry’.32

This disunity unavoidably resulted in the negotiations succumbing to confusion,
disagreement, and even farce. According to one report, the Chinese Manufacturers’ Union
were ‘in a militant mood’ during a meeting with the mission, as they ‘were convinced in
advance that the Delegation was there to persuade them to make slashing reductions in
their output’ and ‘it took some time for the truth to sink in that the Delegation were
concerned rather to seal the output at its present level’.33 On another occasion, one member
of the Chinese Manufacturers’ Union – who was the same ginger merchant also in the
Spinners’ Association – was under the impression that the Union’s chairman, Haking Wong,
had reached a decision on their behalf. It was revealed that he believed this to be the case
after Hong Kong’s DC&I director had questioned him on the supposed deal, having himself
‘heard about it during luncheon at the Hong Kong Club as guests of the Hong Kong General
Chamber of Commerce’. Following this revelation, the trade commissioner reported that
‘Mr.Powell, the secretary of the mission, was walking about saying that he wanted to fight
the Director of Commerce and Industry’. During one meeting, the Hong Kong Spinners’
Association expressed agreement for a ceiling equal to the 1956 figure, yet ‘after lunch,
which they did not take together, certain elements of the Spinners Association had entirely
changed their attitude’. The trade commissioner commented that ‘A certain section of the
Spinners Association (in confidence, [led] by the redoubtable Charles Silas) are strongly in
favour of coming to an agreement with Lancashire’.34 In a later letter however, he pointed
out that Silas ‘is, in point of fact, in no position to lead at all, being merely the Secretary of
the Association’.35 The way the trip unfolded led him to suspect that ultimately the ‘Indian
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industrial negotiators had a shrewd idea of the difficulties that the mission would run into in
Hong Kong, when they made the acceptance of their tentative agreement dependent on the
acceptance of similar terms by Hong Kong and Pakistan’.36
The mission, unsurprisingly, left without securing any agreement. Although Clegg publicly
stated that the trip had been ‘worthwhile,’ the trade commissioner told the Board of Trade
that ‘almost all the press reports that we have read about the U.K. cotton industrialists’
mission to Hong Kong seem to be fairly near the mark, in that little or nothing was
achieved’.37 Cause for optimism was given by a letter from Hong Kong Spinners’ Association
chairman S.H. Yang, hinting that they might reconsider their position once the mission’s
discussion with Pakistan had concluded.38 Talks with Pakistan began on 6 May, with the
intention that the mission would subsequently return to Hong Kong. On 9 May, however, as
talks in Pakistan were ongoing, the mission received a response from the Hong Kong
Spinners’ Association regarding the prospect of additional talks. According to its ViceChairman H.K. Liu, that had ‘decided that they would be unable to agree to any arrangement
involving such restriction and consequently no useful purpose can be served by further
discussions’.39 In light of this move, representatives in Pakistan refused to accept any deal
unless it applied also to Hong Kong and India.40

3. Hong Kong resists

Given the failure of the Clegg Mission to secure voluntary agreements with India, Hong Kong
and Pakistan, the British government faced renewed pressure to take an active role in
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stemming the flow of cotton imports into Britain. Reports in July that imports were, for the
first time, exceeding Lancashire’s exports created further cause for urgency.41 The Chairman
of the Cotton and Rayon Merchants Association, for example, stated at their annual meeting
that the time had come for ‘a halt to this unlimited importation of duty free Empire textiles
for consumption in the home trade,’ and that this should be achieved ‘by imposing a total
quota at about the present level of trade within which India, Pakistan and Hong Kong could
compete for their share of the business’.42 The Board of Trade likewise believed that the
British government should become more involved, but rejected a unilateral imposition of
quantitative restrictions as a solution. Instead, they advocated a government announcement
in favour of inter-industry discussions with an agreed ceiling as the outcome, and that the
government should be prepared to police the agreement through import licensing.43

This strategy was not regarded as entirely unproblematic, given Hong Kong’s status as a
British colony. One member of the Tariff Division argued that any consent given by Hong
Kong for import policing ‘has to be given by H.M.G. in the U.K. on her behalf’ and likened it
to ‘forcing a girl into marriage below the age of consent’.44 Nevertheless, new Board of Trade
president David Eccles, having replaced Peter Thorneycroft in January 1957, affirmed in a
meeting of the cabinet’s Economic Policy Committee that it is ‘essential to the success of the
inter-industry discussions that the United Kingdom Government should be prepared to
license imports from Hong Kong,’ and that it would be ‘a freely agreed quota which satisfies
the requirements of the Hong Kong industry, as of the Indian and Pakistan industries,’ and
therefore making the difference in political status seemingly irrelevant.45
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The issue of whether to restrict imports from Hong Kong was however a divisive one for the
government departments concerned; Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd
consistently made a case against any measures by the British government to this effect. His
arguments included the precedent restrictions might set for other nations seeking to
discriminate against Hong Kong goods. In a meeting of the cabinet economic policy
committee in March, he reportedly expressed the view that he was not in a position to
‘advise the Government of Hong Kong to take any action which would adversely affect the
prosperity of the Colony in order to support a single industry in Lancashire’.46 In a cabinet
meeting on the discussion of import policing, he argued that the apparent threat to
Lancashire posed by textile imports ‘was not a problem which could be settled piecemeal’
and ‘the adoption of import licensing for cotton textiles from Hong Kong would lead to
claims by other United Kingdom industries for similar protection. He instead emphasised the
responsibility of Britain to safeguard Hong Kong’s interests, stating that they should ‘to the
contrary, feel obliged to come to the defence of Hong Kong under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade against arrangements made by other countries to restrict by means of
import licensing the import of Hong Kong goods’ and likewise ‘could scarcely agree to be a
party to a similar arrangement ourselves’.47 Referring to ongoing discussions for a European
Free Trade Area, he also suggested that ‘limitations on Hong Kong exports of cotton textiles
to the U.K. would be hard to explain at a time when we were proposing free entry into the
U.K. for manufactured goods from Europe’.48

Lennox-Boyd and the Colonial Office were perceived as a major obstacle to an agreement
with Hong Kong. One Board of Trade member commented that there was ‘a strong
impression in Lancashire that a solution to the problem of Asian imports by voluntary
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agreement between the industries concerned was being frustrated by the intransigence of
the Colonial Secretary’.49 In his personal diary, Streat reflected that ‘there were people at the
Colonial Office who would go to almost any lengths to defend what they regarded as a
principle of supreme importance. The Commonwealth Relations Office was a bit sticky but
that was nothing in comparison with the Colonial Office over Hong Kong’.50 Hong Kong fit
uneasily into the Commonwealth conception; as Mark Hampton has suggested, a ‘significant
racial dimension in both the Dominion and Commonwealth ideas meant that they would not
easily apply to Hong Kong, a small and predominantly Chinese colony that was never likely to
have a very large number of British settlers’.51 Clegg, referring to the principle of duty-free
entry of Colonial goods into the United Kingdom, had wondered for instance whether ‘Hong
Kong might well be regarded as a special case, since the industry there was essentially
Chinese’.52 The Commonwealth Relations Office, however, supported the Colonial
Secretary’s objections, and said that they saw ‘little difference in principles between a
Colony and an independent member of the Commonwealth,’ meaning both in their view
should continue to enjoy preferential trade relations.53

Despite the reservations of the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office, the
Prime Minister nonetheless believed that they should continue to press for a voluntary
restriction from Hong Kong and consult the colonial government on the issue.54 The position
of the Hong Kong authorities provides considerable insight into the priorities of the colonial
administration and the nature of their relations with the metropole. Prior to the Clegg
mission, the Hong Kong government expressed unwillingness to take a central role in
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negotiations as Nehru had done in India, pledging only to ensure a ‘cordial atmosphere’ for
any talks that took place, leaving the British Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong responsible
for organising the mission.55 Whilst the mission met with senior government officials
including Governor Alexander Grantham and Colonial Secretary Edgeworth Beresford David
it was in an informal capacity, and a report insisted ‘there was of course never any question
of the Hong Kong Government being in any way brought into the matter’.56

Whilst the British government had considerable legal authority to direct policy in Hong Kong,
in reality, the dynamics of power were more complex, and Hong Kong governors were not
averse to resisting directives from London. In Lennox-Boyd’s discussions with Alexander
Grantham at the Prime Minister’s suggestion, Grantham told him ‘I have not so far
intervened in the “inter-industry” negotiations because it was most undesirable that there
should be any suggestion of Government sponsorship of the idea of restriction’. Grantham
claimed that given the industry was divided it would not be possible to assemble a fully
representative group with which to reach an agreement. The governor even asserted that
‘there is no such thing as a Hong Kong “industry” as there is a U.K industry’ and ‘the
“industry” is not a close-knit and disciplined body of producers, accustomed to think in terms
of industrial co-operation and restrictive practices’. On the question of import licensing, he
stated ‘I should make it clear that even if the “industry” were to decide to ask H.M.G. to
impose legal controls I could not endorse its request nor could I undertake to impose
controls at this end’.57

Grantham’s position was not unusual given that the colonial government perceived its
primary responsibility to be responding to the needs of Hong Kong, as they perceived them,
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and regarded itself as accountable first and foremost to the colony – a theme that this thesis
will consistently address. For this reason, the Hong Kong government were resistant to any
suggestion that they existed to serve the interests of the British government in London. The
colonial secretary had responded to initial correspondence regarding the Clegg mission by
insisting that ‘any compulsive action by the Hong Kong Government to restrict exports in the
interest of competing manufacturers elsewhere would be politically quite unacceptable
here’.58 Robert Black, who would succeed Grantham as governor in January 1958, would in
an argument on the composition of any potential agreement, state that:

I am convinced that if I personally now make any statement, public or private, to the
effect that I consider an agreement including made-up goods to be in the best
interests of Hong Kong, I shall forfeit the confidence and the trust not only of the
industry but of unofficial opinion generally. I shall be regarded no longer as looking
after the interests of this Colony, but rather as an official representative of H.M.G.
here to promote the interests of the U.K.59

That Hong Kong governors were able to resist directives from the British government was
evidence of the well-documented level of autonomy enjoyed by the colonial government.60
Yet it must also be viewed in the context of the changing nature of colonialism during a
period of rapid decolonisation. In the postwar period, the Colonial Office believed a more
interventionist approach was necessary in light of the numerous challenges presented to
British imperial rule, particularly the rise of nationalist movements. The concept of
trusteeship was expanded to include a developmental and welfarist role for colonial
governments, with the eventual aim of self-government for colonial peoples and continued
links to ex-colonies through the Commonwealth.61 Hong Kong, not being on a path to
independence was not on this trajectory, but the new role prescribed to remaining colonial
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governments still had implications for the colony. One 1957 article in a Hong Kong
newspaper made this clear:

First of all, it is to be stressed that although we are a Colony, we are not colonial
pawns. The day when colonies were mere appendages, of value only inasmuch as they
served the Mother Country’s interest, has passed. Our political allegiance is to the
Crown, but our economy must serve, first and foremost, the interests of the citizens of
Hongkong.62

Wider shifts in the nature of British imperialism and the onset of decolonisation therefore
influenced perceptions on how colony-metropole relations should be conducted in the
remaining empire. Nevertheless, the capacity of the colonial administration to defend what
they regarded as Hong Kong’s interests in the face of metropolitan interference was limited.
The colony’s autonomy was not sacrosanct – the British government had the legal means to
impose its will – but was grounded in the practicalities of governance. Hong Kong was far
away, and the metropole lacked either the will or means to manage the colony from
London.63 There were times when the British government, however, was willing to intervene.
Reasons for interference could include dissatisfaction with social conditions in the colony, or
for the sake of diplomatic relations with China.64 Likewise, as shall be explored, the Prime
Minister would personally intervene to ensure that Hong Kong would agree to a system of
quotas, leading to perceptions in Hong Kong that the British government was prioritising
domestic political objectives over the economic welfare of the colony, and was therefore not
a reliable guardian of its interests.
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4. Special circumstances

In the summer of 1957, meanwhile, Grantham proposed a ‘peril point’ as an alternative to
quantitative restrictions. The suggestion was that, rather than to impose quantitative
restrictions on Hong Kong, a hypothetical level of exports from Hong Kong to Britain would
be chosen that if exceeded, would void any agreement Britain reached with India and
Pakistan. The logic of the suggestion was that India and Pakistan could agree on quotas with
Britain, safe in the knowledge that if Hong Kong were to benefit from the restrictions and
achieve a certain level of growth, they would soon be removed.65 Whilst the cabinet felt that
the option should be explored, it was regarded as necessary that a ceiling figure would be
decided in Hong Kong, as otherwise the figure would likely be so low as to quickly void any
agreement.66 Grantham was informed that Hong Kong should come up with a figure before
further talks between Lancashire’s representatives, India and Pakistan, and the colonial
secretary asked Grantham to assemble a suitably representative body.67 Reluctantly agreeing
to consult industry representatives, the governor proposed ‘to proceed on the basis of
exports over the three years 1958/60 of cotton textiles in the piece for internal consumption
in the United Kingdom’.68 By late October, he reported that cotton piece goods were likely to
rise to 70msy that year, and could be set a limit of 85msy over next three years. He told
Lennox-Boyd that the figure would be no higher because ‘the United Kingdom market is
comparatively unprofitable,’ and ‘manufacturers now producing grey cloth for the United
Kingdom market would prefer to sell finished goods to other markets and believe that
forthcoming expansion of local finishing industry will give them the opportunity’.69
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In a subsequent meeting of the Clegg mission and Cotton Board, Grantham’s suggested
figure was met with acceptance, and they planned to invite representatives from India and
Pakistan to Britain.70 Exports of India’s piece goods to Britain were at 133msy in 1956, and
were predicted to increase to 195msy in 1957. If a ceiling was based on the same rate of
increase suggested by Hong Kong, India would be given 234msy, thus allowing for a 20 per
cent increase. Pakistan would likewise have a limit of 11msy, having exported to Britain 8msy
in 1956, with an expected rise to 9msy in 1957. There was however the important matter of
the type of goods that any agreement would cover. For made-up goods such as clothing
items, Hong Kong exported 29msy compared to 8msy from India and none from Pakistan. If
included in the agreement, a ceiling would allow for 36msy from Hong Kong, and 11msy for
India, whilst Pakistan’s would be a joint ceiling of 11msy for both piece and made-ups.71
Their inclusion was controversial; Lennon-Boyd continued to oppose a deal including madeup goods for Hong Kong, insisting that ‘to put any kind of pressure on them to include
finished piece-goods and made-up goods in the agreement would rightly be regarded as a
breach of faith and a betrayal of our responsibilities to the Colony’.72 Grantham similarly
maintained that the agreement should only cover piece goods, whilst the Cotton Board –
now led by Lord Rochdale – was in favour of a deal including made-ups.73

More importantly, India and Pakistan were dissatisfied with Hong Kong’s proposal that the
colony should be only included in the form of a break point. On 28 November, the Trade
Commissioner in Bombay suggested that ‘the exclusion of Hong Kong would present serious
difficulties’ and ‘something more than a notional figure would be required – perhaps an
informal understanding with the Hong Kong mill-owners that they would, in fact, limit
exports to this figure’. Kasturbhai Lalbhai, a prominent Indian industrialist, thus declined to
70
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visit Britain for talks as he saw ‘little point in starting the negotiations with us first’ as it was
‘more appropriate for you to come to an understanding with Hong Kong and then meet us at
Bombay’. The situation had changed since the Clegg mission had reached a provisional
understanding with India, as a foreign exchange crisis was cited as necessitating a higher
ceiling than previously agreed. As for Pakistan, a misunderstanding over the terms of the
proposal with Hong Kong was proving an impediment to progress. Pakistan had believed that
a ‘notional ceiling’ was one that could be increased if necessary by the British government.
Ultimately, the prospect of a ‘peril point’ became a non-starter. Both parties interpreted that
it would allow Hong Kong to maximise its exports during a period of restraint for India and
Pakistan, and the agreement would therefore ultimately collapse.74

It was thus clear that if an agreement was to be reached with India and Pakistan, Hong Kong
would be required to accept a voluntary restriction on exports rather than settle on a
‘notional ceiling’ that would eventually lapse. Furthermore, in a meeting between Macmillan
and the Board of Trade in March 1958, they decided that any agreement would need to be
the product of fresh discussion with the Hong Kong industry, rather than being based solely
on export figures provided by the colonial government. In selecting a Board of Trade
representative to visit Hong Kong, it was apparent that the British government would be
taking a greater hand in the negotiations to increase their chance of success. Yet Hong
Kong’s new governor, Robert Black, proved no more willing to accommodate the mission
than his predecessor. In response to a request by the Colonial Office to support the talks, he
responded with disappointment and expressed displeasure at the expectation that the
colonial government should assist the objective of the mission, and instead requested that
their role should be one of establishing contact between the two parties.75 Having agreed to
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contact industry representatives, several days later he reported their ‘surprise and concern
that U.K. Government was now about to bring direct pressure to bear on behalf of the
Cotton Board’ as was perceived by the selection of Frank Lee, Permanent Secretary of the
Board of Trade. The governor also claimed that the representatives ‘urged that, if it came to
a question of quota, considerable weight should be given to H.K. dependent status as
compared with India and Pakistan’.76

On 25 March 1958, Lee met with industry figures in Hong Kong. He made a case for
restrictions by stressing that Hong Kong’s participation was required to reach agreement
with India and Pakistan, and that pressure on the British government was likely to increase in
the case of failure. Speaking publicly in a radio broadcast, Lee attempted to garner public
support for an agreement by highlighting the difficulties facing Lancashire, but also Britain’s
difficulty in managing its foreign and domestic objectives. He claimed Britain’s continued
determination to ‘play a great part in the world’ had to contend with sterling crises, balance
of payments difficulties, and the demands of building a welfare state.77 Yet Lee’s appeals to
the constraints facing Britain were countered with references to Hong Kong’s own problems
by government and business representatives. In a meeting at the DC&I, the department’s
head reportedly ‘explained that the reason why the Clegg Mission had failed 12 months ago
was that it had failed to show any recognition of the special circumstances of Hong Kong, as
compared to India and Pakistan’.78

The various groups Lee met with during his first meeting, including the HKGCC, the Spinners’
Association, and the CMA, produced a joint response to Lee’s initial appeal. The paper
claimed that Hong Kong was fundamentally different from India and Pakistan, as ‘Hong Kong,
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being a Crown Colony, and an entrepot with a tradition of free enterprise’ made it ‘seem
wholly unrealistic, to an impartial observer, to lump it together with independent
Commonwealth countries such as India and Pakistan which have fundamental differences in
political and economic structure’. The paper stated that ‘in view of its basic policy of free
trade dating back to its foundation Hong Kong is commercially defenceless and has no
retaliatory powers’.79 In their meeting, J.D. Clague of the HKGCC had also asked ‘whether the
duties places by India and Pakistan on Hong Kong exports did not count, as compared with
free entry of their products into Hong Kong[?]’.80 The negotiating committee also referred
the economic embargo and the ‘loss of the entrepot trade with China’ that had arisen as a
consequence, and outlined Hong Kong’s problem of refugees that they alleged was being
tackled without aside assistance:

The Colony is, at the present time, crowded to almost unbearable limits with a refugee
population at a rate which is generally recognised to be one for one with its normal
population and it is a matter of regret that the United Kingdom and, for that matter,
other countries have done little or nothing to assist us in housing and feeding this
enormous influx.81

As the result of an influx of mainland refugees, the colony’s total population increased from
1.6 million in 1946 to over 2.3 million by 1950, and by 1962, the textile and clothing industry
alone employed 42 per cent of the colony’s labour force.82 Given the importance of the
textile industry as an employer, the negotiating committee claimed that ‘any restriction
adversely affecting the textile industry would have repercussions through every sector of our
economy’ and would ‘contribute to progressive unemployment and unrest with all its
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political and social implications, it would uproot the basic policy of free enterprise which has
proved so beneficial generally to the whole economy of Hong Kong’.83

In regard to the intransigence of the Hong Kong industry, Lee ultimately described the
negotiations as being ‘tortuous business’. He identified a supposedly ‘almost passionate
conviction, among Europeans and Chinese alike, Government and non-Government’ that
‘Hong Kong is “different” and that it is intolerable that anyone should think of treating a
Hong Kong industry in the same way as an Indian industry’, finally adding that ‘You are
always coming up against that all-pervasive, irrational feeling, which must I think stem down
from the Government’.84 He nevertheless reported that ‘after some long talks with the
Governor and some of his officials I have got them definitely on our side, at least to the
extent that they now are sincerely anxious that the industry should say “yes”, even if it is
“yes, but”….’. Yet the difficulties Clegg experienced whilst attempting to consult the industry
remained. Lee reported that: The spinners – the more important and more intelligent section
– are in favour of agreeing to a voluntary limitation. The Cantonese weavers (as distinct from
the refugee weavers from Shanghai) are against any agreement’.85 Lee had also mistakenly
informed the industry that he was there only to discuss piece-goods and not made-ups,
despite Lancashire’s requests for their inclusion.86 He was finally only able to secure an
agreement for further discussions with Lancashire, though with a number of conditions,
including that any agreement would be on the basis of retained grey cloth, as opposed to
goods for re-export, and not ‘bleached and finished piece goods’.87
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5. Protectionism prevails

Hong Kong’s hand was eventually forced, as in May that year India agreed to a 140msy
ceiling covering grey cloth, finished piece goods and made-ups, whilst Pakistan agreed to a
30msy limit. Under instruction from the Prime Minister, Lennox-Boyd informed the Hong
Kong governor that ‘the hard fact is that there would certainly be very serious criticism here
alike of H.M.G. and of the Government and industry of Hong Kong if the hardly-won
agreement now reached with both the Indian and Pakistan industries were to founder at this
stage’, and on this basis he should now work towards fostering an agreement between the
industries of Lancashire and Hong Kong.88

In September therefore, Cotton Board representatives visited Hong Kong seeking an overall
restriction on both piece goods and made-ups. The mission proposed a ceiling for retained
grey cloth of 74msy, which allowed for a 10msy increase on the amount for 1957. The Hong
Kong side demanded substantially more - 120msy – and once again an intervention from
Macmillan was needed to break the deadlock, as he telegrammed the mission to inform
them a decision must be reached. The Prime Minister’s motives for imposing his authority
were revealed by the Colonial Secretary, who informed the Hong Kong governor that the
Prime Minister had election concerns.89 Mary Rose has argued that the capacity for Britain’s
cotton textile industry to exert pressure on the British government was in fact fairly minimal,
particularly in contrast to their US counterparts, due to the nature of the British political
system: ‘the combination of centralised political power in a parliamentary system, with the
vagaries of the timing of British elections, has meant that the impact of local, sectional
interests has often been relatively limited’. Leading up to the 1959 general election,
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however, there were ‘nine marginal Lancashire constituencies’ and so ‘the cotton interests
gained some concessions from the Conservative government’.90

Recognising that a voluntary agreement was becoming an imperative, especially as it was still
preferable to imposed restrictions, the Hong Kong industry accepted a three-year restriction
in December. The details for the “Lancashire agreement” were that ‘exports of cotton piecegoods to the United Kingdom for retention there shall not exceed a ceiling figure of 115
million square yards in each year for a period of three years only’ with ‘no limit on exports of
made-up cotton manufactures’. The ceiling however would be adjusted accordingly if madeup goods either exceeded or fell below a determined figure, which was to be no less than
46msy – although a number of clothing items were excluded.91 Given the relatively generous
terms reached, India and Pakistan were able to negotiate higher figures than previously
agreed; India would be allowed 175msy and Pakistan 38msy.92

A key objection Hong Kong’s industry representatives had to the restrictions was the
prospect of setting a precedent, and inviting similar action from either other industries in
Britain or from textile manufacturers in other countries. In September 1958, Black told
Lennox-Boyd that enquiries from the US, the Netherlands and Belgium were a ‘consequence
my fears of which I reported to you earlier’.93 By 1960, Hong Kong had experienced a myriad
of restrictions, including on rubber shoes to Germany and gloves to the Benelux countries,
whilst South Africa had imposed various anti-dumping duties on the colony.94 The text of the
Lancashire agreement stated that the British government had reassured Hong Kong’s

90

Mary B. Rose, “The Politics of Protection: An Institutional Approach to Government–Industry
Relations in the British and United States Cotton Industries, 1945–73,” Business History 39, no. 4
(1997): 142.
91
TNA, BT 175/150, text of agreement.
92
Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism, 62.
93
TNA, BT 258/379, Black to Lennox-Boyd, 25 September 1958.
94
Hong Kong Government Press, Hong Kong: Annual Report 1959, 75; Hong Kong Government
Press, Hong Kong: Report for the year 1960, 79.

53

industrialists that they ‘will not sponsor approaches which might be made by other
industries in the United Kingdom with a view to limitation of exports from Hong Kong to the
United Kingdom’, and that it will ‘oppose vigorously the unilateral imposition of restrictions
by other countries on imports of Hong Kong goods’.95 Nevertheless, there was nothing
preventing other nations from pursuing similar voluntary arrangements. US restrictions on
Japanese textiles during the 1950s had provided scope for Hong Kong to increase its share of
the US market. Hong Kong’s export of cotton products tripled in value terms from 1957 to
1958, and US became the most important market for Hong Kong’s garment exports by 1960
– receiving over half of all clothing exports.96 In February 1959, US Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for International Affairs Henry Kearns visited the colony to ‘urge the Hong Kong
garment manufacturers to limit their penetration into the United States market and to
diversify their products into other lines’.97

Kearns’ suggestions had little impact, and he returned for a second visit in November, this
time in expectation of reaching an agreement on a voluntary quota system, with a threat of
the possibility of restrictions being implemented unilaterally in the event of failure.98 A
significant division emerged among Hong Kong garment producers as a response. The
Garment Manufacturers’ Union (GMU) voted to reject a voluntary export restraint and
pledged the Hong Kong government to resist restrictions, whilst a splinter group made up of
eighteen large firms, which became the Hong Kong Garment Manufacturers’ (for the USA)
Association, was prepared to accept restrictions and made an offer to the US in this regard.
The membership of the splinter group provided the bulk of cotton clothing to the US –
between 80 to 85 per cent. From their perspective, if relatively generous quotas could be
agreed, they could avoid the risk of stricter restrictions being imposed, and be guaranteed a
95
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share of the US market. On 28 December they sent a memorandum to the US Consulate
General in Hong Kong via the colonial government, stating their willingness to accept a
ceiling on five categories of textile garments, providing room for growth, for three years.99

Smaller exporters, wishing to increase their share of the US market, had more to lose from
any quota system, and in December 1959 the GMU wrote to Colonial Secretary Claude
Bramall Burgess stating their opposition. They told him that in a meeting with Kearns on 19
November, they had requested detailed figures on Hong Kong’s share of textile imports
entering the US, and on the output of the US clothing industry. In light of his refusal, the
GMU stated that they ‘were driven to the conclusion that the alleged harm or damage could
not have been of any great consequence’. They claimed that although the splinter group
provided the majority of garments exported from Hong Kong to the US, as they only held a
minority share of the ‘aggregate exports of garments from Hong Kong to all parts of the
world,’ they ‘have no right to claim to represent the garment-making industry in this Colony
nor to commit the whole industry to any voluntary restrictions to the detriment of the
majority of such industry’.100 The GMU had the backing of the major industry groups in Hong
Kong; the CMA also wrote to the Burgess stating that their association ‘is unanimously
opposed to such restriction, and therefore it must request Government to make clear its
stand on the subject’.101
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The colonial government, however, expressed to the US their willingness to ‘recognize and
administer an undertaking… provided adequate safeguards are included to protect the
legitimate interests of Hong Kong’s garment industry and those of the Colony as a whole,’
and Acting DC&I Director D. C. Barty told the US Consulate General that ‘I trust that your
Government and the American garment industry will consider the offer made therein a
generous gesture in the light of Hong Kong’s economic and political problems’.102 Another
government spokesman had stated that their decision was based on recognition that, in light
of the rate of increase in exports to the US, ‘some measure of relief’ can be justified ‘for an
adjustment period’. Nevertheless, they referred to the special circumstances of Hong Kong,
and that ‘under such conditions Hong Kong must increasingly look for markets in the more
developed counties, and must hope that these countries will recognize that it is only by
giving as free access as possible to their markets that they can assist in the long term
solution of problems such as Hong Kong’s’.103 The US garment industry, whilst welcoming the
willingness of the GMU to accept voluntary restrictions, swiftly rejected the deal on offer, on
the basis that the ‘quantities shipped into the United States in 1959’ were so ‘seriously
disturbing,’ that they could not accept the rate to continue, let alone ‘any projected
increases therein’. They likewise sought to see any agreement expanded to include
additional categories.104

The discussions broke down in February; although the GMU submitted a revised proposal,
this was also rejected and stalemate ensued with the press and public opinion having
become ‘increasingly vociferous in their opposition to any limitations’.105 The colony
achieved only temporary respite however, as in 1961 the US made the first step towards the
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creation of a multilateral system of quota restrictions within the auspices of the GATT. On
one hand, this was due to the difficulties of reaching voluntary agreements outside of any
framework – as the US-Hong Kong discussions had highlighted – whilst on the other, it was a
consequence of a number of European powers imposing quota restrictions that violated the
GATT.106 The outcome was the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Cotton Textiles (STA), which lasted from October 1961 to September 1962, before being
replaced by the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles
(LTA), which with a series of renewals, lasted until 1973. Within these frameworks, Hong
Kong would negotiate a series of bilateral quota restrictions with importing countries, with
the exception of Britain. Hong Kong, as a dependent territory, was represented in the GATT
through Britain – the significance of which will be discussed in more detail in future chapters.
Instead, Britain and Hong Kong continued along the lines of the agreement reached in 1959.
In 1962, it was extended, followed by a similar arrangement for three years from 1963,
which was itself renewed several times until 1972, providing a continual source of
resentment towards the British government.

The outcome of the first negotiations had suggested that Hong Kong could no longer depend
on the metropole to defend its interests, and to the colonial administration, the debate over
textile restrictions was not a solitary indicator of this trend. In November 1959, Black asked
the British government for a grant of £2m ‘as a badly needed gesture to show Hong Kong
that H.M.G. is not losing interest in it and is not on the way out’. The governor had
emphasised that China was unlikely to attempt to regain Hong Kong by force, and that the
British were there for the long-haul. The British government had, however, by their own
admission supposedly ‘shaken confidence in the Colony in our intention to remain there’. In
addition to the textile dispute and refugee crisis, reductions in the colony’s garrison and
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disgruntlement at the amount charged for a naval dockyard and lands were cited as reasons.
107

As one editorial in the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) observed:

As has already been demonstrated, the interests of Hongkong are not necessarily
those of the United Kingdom, and it is no use pretending they are. It is to be sure
asking rather a lot of a given territory that it should at once be a Crown Colony and
decide for itself, and as if it could count on no more support from outside than any
independent state, where its best interests lie. Nevertheless, the attempt must be
made. Hongkong has become important enough if the world for its citizens to start
thinking of it as an entity whose interests are best served, like those of a nation, by
acknowledging that it has obligations as well as rights in the world.108

The methods by which Hong Kong’s commercial and industrial elite sought to safeguard
these interests is the focus of the following chapter.

Conclusion

This episode was not the moment the empire unravelled, but was an important signifier
nonetheless. As A.G. Hopkins has shown, in addition to a weakening of racial, constitutional
and cultural ties, ‘the material basis of the British overseas world also began to dissolve from
the late 1950s’ as apparent from the diminishing trade of the old dominions – Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and South Africa – with Britain.109 As Jim Tomlinson has explained,
imperial preference had not been conceptualised with the dependent empire in mind, as ‘for
British advocates of close ties with the dominions it was assumed that the economies were
complementary; Britain would supply the manufactured goods, the dominions the primary
products’.110 Hong Kong, by flooding the British market with manufactured goods, had
subverted the tacit agreement on which the imperial economy was based. Although imperial
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preference lingered on, its days were numbered. As chapter 3 will discuss in more detail, the
economic opportunities offered to Britain by closer integration with Europe were, by the
1960s, regarded as a superior alternative to maintenance of the imperial economy, even
though Britain first tried to reconcile the two ambitions.

The textile negotiations between Britain and Hong Kong had also coincided with Macmillan’s
audit of empire. Although the results of the cost-benefit analysis were ‘indeterminate’, the
Prime Minister had decided that colonial nationalism, a climate of international hostility to
imperialism exacerbated by the 1956 Suez Crisis, and declining public support for the empire
made a gradual departure imperative; following his election win in October 1959, ‘the
colonial empire unravelled instantly and without remission’.111 By 1963, Malaya and
Singapore were both independent, and Hong Kong was the single remaining colony in the
region. This thesis demonstrates that as decolonisation accelerated, Hong Kong became an
anachronism, and was at the mercy of Britain’s increasingly post-colonial concerns and
ambitions. That Hong Kong was grouped together with independent Commonwealth nations
India and Pakistan during the negotiations for export controls showed that continuing British
control could not shield Hong Kong from the consequences of Britain’s geopolitical and
economic repositioning, and eventual imperial dissolution.

The case study above was therefore the beginning of a decolonisation process, one the
following chapter will argue was reciprocal. Britain and Hong Kong were developing their
own divergent, and to some extent, conflicting interests. For Hong Kong, their interests were
the maximisation of export opportunities, which the raising of trade barriers by the
metropole and others threatened to impede. Hong Kong’s increasing dependency on a
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narrow range of goods, and the colonial government’s belief that free trade was essential to
the colony’s economic model, provided little room for manoeuvre or retaliation in response
to protectionist threats. Instead, appeals were made to Hong Kong’s extenuating
circumstances, which involved the creation of specific narratives about the underpinnings of
industrial development in the colony. Chapter 2 will show further how these narratives
demonstrate that Hong Kong’s political and economic principles were rooted in perceptions
of the colony’s unique historical experience, and external and internal constraints.

60

Chapter 2

Responding to Protectionism: Crafting Hong Kong’s Image Overseas, 1959-1966

Introduction

The previous chapter explored how Britain successfully obtained restrictions on Hong Kong’s
exports of textiles, and how this agreement was followed by similar demands from the US
and elsewhere. This chapter will explore how, in response to protectionism, business and
government in the colony collaborated in their attempts to deter future threats. Attempted
restrictions by Britain were interpreted as a consequence of widespread misinformation
regarding Hong Kong, and a general low opinion of the colony overseas. An assessment by
the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC) was that if Hong Kong’s special
circumstances – its lack of space or resources, the pressures on trade with China, the flood of
refugees into Hong Kong – that necessitated a reliance on industrial exports were more
widely publicised, the colony would be in a more favourable position in future negotiations
not only with Britain, but also other nations seeking their own restrictions. Likewise,
providing a more sympathetic image of the colony, to counter portrayals of exploited labour
and sweatshop conditions, was perceived as crucial to ensuring Hong Kong’s export growth.

This chapter will therefore demonstrate how the Hong Kong colonial government and
particular business associations in the colony made a coordinated effort to rectify Hong
Kong’s apparent public relations problems in Britain, the US, and Europe. The first section
will trace the institutional origins of the public relations campaign. After prolonged lobbying
by the HKGCC for public funds to continue the activities they had started independently in
1958, the government acquiesced. A Commercial Public Relations Coordinating Committee
(CPRCC) was established in 1962 to oversee the activities of relevant government
departments, as well as a joint committee of the HKGCC and the Federation of Hong Kong
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Industries (FHKI) who together received the government subvention. On the other hand, the
Chinese Manufacturers’ Association (CMA) and the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce
(CGCCHK) received no government funding and operated outside of the remit of the CPRCC.

The utilisation of public relations techniques by British colonial governments on their subject
populations was commonplace in the postwar period. Often implemented in conjunction
with the Colonial Office and other domestic government departments, objectives included:
projecting a more benevolent and welfarist portrayal of colonial rule in response to
nationalism and an anti-imperial geopolitical climate, using cultural diplomacy in order to
cultivate an appreciation of British values and the Commonwealth idea, and finally,
spreading anti-communist sentiment in the context of the Cold War.1 Yet colonial public
relations intended to target opinion in both the metropole and internationally should be
understood as part of Hong Kong’s exceptional level of autonomy obtained during this
period, and reflecting the attitude of a colonial government that placed Hong Kong’s
interests, as they interpreted them, before those of the metropole.2

The chapter will then explore the content of media produced mainly by the Hong Kong
government’s Information Services Department (GIS), but also by other government offices
and the HKGCC, and distributed through both existing publicity channels and those
developed under the auspices of the CPRCC. It will demonstrate how this material
constructed certain narratives in regard to Hong Kong’s economy and governance, and
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crafted an account of Hong Kong’s history that supported them. A paramount and consistent
theme is the fundamental importance of unimpeded trade for Hong Kong, which is justified
through appeals to Hong Kong’s unique combination of geographic, demographic, and
geopolitical constraints, as well as in references to Hong Kong’s particular virtues, such as its
harbour and its labour force. The premise that sudden postwar industrial development
rescued Hong Kong from otherwise economic ruin is another central construct. Finally, the
colonial government’s commitment to economic and social non-intervention – with a few
key exceptions such as refugee resettlement – is posited as having underpinned Hong Kong’s
success not only as a trading post, but also as a manufacturing base. It is not claimed that
these accounts are all necessarily false, but that they were nevertheless deliberately
constructed to fulfil specific goals.

The third section will provide a tentative assessment of the efficacy of the CPRCC and of the
public relations works implemented under its remit. The CPRCC’s attempts at coordination
were ultimately unsuccessful as it was unable to clearly define its function. Whilst intended
to be limited to the realm of public relations, it proved difficult to distinguish “commercial
public relations” from trade promotion, and there was considerable overlap in functions as a
result. Nevertheless, it was part of a process of Hong Kong’s developing commercial
autonomy – and an aspect that has been largely absent in the literature. It was also a stage
in Hong Kong’s institutional development, as the CPRCC was eventually succeeded by the
Trade Development Council (TDC) in 1966, through which the colonial authorities exercised
their continuing conviction that trade promotion and image management were an important
means of maximising Hong Kong’s trade and investment opportunities. The kinds of material
analysed in this chapter and the discourse therein continued to be produced and circulated
by the colonial government.
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1. Institutional Origins

The signing of the Lancashire Pact, and the scramble for voluntary restraints from other
importing countries that followed, had signalled to some in the colony that Hong Kong’s
economic model needed significant overhaul to cope with international protectionism. In
late 1962, CMA chairman Wong Tok Sau publicly called for ‘appropriate modification to
Hongkong’s status as a free port’ as at present the colony was ‘powerless to take measures
counteracting the unjustified discrimination against us’.3 Similarly, a Hong Kong-based
academic writing in FEER noted Britain’s recent application to join the EEC, and claimed that
a free trade policy provided ‘virtually no bargaining power in negotiating agreements with
foreign nations’ as with goods already entering duty free, trade partners had no incentive to
offer concessions. The author therefore, among other suggestions, advised that tariffs could
be raised and quotas imposed in order to provide the colony with leverage and to protect
new domestic industries in order to facilitate diversification.4 Demands for a new economic
approach from the government were not just limited to trade policy and as Leo Goodstadt
has illustrated, came from all sectors of the business community. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s, they joined forces to lobby for an industrial bank, called for efforts to reduce the
level of competition between manufacturers in the colony, and demanded other forms of
government intervention to increase Hong Kong’s competitiveness. Yet the colonial
government ‘publicly rejected these calls to intervene directly in the management of
industrial development’ and ‘limited their role to organizing support services that met the
specific needs of the manufacturing sector in terms of trade promotion, industrial sites and
buildings, professional and vocational training, and research programmes.’5 As this chapter
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demonstrates, in lieu of significant changes to commercial policy, the colonial government
were willing to sponsor public relations initiatives in response to pressure from business
elites, and out of recognition that protectionism was fueled by Hong Kong’s image problem.

Hong Kong was perceived as a target for protectionist policymaking not just for the amount
of textile products it exported to Britain, the US and Europe, but the conditions in which it
allegedly gained this advantage: through the long hours, low wages and poor working
conditions of its workers. That the colonial government made tentative steps towards labour
reform in this period was in part a response to the colony’s poor image in this regard.6
Commenting on this phenomenon, the HKGCC’s report for 1958 claimed that, as well as
criticism levelled by British politicians, ‘during the early part of the year Hong Kong was
subjected to a prolonged and virulent attack in certain sections of the United Kingdom
press,’ and that ‘the majority of the attacks were directed against the Colony’s textile
industry’. With the British government having apparently sided with the Lancashire industry
by supporting their demands for restrictions, the HKGCC had ultimately decided that it
should target British public opinion by ‘attempting to get the Colony a better press in the
United Kingdom’, which in addition to continuing trade promotion, required measures to
improve the general climate of opinion in Britain regarding Hong Kong.7

This form of promotional activity was a new departure for the HKGCC, apparently due to a
prior unwillingness to abandon their commitment to entrepôt trade, and a supposedly
‘parsimonious attitude’.8 The HKGCC contained mostly British and European merchant firms,
and only allowed Chinese representation on its general committee from 1961. Although
initially limiting itself to the concerns of the commercial sector in Hong Kong, the decline of
6
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the China trade and the increased importance of industrial exports during the 1950s –
combined with increased representation in the Chamber among these interests – resulted in
the Chamber placing a higher priority on maximising the opportunities of the colony’s
manufacturing industry and addressing barriers to its expansion. In response to the creation
of the Hong Kong Exporter’s Association in 1955, the Chamber’s annual report for that year
had stated that leaving ‘the promotion and protection of the Colony's export trade’ to an
organisation separate from the Chamber was preferable, as given the broad sectional
representation in the Chamber, ‘it would not be possible for the Staff to devote more than a
portion of its time, or the Chamber to devote more than a proportion of its Funds, to
furthering the interests of one particular section of the commercial community’.9 The
following year’s report however, noting further deterioration in Hong Kong’s balance of
trade with China, stated that ‘thanks to the Chamber Committee’s ‘improved financial
position’, they had ‘considered that the time had arrived when the Chamber could enter
more fully into activities of a trade promotion nature’. Although referring to ‘our natural
market, the mainland of China,’ HKGCC chairman J. A. Blackwood reportedly claimed that
‘the mercantile community was geared to meet both entrepot and local demands and would
like to remain in this position’.10

Whilst the Chamber had attended a few trade fairs in Britain in the late 1940s, and was
gradually represented in non-British exhibitions from 1954, their participation in overseas
trade fairs became more frequent from 1957.11 To some extent the Chamber was merely
catching up with activities carried out by business associations representing specifically
manufacturing interests. The CMA was the first association dedicated to representing the
Chinese-dominated industrial sector. It held an annual exhibition of Hong Kong’s industrial
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products every year in the colony, produced a catalogue of Hong Kong goods, and
participated in overseas trade fairs.12 There were likewise additional groups representing
more specific industrial interests, such as the Hong Kong Spinners Association.13 As this
section will show, the HKGCC’s position of influence within the colony’s political sphere
provided them with greater ability to shape the conduct of Hong Kong’s official and semiofficial public relations campaigns in its more important markets. Working conditions were
not the only source of the manufacturing industry’s poor reputation abroad, as Hong Kong
goods often had a poor reputation for quality and, according to David Clayton, ‘the
“infringement” of trademarks in Hong Kong was perceived by trademark proprietors to be a
“chronic problem’’’ during this period.14 A related complaint was that Hong Kong’s industry
made use of falsified certification to allow goods from Japan and China to be labelled as
originating from Hong Kong, in order to take advantage of imperial preference.15 The
Chamber’s ability to issue the certification required for the export of industrial goods
allowed them to work alongside the colonial government to enforce trademark standards
and ensure Certificates of Origin were correct.16

Nevertheless, public relations became for a short period a product of collaboration between
these associations; in 1958 the HKGCC, CMA and the Spinners’ Association regarded trade
promotion alone as insufficient to overcome the public relations problems that currently
affected Hong Kong, and formed a ‘Public Relations Committee’. Through contacts with the
China Association’s newly-formed Hong Kong committee – an organisation representing
12

David W. Clayton, “Industrialisation and institutional change in Hong Kong,” in Asia Pacific
Dynamism 1550-2000, eds. A.J.H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu (London: Routledge, 2000), 154-155;
Tzong-biau Lin and Victor Mok, Trade Barriers and the Promotion of Hong Kong Exports (Hong
Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1980), 67.
13
The Hong Kong Spinners Association was founded in 1948 as the Spinners Club, and is now known
as the Hong Kong Cotton Spinners Association.
14
David Clayton, “Trade-offs and Rip-offs: Imitation-led Industrialisation and the Evolution of
Trademark Law in Hong Kong,” Australian Economic History Review 51, no. 2 (2011): 181.
15
Hansard, Commons, vol. 526, cc510-1; Gloves (Imports from Hong Kong), 08 April 1954; Hansard,
Commons, vol. 585, c30W; Imports from Hong Kong (Blouses), 25 March 1958; Hansard, Commons,
vol. 584, c.27W; Imports from Hong Kong, 11 March 1958.
16
Clayton, “Trade-offs and Rip-offs,” 192-194.

67

business interests in the region and lobbying for their interests in Britain – they subsequently
hired public relations consultancy Campbell-Johnson & Co. for one year from August 1958.
According to their 1958 report, the move had ‘the dual object of, firstly, taking the heat out
of the dispute with Lancashire and, secondly, creating active goodwill for the Colony in the
minds of the general public and of those who influence public opinion such as newspaper
editors, Members of Parliament, etcetera’.17 Finally, the committee produced material for
circulation in Britain including the film “Hong Kong Today”, and several leaflets and ‘fact
sheets’ relating to Hong Kong’s trade and industry. They claimed that the consultants’ work
in Britain resulted in an ‘increasing number of informed and favourable articles on the
Colony being published in trade and technical papers as well as in the ordinary daily and
periodical newspapers’.18

Given that the HKGCC’s activity was first in response to the restrictions sought and achieved
by Britain, they initially limited their scope to British opinion. As shown however, the
agreement with Britain was followed by similar demands by the US from 1959, and later
from a number of European nations. Following a summary of the Chamber’s public relations
activities in Britain in 1959, their report that year claimed that to conduct a comparable
campaign in the US would however have been ‘prohibitively expensive’. In their annual
speech, HKGCC chairman J. D. Clague likewise remarked that ‘it would be unfair to ask a few
individual merchant and manufacturer firms to continue to bear the expense of public
relations activities which are manifestly on behalf of the whole Colony’.19 Finally, by 1961, as
the following chapter will explore, Britain’s potential membership of the European Common
Market was also perceived as ‘presenting an entirely new public relations problem for the
Colony’.20
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In response to the increased US protectionist threat in 1959, the Chamber wrote to Colonial
Secretary Claude Bramall Burgess requesting public funding to continue with their campaign
in Britain, to expand it to the US, and to recruit a public relations officer in Hong Kong. The
letter claimed that it is ‘essential that a favourable atmosphere be created and maintained in
the countries concerned’ and that:

This, in the Chamber’s opinion, is the function of the Government. It is best achieved
by ensuring that facts about Hong Kong and its problems are constantly presented to
the general public in these countries and, more important still, to those in authority
who make or influence decisions which may affect the Colony.

Asking for funding in the region of HK$500,000 to HK$700,000 a year, they claimed that ‘the
recent Lancashire textile negotiations and the current dispute with the U.S.A. over our
garment exports give warning of the struggles that lie ahead if the Colony is to defeat
attempts by competitive home-based industries in the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. to
restrict imports of Hong Kong goods’.21

During this time both trade promotion and general public relations work was already being
implemented by various departments in the Hong Kong colonial government. Hong Kong’s
Department of Commerce and Industry (DC&I) had been involved in trade promotion since
the establishment of its Trade Promotion Office in 1952, which became a separate Trade
Development Division the following year. Its activities included the publication of a trade
bulletin, and participation in trade fairs and the conduct of trade missions.22 Demands for
protectionism in Britain and the growing importance of finding export markets for
manufactured goods had also provided impetus for the expansion of these activities. The
colony’s Public Relations Office was renamed the Information Services Department – often
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producing material under the name Government Information Services – in 1959, and was
likewise expanded from 53 staff members to 95, with increased funding to match.23 Whilst
concerned with managing the colonial government’s public relations within Hong Kong, it
also circulated material abroad through British Information Services (BIS). Finally, the Hong
Kong Tourist Association had been established in 1957 and circulated its own publicity
material, paid for advertising, and held exhibitions and displays. That public relations work
was carried out independently by different departments gave rise to suggestions in the press
and by government officials that greater coordination would enhance its efficiency and
efficacy.24

The prospect of the colonial government sponsoring the activities of the Chamber was
controversial however. GIS director J. L. Murray, commenting on a report of the activities
carried out by Campbell-Johnson on behalf of the HKGCC, recommended that the colonial
government should ‘welcome the Chamber’s interest and past activity in publicising Hong
Kong’, but should regard it as ‘quite improper – and also downright dangerous – for
Government to subsidise the publicity campaigns of any sectional interest’. He viewed with
scepticism the claims made by the public relations firm regarding the efficacy of their
activities, and ultimately regarded the current work done by the GIS through BIS as
sufficient.25 Murray told the Colonial Secretary that although ‘British Information Services do
not initiate “publicity campaigns” as such on behalf of this or any other Colonial Government
– or even on behalf of H.M.G. itself – except under instruction’, they nevertheless ‘help to
induce a climate of opinion on behalf of the U.K. and the British Commonwealth’. He
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subsequently claimed that in the US, ‘Hong Kong is getting pretty good publicity and that the
average American – particularly on the West coast – is well-disposed in our favour’.26

The controversy to some extent concerned whether some forms of public relations activity
were suitable for the government to engage in, and which should be left to business groups.
One article in the South China Morning Post (SCMP) stated that ‘a fair division of effort
would be for Government to look after its own reputation when assailed, at home as well as
abroad, and for the Chamber to make use of its old friends in the China Association in trade
matters’. On the other hand, the article suggested that imperial networks could not be relied
upon for the US as they could for Britain, as ‘the Boston Tea Party was held so very long ago
that no Colonial links remain even as gratuitous as those we are conceded by our friends in
Broad Street’.27 Sik-nin Chau, chairman of the FHKI and a member of HKGCC, also stressed
the importance of not evoking American distaste towards British imperialism in public
relations work. According to Financial Secretary Arthur Clarke, he apparently:

Made very strongly the point that any representative we have in the States must be a
person from Hong Kong who knows Hong Kong and its problems, and preferably a
Chinese; certainly not anybody who has been associated with the old set-up in China
and certainly not anybody who might have the stigma of “old Chinese hand” or
“colonialism” attached to him.28
Chau had also appeared critical of the film produced by the Chamber, having apparently
criticised its lack of ‘any reference to the Chinese, who constitute 99% of the Colony’s
population’.29

On the question of which activities the colonial government would be prepared or not
prepared to employ themselves, the DC&I director regarded any form of lobbying through a
public relations consultancy as ‘a job for merchants and industrialists’ and ‘not a proper
26
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function of government’.30 The director’s opinion was shared by Governor Robert Black, who
expressed the view that government ‘could not join with the commercial interests in
propaganda, possibly amounting to “lobbying”, which might run counter to the policy of her
Majesty’s Government’, and likewise regarded it as potentially ‘embarrassing’ for the
colonial government to sponsor a single sectional interest of the colony’s economy.31

The governor, nevertheless, recognised a need for greater representation of the colony in
the US, stating that ‘it is necessary to make them realise our population and refugees
problems and their consequences, the need to provide employment, and the success that
the Chinese have made so far in Hong Kong in the face of difficulties of no mean order’. He
ultimately told the Colonial Office that ‘the situation is so serious for us that Hong Kong
business men and industrialists have a strong claim on public funds to help them’, yet only if
the government had oversight over its uses in order to prevent politically sensitive forms of
lobbying.32 In the face of sustained pressure from the Chamber for government funds, in
December 1961, after discussion with the Executive Council, Black decided that the
Chamber, in consultation with the FHKI and the Tourist Association could proceed with
formulating a detailed proposal for their activities and the associated costs.33

In their response, the three groups outlined their justification for Hong Kong having an
independent means of channeling publicity, separate from BIS:

We should state at the outset that while appreciating that it would be cheap to use
the U.K. Government Information Services overseas for the dissemination of
information and promotional materials about Hong Kong, we do not think that it
would be effective. U.K. Information Officers must be concerned primarily with the
30
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interests of the U.K. which do not always run parallel to those of Hong Kong; further,
their staff must of necessity give their first attention to the promotion of U.K. trade,
and cannot be expected to devote much effort to working for Hong Kong.34

As the previous chapter explored, the outcome of the negotiations with Britain had
suggested that Hong Kong could no longer depend on the metropole to defend its interests.
They subsequently believed that the colony needed to exercise self-reliance in the spheres of
public relations and trade promotion. The Hong Kong Civic Association had also written to
the Colonial Secretary in April 1961 to express their support for Hong Kong building up its
own network to this end.35

Despite serious reservations within the D&CI over the value for money of using public
relations firms, and the potential overlap of a coordinating committee with the Trade and
Industry Advisory Board (TIAB)36, one member commented that ‘commercial pressure for an
office of some kind in the U.S. has been so sustained that it may be politically necessary to
acquiesce even if we do not agree’.37 J. L. Murray, previously cool on the types of activities
for which the Chamber requested public funding, had revised his opinion following a trip to
Britain and Brussels in August 1962. Whilst believing that Hong Kong could continue to rely
on Britain’s publicity channels for the circulation of their material, following meetings with
the Chamber’s public relations consultants, he saw further scope for both direct contact and
co-ordination among ‘the various sources of Hong Kong publicity’, and was therefore in
favour of the Commercial Public Relations Coordinating Committee under consideration by
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the Executive Council.38 The proposal, accepted by the government in October, was to allow
for a subvention of government funds to the joint committee of the HKGCC and FHKI, on the
basis that as members of CPRCC chaired by the DC&I director, they would be under
government oversight. Funding for the joint committee came from an increase in stamp duty
on export declarations, to be matched “dollar for dollar” from general public funds, equating
to HK$1.6 million for an experimental period of two years due to the lack of detailed
proposals for the use of funds.39

The committee was therefore primarily a collaborationist venture between the colonial
government – represented through the DC&I, the GIS, and the Tourist Association – and their
traditional allies in the business community. FHKI – the other major business group
represented on the committee – was formed in 1960 on the premise of representing Hong
Kong’s entire industrial community, and providing them with the capability to liaise with the
colonial government. According to the Hong Kong government’s report of 1962, ‘unlike the
majority of local industrial associations, which cater mainly for individual trades, the
Federation cuts across racial and sectional interests and its membership includes all trades,
many nationalities, and enterprises of all sizes’.40 One of the FHKI’s later Chairmen, Sir S Y
Chung, recalled that ‘one of the main objectives of the FHKI was having a united voice to
negotiate with Britain and other importing countries, leading to the development of the
textile quota system’.41
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Nevertheless, the CMA in particular had reservations over the Federation’s membership
criteria. According to one report, the CMA had ‘supported the formation of a Federation of
Industries but recommended that it should be formed on the basis of associations as unit
members, rather than of individual firms and factories’ – a proposition that represented a
‘fundamental difference of approach’ to the Federation’s organisers. The report added that
‘the English language newspapers supported the Committee on this issue, but the Chinese
press was divided with a larger number taking the same view as the Chinese Manufacturers’
Association’. The CMA feared that the FHKI would be established at the expense of these
existing associations, who would lose both ‘prestige and usefulness as a consequence’.42
Relations between the CMA and the colonial government were fractured – by the 1950s, the
CMA had ‘begun to criticise the government’s social, industrial and commercial policies, a
process that had left its relationship with the government in tatters’.43 A former government
official has revealed that the FKHI was explicitly formulated in order to diminish the influence
of the CMA over government policymaking.44

Whilst the activities of the CMA or the Hong Kong Spinners’ Association were occasionally
discussed in CPRCC meetings, they lacked direct representation and did not receive
government financial support. Although on one occasion the DC&I reported that they were
‘providing some assistance’ with an international tour by the Hong Kong Spinners’
Association in the summer of 1963, they made it clear that ‘the tour was of course a private
one’.45 There were even expressions of wariness that activities by the CMA might conflict
with the objectives of the CPRCC. It was reported in one meeting that, during discussion of a
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potential promotional campaign in Europe, ‘some concern was expressed’ at press reports
that the CMA had planned to send their own mission to Europe. Sik-nin Chau had
subsequently agreed to meet the CMA President and ‘stress to him the importance that the
Committee attached to good trade relations with the Common Market, and the need to
ensure that all Hong Kong promotion in it be effective and properly co-ordinated in order
that the best interests of the whole Colony were served’. The suggestion was raised that if
the CMA decided to cancel their tour, they could instead be represented on the ‘official
mission’ that autumn.46 As well as coordinating Hong Kong’s official and governmentsupported overseas public relations operations, the CPRCC therefore also demonstrated a
desire to monopolise the colony’s interactions in this field.

Meeting twenty-nine times from October 1962 to June 1965, the CPRCC’s official remit was
to co-ordinate both ‘broad priorities in the use of public and private funds for commercial
public relations’; to make ‘recommendations as to the amount, source and distribution of
public funds for this purpose’ and to ‘examine and evaluate reports on the use of funds in
relations to specific projects’.47 Commercial public relations was defined by the DC&I’s
assistant director as ‘inducing a favourable climate of opinion towards, and removing
misconceptions concerning, Hong Kong industry and its products through usual publicity
methods such as the written or spoken word and personal contact’.48

The CPRCC’s first meeting on 29 October 1962 was primarily occupied with deliberating the
duties of the committee and its powers, as the members felt some confusion over its remit.
Whilst a statement from the financial secretary had ‘implied that the Committee had a
46
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power of veto over the jointly agreed proposals’ of the HKGCC and FHKI, members were
under the impression that ‘the role of the Committee was solely to advise, and to coordinate the application of available resources’ for the member organisations.49 By the
second meeting, it was decided that the committee would not have a veto, but that the
‘Government had a general responsibility to ascertain how public funds were disbursed’.’50
As the final section will illustrate, the precise function of the committee remained a
continual source of confusion and undermined its effectiveness.

In regard to the delegation of duties, in their first meeting, the committee agreed that ‘the
despatch of trade missions and participation in overseas trade fairs would remain the
responsibility of the Commerce and Industry Department’.51 Much of the circulated publicity
material meanwhile continued to be handled by the GIS. According to a 1964 report, ‘since
January 1, 1959, the Department has produced a total of 44 booklets and leaflets’, of which
seventeen ‘can be said to be directly connected with industry and commerce’ and ten ‘can
be said to have an indirect bearing on industry and commerce by helping to establish Hong
Kong’s “image” and by answering the kind of questions likely to be asked by those interested
in doing business in Hong Kong or with Hong Kong’. In addition to circulating their own
material, the department had an Overseas Feature Service which provided articles and
supplements to newspapers and broadcasters abroad. Their material varied from
introductions to Hong Kong designed for a general audience, to more technical information
targeted at businesses or individuals considering investment or relocation to Hong Kong.
Finally, there were publications which provided information about the cost of living and the
manner of expat life in the colony. The CPRCC recognised however that Hong Kong’s image
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overseas was not the department’s only priority, as their main concerns were domestic in
nature. In one meeting in 1965 it was reported that ‘the bank crisis, the Police swoop on
massive opium stock, Chinese New Year festivities and related campaigns such as fire
prevention had kept the department’s press division very fully occupied’.52

The subvention to the joint committee of the HKGCC and FHKI was meanwhile spent mostly
on consultants’ fees and the salaries of representatives in Europe and the US. They retained
public relations firm Campbell-Johnson and hired their European associates Eric Cypres &
Co., with the intention that the firms would circulate publicity material, arrange visits by
representatives from Hong Kong to Europe and vice versa, and regularly produce “opinion
reports”.53 In addition to hiring their own public relations officer in Hong Kong, in 1964 the
joint committee hired Hugh Barton – former chairman and managing director of Jardine,
Matheson & Co. – as their representative in Europe and K. T. Woo, a former newsman, as his
equivalent in the US. Whilst Barton, stationed in Brussels, was often concerned with
furthering Hong Kong’s interests in regard to Britain’s negotiations with the European
Economic Community, Woo reported that his time in New York as being spent primarily on
handling trade enquiries, liaising with business people, providing briefs and arranging visits
for those who planned to visit Hong Kong and the circulation of information.54 Other funds
were spent on funding the visits of politicians and other VIPs to Hong Kong, as well as printed
material for circulation.55
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2. A Certain Image of Hong Kong

The publication and circulation of film and literature overseas had a number of objectives: to
reduce demand for export restrictions on Hong Kong, to emphasise Hong Kong’s suitability
as a site for business and investment, and to provide a more generally favourable image of
the colony. Regarding the first, the pamphlet Hong Kong and its Textile Industry, produced by
the HKGCC whilst the negotiations with Lancashire were ongoing and circulated by the SCMP
in Britain, put forth many of the arguments made by the Hong Kong negotiating committee
against textile restrictions. One of the most frequently expressed arguments against export
restraints on Hong Kong was that the colony’s particular economic development – through
export-based light industry – was the only one suitable considering a number of specific
constraints. Chief among these was geography – the lack of space for other forms of
economic activity, such as agriculture or heavy industry, and the absence of a large domestic
market; the pamphlet claimed that ‘Hong Kong has no hinterland and no large home market’
and ‘it must export to live’.56 The leaflet Opportunity Hong Kong, also produced by the
Chamber and designed to advertise Hong Kong as an attractive place to do business, further
emphasised these pressures, stating that: ‘Hong Kong is a small British colony, consisting of
some 400 square miles of rock on the edge of the Chinese mainland. It has no raw materials,
no natural sources of power, and little land suitable for construction’. Because of this ‘Hong
Kong concentrates on light industry, particularly the manufacture of consumer goods’.57
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Whilst Hong Kong had significant geographical limitations in some areas, the same pamphlet
details how one aspect of Hong Kong’s geography was key to its economic success: a
‘magnificent natural harbour’ that had first indicated the site’s potential use to the British as
a port.58 The information sheet Facts about Hong Kong produced by GIS also claimed that
‘between Hong Kong Island and the mainland lies Victoria Harbour, which ranks with San
Francisco and Rio de Janeiro as one of the three most perfect natural harbours in the
world’.59 The harbour’s enduring economic value to Hong Kong is described the 1961
government film This is Hong Kong, which opens with image of the harbour, first in the
nineteenth century and then in the present-day 1960s, and details its continuing importance
to Hong Kong’s trade. Yet, as the voiceover explains, whilst Hong Kong’s trade was ‘once
buying from the west to sell to china’ it was now ‘buying raw materials from all over the
world to make up into 100 products, to sell to a hundred countries’.60 The film therefore
details a departure from Hong Kong’s original economic lifeblood – entrepôt trade – towards
a dependence on export manufactures.

This shift is commonly presented as necessitated to a large extent by the postwar policies of
overseas governments. The GIS booklet Hong Kong an Introduction…. asserts that:

The outbreak of the Pacific War and the surrender of Hong Kong on Christmas Day
1941 heralded a series of external events over which the colony has had no control
but which have made it increasingly difficult to live by the old philosophy of free trade.
Since the Japanese surrender in 1945, the rapid replacement of colonial empires in
South East Asia by new nationalisms and new frontiers has meant for the Chinese
people of Hong Kong unaccustomed obstacles to the free movement of themselves, of
their money and of their goods. The economic policies of the new regime [in China],
58
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together with the United nations embargo on trade with China at the time of the
Korean War, similarly brought new barriers to Hong Kong’s commerce.61

A reliance on industry is therefore described as being a necessity given the circumstances
Hong Kong faced, and industrialisation is posited as saving Hong Kong from economic
collapse. According to the same leaflet: ‘The stark choice facing Hong Kong was: produce or
perish’.62 The turnaround is presented as a miraculous survival against all odds in the
government film Made in Hong Kong, which provides a glorifying account of Hong Kong’s
postwar industrial growth. The voiceover, speaking over images of a street in which
manufacturing takes place, describes the scene as ‘part of a miracle – the 20th century
miracle that is Hong Kong’. It continues to suggest that ‘perhaps it should be called an instant
miracle’ as ‘only fifteen years ago it seemed that Hong Kong – its trade dying as immigrants
streamed in from China – was doomed. Today, Hong Kong has the fastest growing economy
in Asia’.63

Hong Kong an Introduction…. outlines why the continuation and expansion of this industry is
necessary for Hong Kong’s economic and social stability, and argues that protectionist
measures against Hong Kong undermine this progress. This is portrayed as not only
detrimental to Hong Kong, but also a ‘tragedy’ for Western values, civilisation, and ‘the free
world,’ as Hong Kong is a symbol for ‘less advanced’ countries’ in achieving growth ‘by trade
61
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and not by aid’.64 The use of Cold War rhetoric for the purposes of defending Hong Kong’s
interests was not a new phenomenon; British politicians, unsure about the intentions of the
new communist regime in China from 1949, had sought to secure a US military backing of
Hong Kong by stressing its role as an important Western outpost in Southeast Asia, both for
its strategic value in waging the Cold War in the region, and in its symbolic importance as a
bastion of democratic principles and free enterprise – a “Berlin in the East”.65 Although the
“Berlin of the East” trope was no longer utilised for purposes of ensuring a defence
commitment by the 1960s, similar rhetoric was utilised in an attempt to discourage
measures that could potentially undermine the prosperity of Hong Kong, which is still
posited as important Cold War outpost. Likewise, as the previous chapter showed,
references to the impact of the economic embargoes placed on China were made with the
intention that Hong Kong should gain sympathy for the consequences it faced as a result of
Cold War policy, and that this should be considered by those who sought to stifle the
colony’s industrial growth.

The enactment of protectionist policies against Hong Kong are thus presented as punishing
Hong Kong for its successful industrialisation and a government that has, in the face of
external pressures, abided by its fundamental principles. Hong Kong: An Introduction….
traces these principles back to Hong Kong’s Victorian roots. Under the heading ‘A Century of
History’, the pamphlet states that:

Like several other British colonies, Hong Kong was originally a creation of the early
Victorian free trade movement, subsequently shaped in great part by the spirit of
adventure and the missionary zeal that carried Britons overseas during the rest of the
nineteenth century and after. Hong Kong’s character of a free port – a port where lawabiding men are free to come and go at will, carrying and exchanging goods without
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tariff or quota – has remained unchanged since its occupation by Britain in 1841, down
to the present day, and has secured its growth and greatness as a commercial city.66

Hong Kong and its Textile Industry, in reference to the colony’s economic accomplishments,
refers to Hong Kong’s status as ‘a British Colony of great value’ and ‘a monument to British
pioneering spirit, enterprise, skill and administration’.67 The film This is Hong Kong, likewise
advancing the narrative that Hong Kong ‘faced ruin’ after the Second World War if not for
the sprouting of industry, asserts that the colony was saved thanks to a ‘farseeing
government’ and a ‘resourceful’ people, which turned it ‘almost overnight from a trading
port to a manufacturing city’.68 The most important accomplishment of colonial rule put
forth is that it allowed the Chinese population’s entrepreneurial and industrial spirit to
flourish unimpeded. The Chinese population of Hong Kong are often depicted as having
innate characteristics and attributes that make them well-suited to the type of industrial
activity dominating Hong Kong’s economy. According to Joint Venture Hong Kong:

Without doubt, the most important factor in Hong Kong’s successful emergence as a
manufacturing territory has been the supply of labour – labour which is not only
industrious but with proper training can also be used in any type of production. For
centuries the Chinese have been world-famous for crafts and skills calling for great
dexterity; now it has been shown that [this] same dexterity has a valuable place on
modern production lines.69

References to the supposed character of the Chinese worker were also used to justify the
approach to labour laws in the colony, and to counter accusations of exploitation. Hong
Kong and its Textile Industry asserts that:
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The Chinese worker is industrious and thrifty’ and that ‘he is ever anxious to earn
more, and prefers to work overtime rather than have more time off for recreation. He
would object to limitation that might deprive him of opportunity to add to his pay.70

Although later publications, particularly those produced by the government, are less blatant
in their justification for lower wages – and to the contrary provide evidence of increasing
wages to refute charges of exploitation – references to Hong Kong’s relatively low living costs
are still put forth as a defence for lower wages than in Europe. Likewise, Hong Kong’s low
wages are still noted as a benefit for potential employers and part of the colony’s capacity to
provide a competitive edge for foreign investors.71

A specific example of the merits of Hong Kong’s colonial rule, therefore, is the longstanding
commitment to allowing the best of “East and West” to come together through minimal
interference. According to Ian Aitken and Michael Ingham, the opening of This is Hong Kong
and its parallel imagery of the nineteenth century harbour and its contemporary equivalent
imply ‘continuity of past and present, and the co-existence of old and new, traditional and
modern’. They state that ‘the themes of continuity and co-existence are central to the film’s
ideological project, and are often deployed in order to justify a colonial presence which has
been able to foster a stability not achieved at the expense of long-standing social mores and
customs’.72 This trope was not limited to government publications, as a 1958 editorial in the
business journal The Hong Kong Exporter and Far Eastern Importer claimed for example that
‘the unique centrality of Hong Kong relative to other countries in the Far East has made it a
convenient meeting place for both Western and European cultures’. Hong Kong’s economic
success was due to the fact that ‘the centuries old practices of China are able to integrate
with the modern scientific techniques coming from Europe and America’.73 Hong Kong as a
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place where “East meets West” also featured heavily in material produced by the Tourist
Association.74

One of the most important challenges facing Hong Kong that the public relations campaign
wished to spread awareness of was demographic – the influx of refugees from mainland
China after 1949. The 1965 government film A Race Against People on one hand credits
Hong Kong’s expanding population and influx of mainland expertise and capital with
precipitating the colony’s industrial advancement, whilst on the other, describing them as
‘Hong Kong’s problem’ given the pressures they placed on the colony’s resources. The film
contrasts images of squalid hillside shacks and descriptions of the fire risk they presented
with newly-built tenements to applaud the government’s resettlement programme. That this
was done without outside assistance is emphasised: ‘the money for these homes, the
schools, clinics like this and everything which has built this community has come from Hong
Kong itself. Hong Kong’s prosperity is the product of its own enterprise’.75

Resettlement and the construction of housing was therefore one area in which the colonial
government was keen to publicise its intervention. The 1962 leaflet Building Homes for Hong
Kong’s Millions credits the Hong Kong government with acting decisively and effectively
following the 1953 Shek Kip Mei fire, which left 60,000 squatters homeless. It states that:
‘Within hours the Hong Kong Government announced it would resettle squatters – it would
provide them with new homes. It would, in fact, become landlord on a scale never
attempted before in similar circumstances’. It compares the conditions in the squatter
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settlements – the ‘primitive, pitiful world of the shanty dweller at first had no running water,
no sanitation, no electricity’ – with images of modern apartment blocks and the superior
quality of life they offered. Opening figures include the assertion that ‘by the end of June
1962 the government had supplied new homes for 470,000 people, 390,000 of which in
resettlement estates’ to the cost of HK$180 million. As with A Race Against People, the
leaflet emphasises Hong Kong’s self-sufficiency in the initiative, stating that it was financed,
with the exception of a few of the cottages, entirely from Hong Kong’s own resources’.76 The
resettlement programmes, as well as the colonial government’s building of public housing
more generally, have been well-studied by historians. Despite being publicised as a selfconcerted effort by a responsive and proactive colonial government, the resettlement, it has
been suggested, was primarily a response to Colonial Office pressure to take action
regarding the squatters.77 Likewise, many of the resettlement estates were reportedly of
poor size and quality, with social services primarily left to charities and other private
organisations.78

With regard to commercial public relations objectives, GIS also publicised government
initiatives that enhanced Hong Kong’s suitability as a site for industry, including land
reclamation programmes, the expansion of its airport, the Shek Pik water scheme, and the
building of industrial towns.79 Despite a few enlightened interventions by the colonial
authorities, however, it is Hong Kong’s commitment to laissez-faire principles such as low
taxation and minimal bureaucracy and exchange controls that are advanced as the colony’s
fundamental ethos. According to Hong Kong for the Businessman, ‘Free enterprise, economic
76
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stability, industrial development and a hard-working, thriving community are features which
always attract capital investment’ and ‘During the past 10 years an increasing number of
overseas investors have come to appreciate these characteristics of Hong Kong’s economy
and have demonstrated their confidence in the Colony by opening branch offices or building
factories here’.80 Joint Venture Hong Kong describes Hong Kong as a ‘free economy which
suffers little government interference’, whilst in Opportunity Hong Kong the colony is
described as ‘unashamedly capitalist’ and ‘the true home of the energetic entrepreneur’.81
Nevertheless, the colonial government is presented as providing a stable and secure site for
investment through the maintenance of law and order, the enforcement of unavoidable
regulation – such as the the maintenance of a certificate of origin system – and the provision
of essential infrastructure.

Publications which sought to advertise Hong Kong to foreign investors consequently
presented the colonial government’s pro-business stance and the quality of Hong Kong’s
labour supply as a fruitful combination. Opportunity Hong Kong credits ‘the energy of its
people, low rates of taxation, an affluence of capital, an enlightened industrial policy on the
part of the Government and a completely free market’ as underpinning Hong Kong’s
economic success. The colonial government’s reluctance to dedicate resources to assisting
the manufacturing industry was justified through its expressed commitment to nonintervention, whilst correspondingly claiming that this very non-intervention had
underpinned Hong Kong’s manufacturing success in the first place. The pamphlet Hong Kong
Manufacturing Industry in the Sixties, which traces the expansion of Hong Kong’s industrial
exports during the decade, illustrates this position in a review of government economic
policy:
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What might be described as its negative aspects, that is to say, its reluctance to accord
special favour to manufacturing industries is bound up with a liberal commercial
policy, which involves a minimum of official intervention or vexatious restrictions, and
neither protection nor subsidisation of manufactures. The Government believes that
dynamic and, above all, coherent industrial development in Hong Kong’s
circumstances is dependent on maintaining these elements of commercial policy.

The same leaflet also expresses the colonial government’s preference to leave the provision
of infrastructure necessary for industry to the private sector, such as the colony’s ‘power
supply, telecommunications, public transport, harbour and warehouse facilities’.82 Given that
the demands for textile restrictions were justified on the basis of labour conditions in Hong
Kong, the publicity material sought to present a more positive representation of life in the
colony’s factories. Hong Kong An Introduction…. insists that the large textile mills ‘provide
dormitories, cheap meals, clinics, recreation facilities and an eight-hour day’ and therefore
the ‘ability to produce cheap textiles results more from modern methods than lower labour
costs’.83 Hong Kong Manufacturing Industry in the Sixties, whilst identifying some examples
of recent government labour regulations – such as the passage of an Employment Ordinance
in 1968 and the introduction of an eight-hour working day and 48-hour working week for
women – again defers responsibility to the private sector. It claims that ‘the most important
development in regard to labour policy in the sixties has been better labour conditions
consequent on employers themselves being able to meet such conditions with more
assurances than in the past’.84 Both historians and contemporaries have shown that the
colony’s advances in labour regulations remained hampered by employer opposition and
conditions were slow to improve; one 1975 leaflet even sought to expose the continued use
of child labour in the colony.85
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3. The Future of Commercial Public Relations

According to the CPRCC’s own report in late 1964, the original conception of the committee
was flawed, and it therefore struggled to achieve its stated aims. The report claimed that the
committee had from the beginning become ‘aware that “commercial public relations” is at
best a vague, and at worse a controversial, term’ and that their meetings were subsequently
‘beset by difficulties of definition’. As a result, they ‘found it difficult to effect coordination in
the fullest effect, let alone ex post facto evaluation’.86 Their struggle to distinguish
commercial public relations from trade promotion resulted in a duplication of effort; the
committee, in one meeting, raised the point that ‘they seldom confined their discussions to
public relations matters, and habitually considered general questions of trade promotion’,
and thus ‘frequently dealt with matters that fell within the sphere of interest and
responsibility of the Trade and Industry Advisory Board’.87 The committee found itself
primarily engaged in an ‘exchange of information’ as a result, in the form of reports given by
the composite member associations of their separate activities. The difficulties in
coordination were regarded as also stemming from the fact that the different government
departments had their own specific and unique objectives, which the committee did not
believe they had the opportunity for overrule. This was especially the case for the DC&I,
given that their initiatives were developed in collaboration with the TIAB, whilst also – along
with GIS and the Tourist Association – responding to the directives of the Colonial Secretariat
and/or the Executive Council.88 Likewise, as the use of funds by the joint committee of the
HKGCC and FHKI did not need formal approval from the CPRCC to be implemented,
Relations and Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975); Robin Porter, Child
Labour in Hong Kong (Nottingham: The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for the Hong Kong
Research Project and The Spokesman, 1975).
86
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government oversight was limited and the use of funds was perceived as incoherent and
wasteful.89

In its final report, the CPRCC therefore recommended that to resolve its coordination
problems, a ‘quasi-independent body, perhaps to be known as the Hong Kong Export
Promotion Council’ should be established and given control over all resources allocated for
trade promotion.90 The possible creation of such a body had been raised some years before
by the DC&I, with one report drawing attention to Japan’s much higher spending on trade
promotion through the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), and noting the
insufficient government oversight exercised through the CPRCC.91 A working committee was
subsequently established in January 1965 with the objective of reviewing the current
conduct of trade promotion in Hong Kong, including that of the CPRCC, and the aim of
deciding whether a new organisation should be established. The working group identified
the weaknesses mentioned and, crucially, pointed to the absence of the CMA on the
committee and its lack of access to government funds as one of several ‘weaknesses in the
present arrangements’.92

They recommended the formation of a ‘Hong Kong Export Development Council’ to succeed
the CPRCC, in addition to adopting the TIAB’s responsibility in advising the government on
trade promotion matters. Whilst mainly concerned with trade promotion, it would still
contribute to ‘the creation of a favourable image of Hong Kong’ through the dissemination of
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information and in providing advice to the Information Services Department on particular
issues, whilst avoiding involvement in ‘Hong Kong’s trade relations either commercial or
political’.93 In early 1966, the working committee’s suggestions were mostly approved,
although the resulting body was named the Trade Development Council (TDC). It took
control of both government offices overseas and those of the joint committee, and was
provided with a budget of HK$12 million which was for the main part government funds,
with the rest from an ad valorem tax on the value of import and export declarations. It
contained representatives from the Information Services Department, the DC&I, the Tourist
Association, the HKGCC, the FHKI, and now crucially, the CMA as ex officio and nominated
members.94

In assessing the extent to which “commercial public relations” as an endeavor fulfilled its
intentions, the outcome is difficult to judge. Regarding its specific policy objectives –
deterring protectionist behaviour that targeted Hong Kong – the assorted undertakings of
CPRCC could not prevent the colony being subjected to continuing export restrictions during
this period. The agreement made with Lancashire in 1959 was extended in 1962, followed by
a similar arrangement for three years from 1963, which was itself renewed several times
until 1972. Furthermore, the US instigated preparations for an international framework of
restrictions under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and
from 1961 Hong Kong was subject to a number of short and long-term agreements limiting
textile exports negotiated bilaterally with a number of Western nations.95 As the following
chapter will examine, the campaign did not sway opinion in Europe sufficiently to win Hong
Kong associate membership in the EEC through Britain.
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Nevertheless, it was unlikely that any attempts by Hong Kong in the realm of public relations
would have altered the fact that the colony was deemed a threat to the established textile
industries in these locations. The intention was instead to provide a favourable image of
Hong Kong to ensure that such decisions were made in the best circumstances, and to
ensure the colony had a voice in the relevant locations. To this end, the approach was
regarded as contributing to advances in this area. In a speech by Colonial Secretary Burgess,
which was also circulated as a leaflet, he refers to Hong Kong’s ‘debased’ image and
contends that it was instead now ‘clear that Hong Kong as a competitor was simply not to be
shouted out of existence’. He likewise referred to improved depictions of Hong Kong in
British parliament, and praise by an American government official of Hong Kong’s
achievements.96 Whatever the shortcomings of the CPRCC, that it led to the creation of the
TDC also made it an important stage in the institutional development of Hong Kong.

Conclusion

The use of “commercial public relations” by the government and business groups and the
particular image of the colony constructed in related media is significant for what it tells us
about the priorities and self-perception of the colonial establishment, and their justifications
for Hong Kong’s economic model. The colony’s exceptionality is emphasised throughout the
material – both its difficulties and its achievements – and is posited as a rationale for both
Hong Kong’s economic path and its governing philosophy. On one hand, Hong Kong’s
dependency on light industrial exports is put forth as an argument against protectionism. On
the other, the colonial government’s commitment to non-intervention is presented as having
been vindicated through Hong Kong’s success first as a free port and then as an industrial
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producer. As Tak-Wing Ngo has demonstrated, this account amounts to ‘policy bias by
denying the existence of alternative policy choices; and ascribes economic successes to the
“good policies” of the colonial authorities by post hoc rationalization’. He argues that Hong
Kong’s industrialisation succeeded in spite of, not because of, government policy, which had
largely ignored the needs of industry prior to the war in favour of facilitating entrepôt
trade.97 As this thesis reveals, the colonial government’s conviction that economic nonintervention underpinned Hong Kong’s industrial development was deeply-embedded.

It has been suggested that this commitment to laissez-faire was rooted in the colony’s
essential subordination to metropole interests.98 This assessment, however, misinterprets
the wider context of Hong Kong’s economic relations with Britain. The public relations
campaign itself was a product of the crisis of faith Hong Kong had in Britain’s capacity or
willingness to safeguard the colony’s interests, as the events described in chapter 1 have
illustrated. Leo Goodstadt has moreover suggested that laissez-faire provided legitimacy for
the colonial government, in the sense that it eventually ‘took on an ethical role’ in ‘providing
the rationale for restricting the claims of the privileged classes on the resources of the
state’.99 Government-supported trade promotion and public relations initiatives, for
example, were considered as compatible with a laissez-faire framework given that it was
deemed unlikely to be otherwise implemented effectively. The extent to which this support
might be interpreted as excessive government assistance to business interests however
remained a consideration.100
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Lastly, whilst the representation of Hong Kong in the media analysed provides legitimacy for
colonial rule in the sense of the current administration – one that is highly autonomous – it
does not justify a conventional imperial relationship with Britain. The self-sufficiency of Hong
Kong and its development into a modern, Asian city without outside assistance – and even in
the face of external hindrance – runs through the centre of much of the material. The
philosophy of the colonial government, despite its British roots, is likewise now one that runs
contrary to prevailing world trends, including those in Britain. The diminishing importance of
Hong Kong’s colonial nature to its success and its image is implied in a speech by HKGCC
chairman G.R. Ross, who comments that ‘our standing is, I believe, changing from that of a
political oddity to a thriving, stable and highly industrialised community operating for the
first time in the top league of world commerce’.101
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Chapter 3

Imperial Preference to General Preference: Hong Kong and the EEC, 1961-1973

Introduction

For Hong Kong, Britain's attempts to join the European Economic Community (EEC) – first
from 1961, again in 1967, and finally from 1970 – were a matter of great importance for the
colony’s future trade prospects. The membership bids also had implications for the
relationship between Hong Kong and Britain as colony and metropole; the decision to apply
was indicative of Britain’s transformation into a post-imperial power, despite the endurance
of Hong Kong’s colonial status. Hong Kong is mostly peripheral in existing accounts of the
accession attempts that otherwise put imperial issues at the forefront; yet as this chapter
will show, Hong Kong's combination of colonial status and an industrialised economy made
finding terms of British entry favourable to the colony uniquely difficult.1

The first section of this chapter will address how imperial and Commonwealth concerns
factored into Britain’s initial decision to apply for EEC membership in 1961, and how in the
negotiations that followed, Britain tried to reconcile its obligations to the remaining empire
and Commonwealth with membership of a European trading bloc. The benefits of imperial
preference – members of the empire and Commonwealth had duty-free access to each
other’s markets – and the nature of Britain’s aspirations for a prominent role in global affairs
had made joining the community undesirable when it was first created in the 1950s. When
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the decision was finally made to apply, agreeing terms of entry with the Six2 that were not
too adverse for Commonwealth members and colonial dependencies was a primary concern.

The preceding chapter demonstrated how the Hong Kong government and the colony’s
business community attempted to use “commercial public relations” in order to deter
protectionist moves against Hong Kong, and to provide a general image of Hong Kong more
conducive to maximising export opportunities. In the rhetoric of the campaign, the necessity
of free trade to Hong Kong was underpinned by the colony’s exceptionality – its combination
of geographic, demographic, and geopolitical particularities. The rationale of the campaign
was that government policy relating to trade matters and flows of trade in general were not
just based on strictly economic considerations. The second section of this chapter uncovers
the different rhetorical techniques Hong Kong’s government and commercial associations
employed to try and influence the outcome of the 1961-63 negotiations between Britain and
the EEC over entry arrangements. Thy first sought associated membership within the
community as a method of retaining preferential access to the British market – increased
trading opportunities with European members was of less concern. Hong Kong’s economic
leverage was limited, so appeals were made on the basis that Hong Kong, as a colony of
Britain, was entitled to “special” access to the British market; that Hong Kong’s commitment
to free enterprise made it an important Cold War asset, and that the EEC had an obligation
to assist “developing” countries. This chapter therefore adds to an understanding of how, in
the Hong Kong context, a defence of free trade was highly adaptable in its applicability to
different rhetorical strategies.

The third section will address the role of changing trade relationships as a process of
decolonisation. Britain's second application in 1967 came at a crucial time in Hong Kong’s
2
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relationship with the metropole. Defence cuts, the British position towards disturbances in
the colony, and the devaluation of the sterling were indications that Britain’s commitment to
Hong Kong and its interests was on the wane – this was certainly the interpretation in Hong
Kong. A second bid for membership of the EEC should be considered as part of the
characterisation of 1967 as a crisis year for the colony’s confidence in the metropole.
Although a veto on British membership landed before the negotiations could begin,
consultations between the Hong Kong and British governments reveal how British entry was
predicted to fundamentally alter the nature of this imperial relationship. By this stage,
preferential access to the British market was less important to Hong Kong. The colony was
more concerned about EEC quota restrictions, and whether Britain would have to converge
with this common policy, because of the possible implications this would have for the
metropole’s capability to defend the colony’s trading rights in international forums.

By the late 1960s, colonial status was appearing anachronistic and incompatible with the
organisation of the international economy. As section four will show, this was problematic
not only with regard to British EEC entry, but also in the division of global economies into
categories based on levels of development. The colony sought recognition as a “developing
country” for instrumentalist reasons – to take advantage of the EEC’s participation in the
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme, which granted tariff concessions to
developing countries. Inclusion was thought to provide satisfactory consolation for the
colony’s loss of imperial preference – Britain began its final bid for EEC entry in 1970 – and
exclusion would have put Hong Kong at a competitive disadvantage. This characterisation
however proved problematic on two accounts: Hong Kong was a successful exporter of
manufactured goods, and was not an independent country. Hong Kong’s eventual
acceptance into the scheme was the only concession Britain could extract from the Six, and
its terms were far from favourable.
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1. First Application

In November 1955, Britain opted against joining what would become the EEC, which would
be ratified (along with Euratom – an organisation to coordinate and regulate European
nuclear power) by the 1957 Treaties of Rome. Key to Britain’s decision that year to withdraw
from the Spaak Committee – in which members of the European Coal and Steel Committee
decided the forms future European integration should take – were economic commitments
to the empire and Commonwealth, which in the mid-1950s, was export-wise still more
important for Britain. In 1955, Britain’s four largest Commonwealth markets – Australia,
Canada, India, and New Zealand – took 23.1 per cent of Britain’s total exports, compared to
the 11.2 per cent of the Six. Likewise, Germany in particular was thought of more in terms of
its threat to Britain’s export trade, than as part of a market that Britain could more
lucratively exploit.3 The British government also assumed that plans for the common market
would collapse, and instead pursued a looser European free trade area for industrial goods
that would also preserve Britain’s preferential trade agreements with the empire and
Commonwealth.4

Entry into the common market would have likewise undermined Britain’s broader economic
and political aspirations in the postwar decade. These included maintaining a strong pound
in order to sustain sterling’s prominence in global trade and commercial transactions, and
thus allow Britain’s ‘commercial empire’ to remain extant.5 An interrelated consideration
was the Sterling Area’s importance to Britain’s balance of payments, and its members’
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interest in a strong and stable pound.6 Finally, a European customs union was regarded as
inimical to the ultimate goal of trade liberalisation on a global scale, spearheaded since the
close of the Second World War by the US.7 On the political side, successive postwar
governments in Britain had stayed aloof from most developments in the realm of
supranationalism in Europe, preferring to avoid any forfeit of sovereignty. Britain’s prestige
and global influence would be achieved through leadership of the Commonwealth, in
partnership – albeit assuming a junior role – with the US, and in association rather than
integration with Europe.8

For Britain, the economic value of imperial preference was nevertheless on the decline
during this period. As Catherine Schenk has shown, by the mid-1950s its ‘quantitative
importance’ to Britain had ‘largely been eroded’ as a result of inflation and changes in
international trade patterns, whilst Europe, recovering from wartime economic disruption,
was eventually recognised as a more valuable marketplace for British exports in the long
run.9 Stuart Ward thus describes Britain’s approach to the ‘interlocking problems of Europe
and the Commonwealth’ in the 1950s as ‘characterized by an attempt to reconcile the
growing conflict between sentiment and self-interest in British priorities’.10 Imperial
preference, in binding Britain and the Commonwealth together, retained political
importance and popular support. Britain’s decision to apply for membership of the EEC in
1961 has therefore been considered as a critical moment in the gradual dissolution of
imperial and Commonwealth ties.11 In the summer of 1961, the British government held
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consultations with Commonwealth governments. Those of the “old Commonwealth” in
particular perceived the move as detrimental to economic and political solidarity with
Britain, whilst some “new Commonwealth” nations, especially in Africa, denounced the
European customs union and its offer of associate status to “developing nations” as a form
of neo-colonialism.12

For the Macmillan government making the decision however, this was not a matter of
choosing Europe over the Commonwealth. The implications for the latter were crucial in
internal deliberations, and ultimately EEC membership was presented as compatible with,
and even beneficial to, Britain’s leadership of the Commonwealth, which required the
economic strength only European integration could offer.13 Furthermore, the final decision
was highly contingent on recent developments. Firstly, British failure by this point to bring a
more expansive European free trade area into fruition, or to ‘bridge’ the subsequent
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) with the EEC, left membership of both the only option to
reap their respective benefits.14 Secondly, by this stage it was recognised that maintaining
influence in Washington required inclusion, as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, through which Britain had exercised political influence over Europe, had been
replaced in late 1960 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) – an association with a more global membership including the US itself. Furthermore,
from the perspective of the US, the end of the French Fourth Republic in 1958 and the
subsequent return to power of Charles de Gaulle made British membership of the EEC a
desirable counterweight to French influence, even if this wasn’t a consideration for the
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British government themselves.15 Finally, the British application was ultimately speculative,
as the conditions for entry would emerge only in the negotiations that followed.16

From October 1961, a negotiating team led by future Prime Minister Edward Heath began
negotiations with the Six in Brussels. From 1961-63, Britain tried to minimise the detriment
British entry would cause to Commonwealth and imperial interests, although debate exists
on the sincerity of their approach.17 A deal for the Commonwealth acceptable to its
membership emerged as one of two major and interrelated problem areas in the protracted
negotiations – the other being the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). For the old
Commonwealth, the supply of “temperate foodstuffs” to Britain was their most important
trade that reverse preferences by the EEC would impair. The British negotiators first sought
‘comparable outlets’ – preferences on certain items exported to the EEC equal to those
granted by imperial preference. In 1962 this proved unacceptable to the Six due to the EEC
principle of non-discrimination against external parties, and therefore Britain was informed
that the Commonwealth nations concerned should expect subjection to the full common
external tariff (CET) from 1970. The only concession the Six would offer was a transitional
period for cereals, on which the CET would be imposed in stages, and some form of special
concession for New Zealand – although no exact agreement was reached by the time the
negotiations collapsed – due to their heavy reliance on food exports to Britain.18
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Historiography has dealt more with how the old Commonwealth factored into the
negotiations, yet Britain’s responsibilities to the empire and Commonwealth as a whole had
to be reconciled with British entry. The Treaty of Rome included a provision enabling
Associated Overseas Territory (AOT) status to be granted to “developing nations”, which
included French and Belgian territories. Whilst out of the question for Australia, Canada and
New Zealand, Britain hoped to obtain AOT status for as many underdeveloped colonies and
Commonwealth members as possible. A number of African territories opposed this
possibility on ideological grounds – it conflicted with designs for African unity and had neocolonial connotations – whilst New Commonwealth members India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
were, it emerged, not perceived as eligible given their level of industrialisation. In the
absence of AOT status, all that the Six would acquiesce to was a gradual implementation of
the CET on their textile exports to Britain, with measures to limit their re-export into Europe
if required.19

Hong Kong, given the size of its textile trade, was the only colonial dependency considered
comparable to this bloc, and was therefore the most problematic colony in the
negotiations.20 The colony was perceived as a twin-threat to European textile and garment
industries; on one hand Hong Kong producers could appear to undercut on price, whilst on
the other, there remained a fear that goods from China could be falsely labelled and enter
the EEC through Hong Kong. The intransigence of the Six to make any concessions on this
basis forced the British negotiators to adapt ‘sub-optimal’ positions. They eventually settled
on angling for a deal similar to the package offered to India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, yet
ultimately failed to reach an agreement by the time the veto landed in January 1963.21 The
following section is concerned with how the colony reacted to these developments and
19
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attempted to influence their outcome. Hong Kong was not represented directly in the
negotiations, and therefore relied on informal appeals to Britain and the Six in order to
improve their chances of a satisfactory arrangement.

2. Making Hong Kong’s Case

From around the mid-1950s, the prospect of any British economic integration with Europe
was of considerable importance to Hong Kong, given that Britain was, until 1959, Hong
Kong’s largest overall export market. From that point onwards, Britain was second only to
the US until after British EEC accession in 1973.22 Due to the primacy of manufactures in this
trade, Hong Kong governor Alexander Grantham was adamant that the colony should be
admitted into the industrial free trade area first envisaged by the British government in
1956. The request was denied on the basis of equal treatment of colonies – none were to be
included – and that the prospect of Hong Kong’s goods entering Europe freely would be
opposed by other members who may already have protectionist measures in place against
Hong Kong.23

British entry into the EEC was of more significant concern given that, in normal
circumstances, Hong Kong would be subjected to the CET in the event of British accession. In
order to ascertain the precise impact British entry might have, the HKGCC commissioned a
report by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 1961. The report’s opening line asserted that ‘If
Britain joins the Common Market, about one fifth of Hong Kong’s domestic exports will be
directly affected’. This was mostly exports to Britain as the six took much less – just five per
cent of colony’s total exports. The report placed a particular emphasis on Hong Kong’s
22
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advantages over its chief competitor Japan, which unlike Hong Kong, had to pay full duties
on exports to Britain in addition to various quota restrictions. In the event of Britain’s EEC
entry, Hong Kong’s goods entering duty free would be subject to the CET tariff of 20 per
cent, whilst those entering Britain from the EEC would eventually become tariff free. The
report’s prediction was that ‘it is most unlikely that the Common Market would permit the
retention of preference for Hong Kong goods in the UK market or its extension to other
members through the association of Hong Kong with the Common Market’. In these
circumstances, the report suggested that the best Hong Kong could hope for were reduced
tariff rates or ‘temporary tariff-free or tariff reduced quotas’ on a ‘comparatively limited
range of products’.24

The Chamber were receptive to the recommendation that, in order to achieve any
concessions, ‘a case for special treatment… must be the basis for the UK’s case to the Six’.25
Likewise, the Chamber were told that Hong Kong’s trade and industrial community needed
to make this case themselves, as in Western Europe there was apparently little awareness of
Hong Kong’s economic constraints.26 Obtaining a favourable outcome for the colony in the
negotiations therefore fell under the remit of the commercial public relations campaign
explored in the previous chapter. Yet it involved going beyond image cultivation into the
realm of influencing a specific policy outcome, and therefore required the construction of an
appropriate rhetorical strategy targeted to the decision makers themselves – for which a
consensus was not always reached. As the metropole was representing its colony in an
international arena and the outcome was likely to have imperial implications, the matter also
engendered more direct involvement of colonial government officials.27
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The Hong Kong business community’s attempt to influence opinion in Europe would be
managed in coordination with its representatives and allies in the metropole in the form of
the Hong Kong Association (HKA). The HKA had its roots in a Hong Kong committee of the
China Association – an organisation that had represented the interests of British businesses
in China since the late nineteenth century. Whereas the China Association had been limited
to British firms only, the HKA was intended to be representative of businesses of both British
and Hong Kong origin; it sought to ‘provide in the United Kingdom an authoritative body
which is recognised at the highest levels as being representative of the industry and
commerce of Hong Kong and qualified to speak on its behalf’.28 Established in 1961, it was
split between a committee in London and a branch in Hong Kong – the latter first chaired by
S. N. Chau. It assisted in facilitating public relations initiatives in Britain and serving as a point
of contact between the Hong Kong business community and the British government – it
retained close relations with sympathetic MPs who composed the All Party Hong Kong
Parliamentary Group. It nevertheless remained dominated by British companies, and the
HKA itself was concerned that it membership had ‘too strong a resemblance to the China
Association’ and lacked ‘non British members’.29 In 1966 it was reported that of a total
membership of 104, the ‘Hong Kong element’ was composed of ‘27 “British” industrial,
trading and service companies, five service organisations such as the Federation, Chamber
and C.M.A., and only three are “Chinese” companies’.30 The positions it adopted therefore
tended to represent the views of the British business community in Hong Kong; for example,
it remained wedded to the idea that AOT status for Hong Kong should be the primary
objective.
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Appeals from Hong Kong business and government representatives were initially limited
primarily to the British negotiators and relevant government ministers. The objective was to
provide them with arguments that could be made to the Six, and to ensure that Britain
remained committed to finding an outcome acceptable to the colony. On the business side,
this involved consultation with Campbell-Johnson, the public relations firm employed jointly
by the HKGCC and the FHKI. Campbell-Johnson echoed the recommendation that Hong
Kong’s ‘strategic aim’ for the negotiations should be convincing the Six of Hong Kong’s status
as a “special case’ distinct from ‘members of the Commonwealth’ or ‘low wage territories’.
As Hong Kong’s economic leverage was limited – it could not offer improved access to the
Hong Kong market since it already operated a free trade policy – they suggested that PR
should focus on gaining recognition of Hong Kong’s constraints. This involved making
arguments about Hong Kong’s reliance on exports, the necessity of expanding industry to
accommodate a growing population, and improving standards of living.31 An angle of specific
relevance to the common market issue was an appeal to colonial responsibility, in order to
preserve Hong Kong’s special trade relationship with Britain and emphasise its importance to
the colony’s economy.

This latter argument was articulated to William Gorell-Barnes, a member of the British
negotiating team who visited Hong Kong in December 1961. He reported opposition to Hong
Kong being considered alongside India and Pakistan in the negotiations. As a colony with ‘no
desire for, or prospect of, independence,’ Hong Kong apparently had a strong claim to a
‘special economic relationship’ with Britain – one that could only be preserved through
associate membership of the EEC.32 The HKGCC and FHKI suggested that the end of this
special relationship could also have consequences for Britain; Hong Kong’s purchases of
31
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British capital equipment on ‘sentimental’ grounds might be diminished in the absence of
imperial preference.33 Hong Kong’s reliance on exports given its geographic and demographic
peculiarities – as explored in chapter 2 – and imperial preference gave Britain special
importance as a substitute home market. This distinguished Hong Kong not only from
Commonwealth nations India and Pakistan, but also from its major competitor Japan. The
fear that Hong Kong would struggle to compete with Japan on equal terms was expressed by
financial secretary John Cowperthwaite – Japan having ‘considerable advantages’ in ‘scale of
production and in technological development’.34 Finally, the HKGCC and FHKI told GorellBarnes that if ‘China is given equal treatment with Hong Kong, it could, with no difficulty,
capture all our markets’.35

Although Gorell-Barnes claimed to find a consistency of opinion across government and
industry in Hong Kong on the issue, the colony’s financial secretary for instance thought that
attempts to present Hong Kong as a special case for the purposes of the negotiations were
flawed, telling the HKGCC that Hong Kong should instead try to prevent ‘a special case being
made against’ the colony. This referred to the EEC’s bestowing of AOT status; refusing to
extend AOT to a colonial dependency such as Hong Kong would be an exception rather than
the rule in current policy. He was also sceptical about the attempts of the business
community to influence the negotiations through public relations initiatives – he thought
public opinion would be inconsequential for the decisions of the Six.36 Nevertheless, in a
follow-up he suggested that as France in particular believed Hong Kong was ‘no more “than a
factory were Chinese capitalists exploit Chinese refugees”’ there were advantages in
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demonstrating that it was instead ‘a community in the full sense of the word with our own
identity and our own economic and social problems and solutions’.37

Campbell-Johnson, taking the position that Hong Kong should pursue special treatment,
suggested that arguments for treating Hong Kong exceptionally should focus on political
aspects and be projected to both Britain and the Six. Their report referenced a New York
Times article comparing Hong Kong’s value as a Cold War outpost to that of West Berlin, and
suggested that the analogy is ‘one the Europeans will readily grasp’.38 As discussed in the
previous chapter, promotional material intended to deter protectionist measures against
Hong Kong posited the colony as an exemplar of Western values and the capitalist
development model, and therefore emphasised its symbolic and strategic importance at the
edge of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The proposal to use more explicit Cold War rhetoric was
however received cautiously by the HKA and HKGCC. The HKA ‘questioned very seriously
indeed the wisdom of utilising the comparisons between Hong Kong and West Berlin’ as
‘although this may well appeal to Common Market countries,’ it was feared that if ‘plugged
in detail, it may well offend Peking’.39 Cowperthwaite agreed that ‘the “Berlin analogy”,
while useful in private discussion with individuals, has certain dangers if used publicly’.40

Their hesitancy should be understood in the wider context of Sino-British relations over
Hong Kong during this period – the duration having been characterised as one of ‘strategic
equilibrium’. Although the CCP did not recognise the unequal treaties that had handed Hong
Kong to Britain and were ideologically opposed to an imperialist outpost at their doorstep,
the colony was an important source of foreign exchange and a useful trading post. China
37
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therefore did not press the issue of sovereignty.41 British and Hong Kong governments, not
taking China’s acquiescence for granted, sought to avoid any actions in the colony that might
upset this delicate status quo – including any significant democratic reform or progress
towards independence. For this reason, they also felt unease about US operations in the
colony; in the late 1950s the Chinese government indicated that overt use of Hong Kong as a
Cold War base by Western powers would not be tolerated.42 From the mid-1960s for
example, China made four official complaints to Britain about US naval visits to Hong Kong
relating to the Vietnam War.43

For these reasons the HKGCC decided against explicit use of the West Berlin analogy, but still
considered political arguments for Hong Kong’s special treatment as their ‘strongest card’.
Likewise, the justifications made by Hong Kong’s representatives still had implicit Cold War
connotations. The chamber told Campbell-Johnson for example that ‘acute world interest
[in] our refugee problems’ provided an opportunity to demonstrate the colony’s need for
export expansion.44 In the early 1950s, the Hong Kong government had wished to avoid the
influx of refugees from mainland China from becoming politicised, for the same concerns
about not provoking China mentioned above. The colonial government refused to even
officially recognise the incomers as refugees – although this was as much to avoid
responsibility towards them as it was for political reasons.45 On the other hand, Taiwan
pressed for their recognition as refugees, whilst the US saw aid provision as a source for
information gathering and a propaganda opportunity.46 Later in the decade, the refugee

41

Cheuk-Wah Chan, “Hong Kong and its Strategic Values for China and Britain, 1949-1968,” Journal
of Contemporary Asia 28, no. 3 (1998): 348.
42
Chi-kwan Mark, “Lack of Means or Loss of Will? The United Kingdom and the Decolonization of
Hong Kong, 1957-1967,” The International History Review 31, no. 1 (2009): 54.
43
Chi-kwan Mark, “Vietnam War tourists: US Naval visits to Hong Kong and British-AmericanChinese relations, 1965–1968,” Cold War History 10, no. 1 (2010): 2.
44
CHAS-03-10 (CHAS/C/10), Kite to Foley, 14 June 1962.
45
Glen Peterson, “To Be or Not to Be a Refugee: The International Politics of the Hong Kong Refugee
Crisis, 1949 –55,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36, no. 2 (2008): 181-182.
46
Chi-kwan Mark, “The ‘Problem of People’: British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese
Refugees in Hong Kong, 1949–62,” Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 6 (2007): 1156-57.

109

problem garnered wider international recognition; in 1957 the UN general assembly officially
called attention to the issue.47 Furthermore, the colonial government was keen to publicise
their efforts in the resettlement of refugees and to dispel negative depictions of their
conditions in Hong Kong. By the 1960s, Hong Kong was therefore more willing to make
political capital of the refugee issue. On one hand, the point was repeatedly made that
diminished trade opportunities would be detrimental to the employment of refugees, and
Hong Kong would require financial aid from not only from Britain, but would be a ‘major
relief and unemployment problem’ that would have ‘political implications for the whole
Western world’.48

The consequences of an unsatisfactory settlement for Hong Kong were therefore posited as
a problem not just for Hong Kong but for the Western bloc as a whole. In addition to the
refugee crisis and its Cold War implications, Hong Kong was presented as an outpost of
Western values and a successful example of the development model promulgated by the US
and its Cold War allies. In October 1962, seven unofficial members from Hong Kong’s
Executive Council (ExCo) and Legislative Council (LegCo) – among them members of the FKHI,
HKGCC and HKA – travelled to Britain to meet with colonial secretary Duncan Sandys.49 In a
memorandum supplied to him by one member, which also reiterated Hong Kong’s
dependence on Britain and its need to export, the point was made that:

Any deterioration in a standard of living and reduction in employment will surely
reverse the present position of a shining example of the free enterprise system and
instead may provide adverse propaganda material of an effective nature which those
outside, who are not well-disposed to the aims and methods of the free world, may
utilise with damaging results to Great Britain and the free world.50
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A few days prior to this visit, two members of the delegation, along with HKGCC Secretary
General J.B. Kite and representatives of Campbell-Johnson, visited Paris and Brussels to
present their arguments directly to those with influence within the Six.51 In one speech at the
Office Belge du Commerce Extérieur, Kite argued that ‘Hong Kong’s survival is important to
Europe because of its position as part of the free world in the borders of the Communist
world. It is the best shop window of the West in the East’.52

The argument was not just made in private. With the intention of gaining public support for
Hong Kong’s cause in the negotiations, the colony’s business networks also made appeals in
the British press. A joint letter published in The Times outlined the consequences for Hong
Kong if it were not ‘adequately protected’ in the event of Britain joining the EEC, and why
this would be detrimental to Cold War interests:

An abrupt reversal in the trend of our recently improving standards of living, let alone
widespread unemployment, would appear as a conspicuous failure of free enterprise
and the principles of the free world which Hong-kong has practised for over a century.
Even more important perhaps it would demonstrate to all that the nations of Europe,
far from wishing to assist less developed countries, are determined to keep down all
industry outside their own block.53

Associating Hong Kong with ‘less developed countries’ was another deliberate rhetorical
strategy, yet it was one that had to be reconciled with the aim of dispelling Hong Kong’s
sweatshop image. The purpose of the commercial public relations campaign explored in the
previous chapter was to counter Hong Kong’s reputation as a low-cost, low-wage producer,
and to in turn weaken the justification for protectionist measures levied against the colony.
This involved demonstration of improving wages and living standards, and of industrial
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modernisation – achievements that were also necessary for presenting Hong Kong as a
successful development model. For this reason, Gorell-Barnes reported ‘some reluctance to
accept the description of Hong Kong as a “less developed” country producing “low-cost”
manufactures’ and he had to explain ‘the tactical reasons for which it had been considered
advisable to make the initial case for Hong Kong this way’. Although these were apparently
understood, the case was still made that ‘it is becoming increasingly untrue to speak of her
manufactures as being “low-cost”’.54

Presenting Hong Kong as a developing or less-developed territory however had certain
strategic advantages. On the one hand, it was a condition for AOT status. On the other, it
provided an opportunity for arguments to be made that refusing to grant AOT status to Hong
Kong, or failure to offer a comparable concession, would justify criticisms that the EEC
operated to the benefit of the developed nations of Europe to the detriment of the less
developed. This critique manifested in accusations of neo-colonialism by post-independence
leaders in Africa, such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré; the
former compared the Treaty of Rome to the 1885 Congress of Berlin. According to one
assessment, Nkrumah and Touré saw the system of association as a ‘strategy to foil national
independence in Africa per se’ and ‘a deliberate attempt to frustrate the formation of any
types of independently organized African integration and regionalization schemes’.55 India’s
first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru likewise regarded associate membership as a barrier to
the political independence of territories still under colonial rule, and ruled out AOT for
India.56 Hong Kong’s position differed in that their arguments were on the basis of probable
exclusion rather than inclusion, yet still hinged on the premise that the EEC served the
interests of the developed over the developing. In his speech in Brussels, HKGCC’s secretary
54
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general claimed that, as Hong Kong was the ‘only example so far of an overseas dependency
of Europe breaking through into the stage of self-sustained growth,’ if the colony was ‘to
suffer the adverse effects of exclusion from the new preferential club of advanced
industrialised nations… it [will] be evidence in support of the accusation of “neo-colonialism”
levelled against the Common Market’.57 In a June meeting with Colonial Office
representatives, Cowperthwaite had also stated that ‘the reaction in Hong Kong might be
that the “neo-colonialism” label was justified’ if the EEC were to seek additional safeguards
against the flow of Hong Kong textiles into Europe, should Britain join.58

Reports from the negotiations in Brussels, from February 1962, show that the British side
utilised these narratives to try and obtain a favourable outcome for Hong Kong. Head
negotiator Sir Pierson Dixon ‘explained the United Kingdom view stressing the responsibility
of developed countries to accept imports from developing countries’ and ‘stressed the
importance of manufacturing industries to Hong Kong’s economy, and the special
responsibility of the United Kingdom for the colony’.59 In a following meeting, Dixon alluded
to Hong Kong’s geopolitical importance in the ongoing Cold War – it ‘may influence evolution
in that part of the world’.60 In the early stages of the negotiations, AOT status for Hong Kong
was the main objective, although there was awareness on the British side that this had a
limited chance of success. In February, the EEC indicated that this would not be granted, and
furthermore, that the full CET would be applied to Commonwealth goods. Nevertheless, a
working party was established to discuss potential concessions for the textile goods of Hong
Kong, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, yet Hong Kong would be considered only after some
solution had been agreed for the other three. The colony was considered by the Six as a
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more serious threat, and there was a lingering mistrust of Hong Kong’s certificates of origin
system.61

Britain’s representatives subsequently decided to abandon AOT status as an objective, and
to pursue instead a compromise more acceptable to the Six. Their new proposal for all four
of the problem territories was ‘comparable opportunities’: ‘opportunities for exporting to
the combined markets of the United Kingdom and the Six comparable to those which they
now enjoy’. One avenue through which this could be achieved was through the removal of
quota restrictions on textiles.62 Cowperthwaite was not enthusiastic about this proposal;
Hong Kong’s trade of textiles with Europe was not high enough to make the removal of
restraints an adequate replacement for the loss of preference in Britain, and he objected to
‘regarding the removal of illegitimate restrictions as a proper quid pro quo’. Instead, he
thought the current restrictions could be used as a justification for the continuation of some
sort of preference.63 By March, the working group had begun to consider Hong Kong, but
were more concerned with safeguarding EEC textile industries, even with the CET in place. In
May, one negotiator told them that ‘Hong Kong presented special problems because of her
highly developed industry, her access to duty free raw materials and her low-cost labour
advantages’.64

News of these developments was met with frustration in Hong Kong. Governor Robert Black
reported being ‘increasingly concerned’ for the prospects of the colony.65 By August, with no
progress made in Brussels, he became disillusioned with the British government’s approach.
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He told them there was ‘apprehension in Hong Kong’ due to a belief that ‘Her Majesty’s
Government will be forced to apply the very limited concessions they can obtain for the
benefit of Commonwealth countries which have a political status enabling them to exert
pressure or at least make their voices heard’.66 The HKA also expressed concern in a meeting
with a member of the delegation to Brussels that ‘a settlement with Hong Kong would be
reached in the very last stages of the negotiations, after the main issues (e.g. temperate
foodstuffs) had been resolved and when the British side had virtually no bargaining power
left’.67 They also believed that ‘there has been too ready an acceptance of the attitude of the
Six in refusing association to Hong Kong’.68 Finally, the Hong Kong press became critical over
Britain’s handling of the negotiations; the UK Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong summarised
a prevailing belief as being that ‘Hong Kong lacks and needs vigorous and effective
presentation of their case in both London and Europe’.69

The British government preferred to keep the details of the negotiations confidential – they
were averse to press coverage and limited the distribution of proceedings to the colonial
government.70 Black was subsequently frustrated at not being able to make the details of the
negotiations public in order to placate Hong Kong opinion, and was ‘considerably
embarrassed’ that he could not keep the HKGCC and FHKI fully-informed.71 Back in May, in
light of the stance of the Six towards Hong Kong, the British party had suggested that some
direct contact between a Hong Kong government representative and negotiators from the
Six may be justified.72 Cowperthwaite subsequently met with the working party in

66

TNA, CO 852/2074, Black to Duncan Sandys (Secretary of State for the Colonies), 18 August 1962.
TNA, CO 852/2074, note of meeting between HKA and G.H. Andrew (BT) on 11 September 1962,
by N. K. Fisher, 12 September 1962.
68
CHAS-03-10 (CHAS/C/10), Collar to Knowles, 19 November 1962.
69
TNA, CO 852/2074, Arthur Wooller (UK Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong) to Mervyn S.
Trenaman (BT), 22 August 1962.
70
TNA, CO 852/2072, Trafford Smith (Commonwealth Office and UK Delegation at Brussels) to
Black, 25 January 1962.
71
TNA, CO 852/2073, Sir. Robert Black (Hong Kong Governor) to Sir Hilton Poynton (CO), 16 May
1962. Copies were also sent to members of four other government departments.
72
TNA, CO 852/2073, UK delegation at Brussels to Foreign Office, No. Codel 163, 13 May 1962.
67

115

November, telling them that Hong Kong ‘practiced at all times the most liberal trade
practices; we have indulged in no unfair practices’. He also raised the point that the EEC’s
trade balance with the colony was in their favour, and refuted the accusations of origin
mislabelling. Finally, he emphasised the importance of the colony’s ‘special position in the
United Kingdom market’ and, in referring to the EEC as ‘developed countries’, implied they
had a responsibility to the economic wellbeing of Hong Kong.73

By this stage, the EEC had agreed on a transitional period for India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka,
and the British delegation were attempting to secure the same for Hong Kong. No agreement
was reached by the time the negotiations collapsed. All that the working party had produced
was a vague commitment to a future arrangement – apparently an application of the CET at
‘a rhythm to be defined later’, with safeguards in the case of ‘disruption’ caused by Hong
Kong, and ‘appropriate community measures’ if Hong Kong was overly burdened by the
tariff. However, the French side, having been the primary obstacle to an agreement for the
colony during the negotiations, had even placed a ‘reservation’ on these proposals.74 The
French had not accepted British responsibility to the territory as a concern of the community
without an accompanying acceptance of the need to protect its industries from Hong Kong,
nor had they recognised Hong Kong as a developing country for the purposes of AOT.75

3. The Second Application

Prior to becoming Labour Prime Minister in 1964, Harold Wilson had voiced opposition to
British membership of the EEC on the grounds that trade with the Commonwealth should be
73
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prioritised, and that the community was – he argued – on the path to federalism. Helen Parr
argues that Wilson and other party members were in fact in favour of being part of ‘the
“right sort” of Europe’, but on entering government their priorities were relations with the
Commonwealth and the US.76 The decision to reapply in 1967 followed developments
comparable to those that preceded the 1961 application. The British once again tried and
failed to amalgamate the EFTA with the EEC. A new incentive however was that fears over
the supranational nature of the EEC were somewhat allayed by the EEC’s decision in 1966,
following pressure by de Gaulle, to offer a veto on certain issues in the European
Commission. In the build-up to another election win in March 1966 – called because the win
in 1964 had given Labour a majority of just four seats – Wilson had expressed the
government’s willingness to enter the EEC, if the terms were acceptable to Britain. The
decision to apply was hastened by domestic pressures: the sterling crisis and subsequent
failure of the government’s National Plan for economic growth necessitated defence cuts
and a look to Europe to rescue the British economy. In October 1966, Wilson decided that
Britain should prepare for an application, and the government began probing the Six in early
1967. An announcement of the intention to apply was made on 2 May.77

Imperial and Commonwealth concerns took on less significance during the second
application than they had for the first. The independent Commonwealth had weakened both
politically and economically, the former by Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in 1965, and the latter by the British government’s introduction of a 15 per
cent surcharge on all manufactured goods the year previously. The surcharge represented an
erosion of imperial preference, the value of which to all parties was in general decline due to
the liberalisation of global trade through the GATT. Nevertheless, India, Pakistan and Sri
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Lanka hoped to see a revival of the provisional deal offered to them in 1962. Similarly, those
offered and willing to accept AOT status expected continuity. New Zealand was still
dependent on exports of temperate foodstuffs to Britain, but was confident on reaching a
special arrangement after approaching the EEC independently. Australia opposed Britain’s
membership bid publicly for domestic political reasons, but was unlikely to be seriously
affected in economic terms.78 Hong Kong was once again likely to be regarded by the EEC as
a ‘special case’ for which some agreement would need to be reached. In November 1967
however, before the negotiations could even begin, de Gaulle vetoed British membership for
a second time, citing the recent sterling devaluation as evidence of Britain’s economic
weakness.79 News of the devaluation also came as a shock to Hong Kong and its damage to
the value of the colony’s sterling reserves was a source of resentment towards the British
government. Given that the year was also one in which disturbances in the colony led to a
reassessment by Britain of its commitment to Hong Kong’s security and long-term future,
this section will explore how Britain’s second membership bid should be considered as part
of Hong Kong’s broader crisis of confidence in Britain, and a characterisation of 1967 as a
pivotal moment in this trend. Finally, it was a period in which questions emerged about Hong
Kong’s long-term commercial autonomy.

The announcement by the British government of their intention to apply came at a time in
which Britain’s commitment to Hong Kong and its interests were, from the perspective of
those in the colony, in doubt. The first indication was in matters of defence. The colony was
made increasingly responsible for the cost of its own garrison. In July 1966, Hong Kong was
told that their contribution should increase from £1.5 million a year (since 1958) for the
garrison – plus costs of £6 million over four years from 1965/6 for related infrastructure – to
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£11 million annually to maintain the garrison at its current size. The colonial government
eventually managed to reach a compromise and agreed to pay £5 million of the total £15
million costs. Insult to injury was added in December when the garrison was decreased by
one unit.80 These developments were part of a long-term assessment of Britain’s defence
capabilities that had begun under Harold Macmillan, and culminated with the Wilson
government’s decision in July 1967 to withdraw from military bases “east of Suez”. Whilst
Hong Kong’s contributions to its own defence ensured their garrison would be excepted,
Britain would begin to withdraw its forces from surrounding military bases in Malaysia and
Singapore leaving the colony remote. As the context in which Britain’s second EEC
membership bid was announced, at a meeting of HKGCC members with Conservative MPs
Anthony Royle and Charles Fletcher-Cooke, one member summarised the colony’s
perspective on the apparent changes in Britain’s priorities:

Mr. Browne reverted to the question of confidence, pointing out that the run-down of
the British position East of Suez combined with the weakness of sterling were leading
to a certain feeling of uneasiness and a fear that Britain no longer had the will or the
wish to maintain any sort of position in the Far East. In the light of the Prime Minister’s
expressed view that Britain must get into the Common Market, there was a feeling
that Hong Kong’s interests would be completely over-looked. This might well lead to a
lack of confidence in Hong Kong towards the U.K. and in turn might curb British
exports to Hong Kong.81

The question of Britain’s commitment to Hong Kong’s defence and to British rule in the
colony acquired new importance in the summer. In April, a labour dispute in a Kowloon
artificial flower factory developed into colony-wide strikes, demonstrations, rioting and acts
of terrorism, leading to 51 deaths and 4,500 arrests. Although communists in Hong Kong
claimed to have the backing of Beijing, the colonial government maintained that the riots
were an indirect consequence of the Cultural Revolution underway in mainland China, and
the colony was not under threat of invasion. Nevertheless, Beijing’s intentions were
80
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uncertain, and fears were raised when on 8 July Chinese militia crossed the border and killed
five Hong Kong policemen in Sha Tau Kok. In the unlikely event of Chinese invasion, Britain’s
diminished defence capabilities in the region and the refusal of the US to commit to the
colony’s security, made a military defence of the colony was unfeasible. Evacuation was also
ruled out, and the British government permitted the colonial government to handle the
disturbances alone.82

The disturbances prompted a revived attempt in Hong Kong to coordinate overseas public
relations to counter bad press and restore confidence among buyers, investors, and visitors.
An ad-hoc meeting of relevant government department heads and industry leaders was held
on 21 August.83 By the fourteenth meeting on 19 October, attendees called themselves the
‘overseas Public Relations Co-ordination Committee’.84 Just two days earlier a ‘Public
Relations Liaison Committee’ was formed in London – the Hong Kong government office and
HKA featured – to coordinate Hong Kong PR efforts in Britain.85 In discussions on a suitable
PR strategy prior to the formation of the committee, Susan Yuen of the HKA Hong Kong
branch and head of the FHKI told the London committee that:

There is one signal which all are looking for and which has not yet so far been received
– a positive statement from HMG that Hong Kong will remain under British
administration until [the expiry of the New Territories lease in 1997]. There has been a
statement that HMG supports the Hong Kong Government in maintaining law and
82
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order, but no firm statement that it will preserve the status quo until the lease runs
out.86

Nevertheless, the response was that such a declaration would risk ‘adverse political reaction
from China’.87 In doubt over Britain’s commitment to the colony, the HKGCC and HKA also
pursued the production of publicity material emphasising the colony’s economic value to
Hong Kong in terms of its trade balance, invisible earning and sterling reserves among other
factors.88

It was in this context that consultations between the British and Hong Kong governments –
first in July and again in October – were held on the issue of Britain’s EEC application and its
consequences for the colony.89 During the first round of discussions, it was revealed that
there was a split of opinion in the colony on the position Hong Kong should take during the
negotiations. DC&I deputy director Philip Haddon-Cave claimed that that ‘support for
Association was prevalent among the British mercantile houses rather than among the
Chinese business community’ whereas ‘he did not think that either the Hong Kong
Government or the non-official trading associations would wish to advocate a proposal
which could not succeed, and could well attract hostile reactions from the Six. So far as Hong
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Kong was concerned, Association was clearly a non-starter’.90 Although no declaration of
Hong Kong’s final position was made during the two rounds of talks, they revealed a shift in
concerns from the first application. Firstly, Hong Kong had become less dependent on the
British market whilst trade with Europe had increased; ‘in 1960 Hong Kong sold just over 20
per cent of her exports to Britain and about 5per cent to the E.E.C.’ whereas ‘by 1966 she
was selling about 17 per cent to Britain and just over 10 per cent to the Community’.
Secondly, Hong Kong feared that any request for ‘special arrangements’ – such as some
temporary continuation of preference – could be met with a ‘disruption clause’ such as that
favoured by the Six towards the end of the 1961-63 negotiations.91 In the final session of the
October discussions, Cowperthwaite reported that the Hong Kong government ‘had decided
that in general they should not ask Britain to make any specific demands to the Six on Hong
Kong’s behalf’.92

In the consultations, two other issues relating to British EEC entry had emerged as priorities
from the perspective of Hong Kong. The first was inclusion into the EEC’s generalised system
of preferences scheme as a potential consolation for the loss of imperial preference, which
will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. The second related to the GATT. Whilst
the loss of imperial preference and subjection to the CET was now regarded as less of a
threat to Hong Kong’s export trade, quantitative limitations on textiles and textile goods
were still a concern as, whilst the colony’s industry could appear to remain price competitive
when tariffs were applied, strict quotas would be a detriment to export growth. From 1962,
Hong Kong was subject to the LTA for five years. Arranged through the GATT, the LTA was
used by participating nations – of which the Six were included – to place restraints on Hong
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Kong. Upon expiring, it was renewed until 1970. The colonial government’s fear was that
British entry into the Six would result in Britain having to take part in a bilateral agreement
between the EEC as a whole and Hong Kong.93

As well as potentially inflicting stricter quotas on the colony’s textile exports to Britain than
would otherwise be in place, this hypothetical scenario also had implications for Hong Kong’s
rights within the GATT and therefore the colony’s commercial autonomy. Hong Kong, as a
dependent territory, could only be represented in the GATT by Britain on the colony’s behalf.
Haddon-Cave raised the point that, if the EEC chose to operate as single actor in GATT
matters, following British entry into the EEC, Hong Kong could lose its GATT privileges in
relation to the Six, and ‘Britain might then find herself, as the metropolitan power, making
complaints on behalf of Hong Kong against a Community of which she was a member’.
Dependent territories could however become a contracting party to the GATT – or
alternatively, obtain de facto recognition of this status – if full commercial autonomy were
obtained. The possibility was raised that these could be achieved by a statement of the
colony’s commercial autonomy.94 Yet this was considered politically dangerous – according
to one Foreign Office official there was ‘likely to be a strong Chinese reaction to any attempt
to declare Hong Kong independent for the purposes of international trade’.95

A second veto by de Gaulle in November, with Britain’s decision to devalue the sterling as
rationale, postponed the issue. The devaluation was not just a blow to Britain’s chances of
EEC membership but also to Hong Kong’s confidence in the metropole. With Hong Kong’s
sterling assets worth around £400 million, the 14 per cent devaluation had resulted in ‘an
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immediate loss of £56 million’ for the colony.96 The measure was therefore a cause of major
grievance in Hong Kong; the lack of notice given to the colony was an exacerbating factor.
The devaluation – combined with Britain’s review of the country’s defence arrangements
and the precariousness of Hong Kong as exposed by the 1967 riots – put in doubt Britain’s
commitment to the colony and the empire as a whole. Likewise, the 1967 EEC bid prompted
Hong Kong’s own assessment of the future of its relations with Britain.

4. The Third Application

In April 1969 Charles de Gaulle resigned, and the following June Wilson lost the general
election to the pro-European Edward Heath. Talks with the Six began the same month, and
the prospects for British entry were hopeful. Sterling and Britain’s trade balance were in a
more favourable position, whilst Heath was willing to accept EEC policies – including the CAP
– without challenge. Imperial and Commonwealth considerations were now even less
important than in 1967: the value of imperial preference had further diminished and tariff
reductions in the 1967 Kennedy Round of the GATT had reduced Britain’s importance as a
market place relative to the EEC. Apart from a transitional period for the removal of imperial
preference, no specific deal was expected for Australia, Canada or New Zealand – with the
exception of a special arrangement for the latter’s dairy produce – or for the Asian
Commonwealth, who could in any case negotiate their own arrangements as independent
nations. African states in the Commonwealth could do the same, or opt for association
through membership of the Associated African and Malagasy States. A deal was also
required to safeguard Caribbean sugar exports. Finally, the few remaining colonial
dependencies could be considered for AOT status, with the exception of Hong Kong.97 By
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October 1970, deals were made regarding all Commonwealth concerns with the exception of
New Zealand dairy produce, Caribbean sugar, and Hong Kong. The EEC pledged to safeguard
Caribbean sugar in May 1971, whilst in June the same was expressed for New Zealand dairy
produce. By this stage, Britain and the EEC had also overcome a remaining nonCommonwealth issue: the amount of Britain’s financial contribution.98 No specific
arrangement for Hong Kong was reached in the terms of Britain’s accession in 1973.
Nevertheless, Hong Kong’s acceptance into the EEC’s GSP scheme introduced in 1971 was a
related development and effectively a concession for Hong Kong’s loss of imperial
preference. This required designation as a “developing country” – but both parts of the term
proved to be problematic for Hong Kong.

Hong Kong’s need for concessions had diminished by this period, as the colony was both less
dependent on the British market and simultaneously more competitive in the EEC. The share
of Hong Kong’s domestic exports going to Britain had fallen from 20 per cent in 1961, to 13.9
per cent in 1969. Furthermore, the EEC’s share had increased from just 6 per cent in 1961 to
10 per cent in 1969. The colony’s reduced dependence on the British market was also a
result of the increasing share of exports taken by the US; from 23 per cent in 1961 to 42 per
cent in 1969. A memo by the DC&I for the TIAB concluded that ‘the effects of loss of
preference are therefore likely to be less serious than previously envisaged’ as ‘in many
cases, well developed performance in other markets, especially the U.S., tends to indicate
ability to surmount tariff barriers and compete successfully with other suppliers’.

The most important development concerning imperial preference was Britain’s
announcement that, from 1972, all cotton textiles would be subject to a tariff ‘almost
identical’ to the CET, and therefore effectively eliminating imperial preference. As a result,
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just 14 per cent of Hong Kong’s exports to Britain would be affected by the elimination of
imperial preference.99 One report produced soon after Britain’s talks with the EEC concluded
that ‘the need to seek special treatment is thereby diminished’. Based on the EEC’s reaction
to the colony’s request for special treatment in the 1961-63 negotiations – a demand for
corresponding safeguards through quantitative restrictions – a ‘strategy of maintaining a
“low posture”’ as approved by ExCo and the TIAB in 1967 remained valid. The colonial
government’s view was that Hong Kong should be kept out of any statements by the British
government made to the Six, with the possible exception of references to the GSP, though it
was also preferable this be excluded from the negotiations.100 As will be shown however,
entry into the GSP could not be separated from the issue of British entry.

The GSP was an attempt by poorer nations to readjust the system of international trade in
their favour. It was therefore born out of the ‘third world’ movement – a product of Cold
War politics, this was the self-conscious attempt by African, Asian and Latin American
nations to create a third way distinct from either US or Soviet influence. A 1961 conference
in Belgrade gave rise to the Non-Aligned Movement, in which assertions of political
independence, neutrality, and opposition to colonialism were matched by attempts to
confront problems of economic underdevelopment. The 1962 Conference on Problems of
Economic Development, held in Cairo, was a follow-up to the Belgrade conference.
According to Giuliano Garavini, in the discussions ‘a common viewpoint had clearly emerged:
Trade was considered the primary motor of development, and the privileged economic
relationships among the developed countries, or between them and the poorer nations, an
unjust instrument of pressure on discrimination’. The subsequent Cairo Declaration criticised
regional trading blocs including the EEC and ‘presented a resolution in support of a new UN
99
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conference on “all vital questions relating to international trade, primary commodity trade,
[and] economic relations between developing and developed countries”’.101

The outcome was the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) with
the slogan “trade not aid”. The Group of 77 (G77) were the signatories of a joint declaration
presented to UNCTAD that same year. They were critical of the GATT for its role in the
creation of global trade arrangements that favoured developed nations. Although in 1965 a
part IV was added recognising a disparity between developed and developing nations and
encouraging beneficial trade agreements for the latter, G77 members pushed for a system of
trade preferences for the manufactured goods of developing nations – something the GATT
was not conceived to foster given that it operated on an MFN principle.102 Following the
second UNCTAD meeting in February 1968, the G77 – at this stage now containing 86
members – agreed that the GSP was the optimal framework for their objectives; it proposed
that tariffs on the manufactured or semi-manufactured goods of developing countries
exported to developed countries should enter at zero or reduced tariffs.103

In light of these developments, the benefits of Hong Kong being recognised as developing or
less developed were once again pertinent. One DC&I memo considered how this
characterisation offered ‘a potential tactical advantage’ in obtaining favourable trading
arrangements.104 Hong Kong, as a colonial dependency, was not eligible to join the G77, but
the OECD had expressed the view that all developing nations should be eligible, and
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difficulties of definition eventually led to broad agreement in the principle of self-election.105
Government officials in Britain and Hong Kong were cognisant of the fact that this
characterisation was problematic for Hong Kong. Colonial secretary Frederick Lee told
Governor David Trench that, whilst he agreed this appeared to be ‘the best strategic posture’
with which to defend Hong Kong’s rights to reasonable market access in individual
instances,’ it would be a difficult case to make:

If the definition were a reasonably tight one it would be hard to agree that Hong Kong
were still less developed. In terms of the growth of manufacturing industry, average
income per head, the standard of living of the generality of the population, nutrition,
education, health services, even housing, etc., Hong Kong is already well ahead of the
really poor majority of the world.106

Furthermore, self-presentation as developing would also have to be used selectively. The
DC&I paper stated that ‘there may be occasions when it would not be advantageous to be
considered as [less developed country] status and we might then attempt to get the best of
both worlds by seeking developed status in a particular sector’.107 Lee’s response was that
the colony needed to avoid inconsistencies, and that it certain instances ‘developed status
would need to be obtained by stealth’.108

The lack of concrete parameters for what constituted a developing country, whilst providing
the opportunity for self-election, also had the disadvantage of allowing exclusion from this
categorisation on arbitrary grounds. This was the case during discussions in March 1967 on
the renewal of the LTA. Hong Kong sought expanded textile quotas from the EEC in
accordance with part IV of the GATT, but was informed that Hong Kong was not regarded as
developing due to the fact the colony was not a primary producer of cotton. There were
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however a number of positive precedents for Hong Kong: in OECD reports the colony was
treated as developing, and its experience in the 1967 Kennedy Round of the GATT also
implied developing status.109 Nevertheless, at the time of its first introduction the possibility
of Hong Kong’s trading partners establishing the GSP was regarded as counter to the colony’s
economic interests. The possibility of exclusion was high and this would place the colony at a
relative disadvantage; Hong Kong benefitted from the MFN principle of the GATT, which the
GSP would erode; and finally, Britain’s entry into the scheme would further undermine the
value of imperial preference – even if this was now less important to Hong Kong, it still
retained some value. 110 During 1968 the OECD as a whole met to discuss the GSP, but no
agreement had been reached on a common approach. By late 1968 British government
officials learned that the EEC was likely to exclude Hong Kong from its preference scheme.111
In a private meeting, one EEC representative to the UNCTAD’s trade and development board
told a British representative that France was the primary obstacle to Hong Kong’s inclusion,
and that ‘the U.K. should now begin to exert political pressure generally, but that this should
be especially directed towards changing the French opposition’.112

The EEC representative was provided with a list of arguments for why Hong Kong should be
recognised as developing, and therefore benefit from the GSP. They included other
precedents – ‘Hong Kong has hitherto always been accepted as a developing country’ – and
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the fact that the colony’s national income per head put it below other countries whose
developing status was accepted. To counter one reason given for exclusion from developing
treatment in the renewal of the LTA, that Hong Kong was not a grower of cotton, the
document stated that ‘it cannot export raw materials that it does not possess’. Despite being
an industrial exporter, it was claimed that Hong Kong ‘does not have any heavy or
sophisticated industry as is normally found in a developed country’ and ‘as much as half of its
industrial production consists of textiles, again not a characteristic of a developed
country’.113

There was a general consensus that making the case for Hong Kong as a developing country
could not be done publicly or be achieved by the lobbying of business groups comparable to
that described in section 1. Representatives from the colony’s commercial associations told
acting governor Hugh Norman-Walker that, although Hong Kong’s bleak prospects in the GSP
were ‘potentially the most serious and alarming’ of Hong Kong’s problems in the realm of
trade and industry concerns, they realised that there was little scope to influence the
outcome of the negotiations. They nevertheless enquired whether a ‘P.R. exercise’ might be
beneficial, but were told by Trench in reply that they should limit appeals ‘through the
diplomatic channels that are already serving us well’.114 Nevertheless, the debate entered
the public sphere: the CMA vice-president for example publicly stated that ‘there is no
ground at all in calling Hongkong a developed country,’ whilst others pointed to the inherent
contradiction in Hong Kong’s attempts to both appear as developing whilst in other contexts
lauding Hong Kong’s level of development and its economic achievements.115
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The question of Hong Kong’s inclusion in the EEC scheme had not been resolved by the time
Britain reopened discussion on community membership in June 1969. In late 1969 however,
the EEC revealed that the colony was not to be accepted, and was instead be offered a minor
concession in the form of a preference equal to 5 per cent of the colony’s exports to the EEC.
Hong Kong’s representative in Geneva called the offer ‘completely valueless’ and reported
strong opposition from members of the British delegation.116 Worse for Hong Kong was that
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore would be included in the scheme. When the British
delegation inquired as to why Hong Kong was facing ‘thinly veiled discrimination with no
apparent logical justification’ they were informed that a view within the Six was that the
colony was not a “country” and therefore did not qualify.117 The argument was justified on
the basis that as a colonial dependency, Hong Kong was the responsibility of the
metropolitan power and therefore did not require the same assistance given to developing
countries.118 Furthermore, the Six reportedly feared that the G77 would oppose inclusion of
non-members, particularly those with Hong Kong’s level of development.119

British government ministers had preferred to keep the GSP issue separate from the EEC
entry negotiations, choosing to focus on the OECD as a forum to press for Hong Kong’s
inclusion in the scheme.120 The two objectives proved inseparable however. Firstly, in July
the EEC had expressed preference for current members and prospective candidates coming
to a consensus on the GSP issue, in preparation for a common community policy. Whilst
British ministers were in favour of such an approach, they were concerned of a scenario in
which Britain, ‘as a result of harmonising its Generalised Preference offer with that of the
European Communities, had to exclude Hong Kong from the list of beneficiaries’. A further
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argument was that inclusion of Hong Kong in the schemes of other OECD members – such as
that of the US – was likely to be dependent on the precedent set by the EEC. This was of
concern to the EEC because Hong Kong’s acceptance into the US scheme might serve to
divert exports from Hong Kong to the US. Finally, exclusion from the GSP on the basis of
being a “territory” and not a “country”, and therefore implying responsibility lay entirely
with Britain, would be an implicit acceptance of ‘the enlarged Community’s responsibility for
Hong Kong’ in the negotiations.121 By early 1971, the Six were convinced that inclusion of
Hong Kong in the GSP was an appropriate means of dealing with the colony, in respect to
British entry of the EEC. Their offer however had a number of provisions that served to
substantially weaken the benefits of entry. Crucially, the offer excluded textiles and
footwear. Furthermore, it contained various safeguards for products regarded as sensitive.122

The CMA had placed a high priority on entry into the GSP schemes; following its creation the
association ‘made a series of approaches to official representatives and business of the
major donor countries based in Hong Kong, stressing the possible economic, social and
political repercussions that could occur if Hong Kong were to be excluded’.123 By 1972, Hong
Kong had been included in the schemes of Austria, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, and
Switzerland in addition to Britain. However, ‘because of the restrictive nature of some of the
schemes, the benefit derived from them was rather limited’. The CMA claimed that ‘it is
particularly regrettable that Hong Kong had been discriminated extensively and most unfairly
by Japan’ due the exclusion of 96 items from the scheme as it applied to the colony, whereas
‘Hong Kong’s close competitors – Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore – were allowed to
enjoy full preferences’.124 Likewise, the CMA were highly critical of the ‘discrimination’ Hong
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Kong faced in the EEC scheme, and were concerned that upon Britain’s accession, ‘Hong
Kong textile and footwear would also be denied of preferential treatment in the British
market, while countries such as South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia would be, on the
contrary, granted duty free access’. They subsequently petitioned the foreign secretary to
press for Hong Kong’s inclusion in the scheme, with ‘little success’ achieved following British
entry.125

Finally, Hong Kong’s fears about the nature of its GATT status following British accession did
not come to pass. Although the EEC would be represented singularly in forums, its members
remained as separate contracting parties. In late 1972, the British government were able to
tell the GATT administration that ‘the United Kingdom is the contracting party which has
acceded to the GATT on behalf of Hong Kong, and must continue to be responsible for Hong
Kong’s GATT rights and obligations’.126 As Lawrence Mills has described, this led to a
convoluted system of representation, in which a member of the British contingent of the EEC
delegation would be speaking for Hong Kong, and often from an opposing standpoint to the
EEC.127 Nevertheless, the arrangement was one that conferred Hong Kong with full
responsibility for managing its own trading rights.

Conclusion

The previous chapter showed how Hong Kong sought to defend its channels of trade from
restriction by embarking on an independent programme of commercial public relations.
Britain’s attempts to enter the EEC likewise prompted the colony’s business representatives
to attempt to influence political decision making. Associate membership within the EEC, or
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failing that, some arrangement comparable to imperial preference, was regarded as an
appropriate method of preserving Hong Kong’s special access to the British market. During
the 1961-63 negotiations this was justified on sentimental appeals to British responsibility to
the colony, yet this failed to convince the Six. Likewise, Hong Kong’s symbolic importance as
a beacon of Western values was not regarded as sufficient reason to mitigate the colony’s
subjection to the CET, nor was Hong Kong regarded as a developing country.

Despite attempts by Hong Kong’s business associations to influence the outcome of the
negotiations, the colony was ultimately dependent on Britain’s commitment to the interests
of Hong Kong, and the lengths the British government would go in protecting them. Towards
the end of the first membership bid, this faith was wavering. By the time of the second bid in
1967, there were serious doubts that Hong Kong would be a priority. The British bid was in
part born from domestic crises, and Britain seemed to be withdrawing from its imperial
commitments during this period. In the end, the metropole’s resolve was not tested as
negotiations failed to materialise. Nevertheless, it was a crisis period in relations between
Britain and Hong Kong, and brought to the forefront the problematic nature of colonial
status in a period of imperial retreat.

Hong Kong’s anachronistic status was most sharply evidenced by the colony’s attempts to
benefit from the GSP. Industrialised yet constitutionally dependent on Britain, the colony’s
self-representation as a “developing country” for instrumentalist reasons did not appear
likely to yield success. It is unclear whether the Six were convinced by Hong Kong’s
arguments in favour of its developing status or not, as the colony’s inclusion was likely
granted to remove it from the accession negotiations. Although the terms of entry were
underwhelming, exclusion would have been detrimental, and acceptance into the EEC
scheme was followed by involvement in others – most importantly that of the US in 1976.
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Given that inclusion in the EEC’s GSP scheme was in lieu of any arrangement within Britain’s
terms of ascension, however, Hong Kong’s special economic relationship with the metropole
could not survive British entry into the community in 1973.

The Hong Kong government had feared for the colony’s GATT rights on British accession,
which if lost, would have been detrimental to its trading rights and the management of its
commercial relations. Not only did Hong Kong’s GATT status not alter, the arrangement also
bestowed on Hong Kong de facto autonomy over the conduct of its external commercial
relations. By this stage, the colony had also achieved financial autonomy, adding to a sense
that decolonisation ‘was well underway’ by the time Britain entered the EEC at the beginning
of 1973.128 As the following chapter will explore, these developments had significant
implications: when Hong Kong came to negotiate with the EEC over textile restrictions,
Britain was less willing to press for the colony’s interests. Owing to textile issues, and a
number of other issues of contention, relations between Hong Kong and Britain reached a
low-ebb during the 1970s.
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Chapter 4

Hong Kong in the 1970s: Change and Continuity

Introduction

The 1970s in Hong Kong have been categorised in a number of ways: as a period of economic
boom in which Hong Kong assumed its status as an international finance centre, as the years
in which governor Murray MacLehose ushered in a new era of social reform and political
legitimacy, as the decade of ‘autonomous’ Hong Kong, as the time when a distinct “Hong
Kong identity” became more pronounced, and as a ‘decade of social conflict and popular
mobilization’.1 As this chapter will investigate, the 1970s were also a period in which Hong
Kong was faced with the most stringent restrictions on its exports to date. Furthermore, it
was a time when relations between Hong Kong and Britain reached a low-ebb, as a result of
policy decisions on both sides, and from continuing criticism in Britain of Hong Kong’s
economic and social conditions. Finally, it was a decade that witnessed the beginnings of a
fundamental ideological shift in economic thought, resulting in changing representations of
Hong Kong’s economic model overseas.

This chapter will argue that, although existing characterisations of Hong Kong for the period
may hold true, the decade was essentially one of continuity. The importance of
manufacturing remained fairly consistent during the decade, and not until 1981 did the
financial sector surpass manufacturing in terms of contribution to Hong Kong’s GDP.2
Although the colonial government expressed some willingness to intervene in areas of social
policy, and made a token effort to respond to demands for industrial assistance, they
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maintained their commitment to non-intervention in the economy and their commitment to
its virtues became further entrenched by the end of the decade, despite internal and
external challenges.

The previous chapter explored how Britain’s second application to the EEC in 1967 came at a
crisis point in relations between Britain and Hong Kong. As the first section demonstrates,
the build-up to Britain’s ascension into the Community in early 1974 was also a period in
which a number of strains in the relationship between the two governments emerged.
Textile issues were again at the forefront, albeit not the only issue of contention. The British
government’s decision in late 1971 to reinstate a system of quota restrictions came at an
inauspicious time, as it followed agreements extracted from Hong Kong by the US restricting
exports of an expanded variety of textile manufactures – a move that would precipitate the
development of the most comprehensive system of international textile restraints to date in
the form of the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA). The metropole was accused by the colony’s
business and government representatives of both neglecting its responsibilities for Hong
Kong’s economic welfare, and exacerbating a protectionist revival. The 1970s has been
presented as a period of general disinterest in the metropole, among British government
officials and politicians, towards Hong Kong.3 Whilst this may be the case, section one reveals
that certain officials regarded souring relations and a poor image of Britain there – its
economic stagnation in contrast to Hong Kong’s prosperity – as detrimental to metropolitan
interests in the colony.

The negotiations between Hong Kong and the EEC prior to the renewal of the MFA in 1977
reflected this political backdrop, as section two explores. In contrast to comparable
situations previously, the British government proved unwilling to press for Hong Kong's
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interests for a number of reasons: they placed a high priority on protecting domestic
industries during a period of economic fragility; as a member of the EEC, they also had
community-wide objectives to consider, and finally, British officials were unconvinced by
Hong Kong’s arguments about the impact the proposed restrictions would have on the
colony’s economy. Governor MacLehose sought to present the EEC’s quota demands as a
barrier to the Hong Kong government’s social policy initiatives. Whilst the arguments he
made against trade barriers were therefore grounded in an apparent policy shift in Hong
Kong, the abandonment of previous rhetorical strategies also reflected a new geopolitical
climate. With détente between the China and the West from the early 1970s, the rhetoric of
Hong Kong as in important symbolic and strategic Cold War outpost was no longer pertinent.
By this stage, however, Hong Kong’s successful growth – particularly in contrast to elsewhere
– had made the governor’s warnings seem exaggerated. FCO officials also noted that the
colonial government’s level of financial commitment to the reforms was currently well within
their capabilities.

In response to intensive protectionism, global economic slowdown, and growing
competition, the colonial government received increased pressure to assist the colony’s
industries. Section three will show that neither they nor Hong Kong’s growing trade unions
were able to persuade the government to depart from a commercial policy they perceived
was most appropriate for Hong Kong, and had seemingly underpinned the colony’s now
conspicuous success. As section four will show, that Hong Kong was prospering whilst Britain
and other Western powers endured economic hardship appeared to vindicate the colonial
government’s policy choices, and as a result, colonial officials became spokespeople for the
virtues of free trade and economic non-intervention. Furthermore, to critics of the “postwar
consensus” in Britain and to opponents of managed economies and high government
spending more generally, Hong Kong offered a vision of a better alternative. The social

138

reforms that the colonial government had initiated during the 1970s were not enough to
deter advocates of free market principles from pointing to Hong Kong as an exemplary
model. Finally, the election victory of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 resulted in a convergence
of the prevailing economic doctrines in Britain and Hong Kong.

1. Fractured Relations

By 1969, Hong Kong had experienced a decade of quota restrictions on textiles through the
agreements with Britain and under the auspices of the GATT. Despite these restrictions, the
colony experienced ‘continuous double-digit growth’ from 1961 onwards.4 This was due to
the combined effects of Hong Kong’s ability to perform at almost maximum capacity within
the confines of the quotas, and the fact that the quota system provided a guaranteed market
share and inflated market prices.5 Hong Kong’s ‘remarkable performance’ against the export
quotas was owed to their efficient allocation in the colony.6 The Cotton Advisory Board –
known as the Textiles Advisory Board (TEXTAB) from 1969 – was set up to assist the colonial
government with the allocation of quotas to producers based on their past performance,
whilst the transferability of the quotas allowed them to be bought and sold. Hong Kong and
other producers of garments had also been able to avoid the restrictions of the LTA through
blending cotton with man-made fibres (MMF) in clothing items, as the LTA applied only to
cotton products defined as containing at least 50 per cent cotton by volume or weight.7
According to the Hong Kong government’s annual report for 1970:

The use of fibres other than cotton and new processes in the finishing and garment
industries are of growing importance. Twenty-one textile mills are engaged in the

4
5
6
7

Ho, Trade, Industrial Restructuring and Development in Hong Kong, 21.
Mills, Protecting Free Trade, 97.
Lin and Mok, Trade Barriers and the Promotion of Hong Kong Exports, 38.
Mills, Protecting Free Trade, 67.

139

production of polyester-cotton and polyester-viscose yarn for weaving into shirting
and other fabrics for which there is a rapid growth in demand.8

As a result of their increasing use by Hong Kong and other producers, Richard Nixon, upon
winning the presidency in 1969, sought a renewal of the LTA that would encompass both
MMFs and wool products. In May 1969, US Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans visited
Hong Kong to request the colony’s attendance at a ‘special meeting the US proposed to hold
within the GATT’ regarding MMFs and wool, which the colony’s representatives declined.9
Nevertheless, in late 1969, discussions between representatives of the two governments – in
addition to members of the British mission to the UN – were held in Geneva. The Hong Kong
side disputed allegations that the colony’s industries were causing disruption to their US
counterparts, and were told in response that failure to reach a voluntary agreement could be
met with restrictions on these new categories imposed unilaterally.10

Although the EEC restricted MMFs from Japan, the Community were opposed to a
multilateral system covering these categories on the basis of that members themselves
supplied these goods to the US market. Whilst Hong Kong had agreed to restrictions on
either MMFs or wool with several importers on an individual basis – including MMFs to
Canada, and wool to Norway, Sweden, and Germany – the renewal of the LTA for three years
in 1970 remained confined to cotton goods.11 Unilateral US quota restrictions on clothing
and footwear almost came to fruition with the 1970 “Mills Bill,” yet despite passing in the
8
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House of Representatives, the legislation failed to be voted on in the Senate after being
purposely delayed.12 At the same time, the US proceeded with seeking restrictions on MMFs
and wool on a bilateral basis, focussing on East Asian suppliers as the primary exporters. In
October 1971, Nixon was concerned about a forthcoming presidential election and placed a
high priority on obtaining restrictions. The US were able to extract agreements on MMFs and
wool from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, following further threats of
unilateral action and the imposition of a ten per cent import surcharge.13 Hong Kong’s
officials felt strong-armed into the agreement; DC&I director Jack Cater claimed the
agreement was made with ‘a pistol at our heads’.14

Meanwhile, the Conservative British government made the decision in late 1971 to continue
with a policy of quotas on textile goods, despite the decision made by the previous
government in 1969 to impose a general tariff on these imports. The announcement of the
tariff, which was to come into effect in 1972, had been paralleled by assurances that quotas
would no longer be used. Justifications for the turnaround included ongoing unemployment
in Lancashire, that quota restraints would be operated regardless on a community basis once
Britain joined the EEC, the possibility that exports to the US would be diverted to the British
market following US agreements with East Asian producers, and ‘evidence of a large build-up
of orders already in the pipeline for 1972’.15 The turnaround was met with fierce criticism in
Hong Kong from business groups. A joint letter to the trade and industry secretary from
members of TEXTAB and the chairmen of the FHKI, CMA, and Hong Kong Garment
Manufacturers’ Association among others, called the decision ‘an inconsiderate and
unreasonable measure by the British Government’ and one that would ‘be interpreted in
12
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Hong Kong as showing the absence of a sense of moral obligation of the British Government
towards Hong Kong people’.16 In an opening statement at a series of meetings held between
British and Hong Kong officials in January 1972, Haddon-Cave reported on the
‘embarrassment caused to the Hong Kong Government by HMG’s volte-face’ and ‘the illfeeling and uneasiness it had caused in Hong Kong’s industrial community’. Furthermore, the
financial secretary claimed there that was ‘apprehension that Hong Kong’s interests would
be sacrificed when the UK became a member of the enlarged Community, and a suspicion
that HMG would find it difficult to continue to offer support to the Hong Kong textile
industry’.17

From the perspective of the colony’s business and government elites, the textile quota
turnaround was one issue of several causing a lack of confidence in the metropole. The
discontent was enough that Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home told Prime Minister
Edward Heath that he was ‘concerned about the state of Hong Kong’s relations with Britain,
and the implications of these relations for our interests’. Whilst he said the ‘problems need
not be overstressed,’ he told the Prime Minister there were several ‘areas of strain’.18 These
included the renewal of the sterling agreements reached after devolution in 1967 – Hong
Kong had pressed the British government for a further renewal of the exchange guarantees
that would compensate for a decline in the value of sterling, but the British government had
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delayed on the basis of Australian opposition. In August 1973, with the current agreements
set to expire in September, the Hong Kong government threatened to diversify half of its
sterling reserves, which the British government opposed.19 Another trade-related grievance
was British entry into the EEC’s GSP scheme, which would take effect with British accession
at the beginning of 1974. As shown in the previous chapter, Hong Kong resented that they
were exempt from preferences for footwear and textiles, which competitors such as South
Korea enjoyed. Finally, Britain’s contentious control over landing rights at Hong Kong’s
airport was an ongoing area of dispute.

Economic issues were not the only source of contention between the two governments
however. Douglas-Home likewise referred to two high profile judicial cases that had, in the
first example compromised the autonomy of the Hong Kong justice system, and in the latter,
hindered the colony’s anti-corruption efforts. Divergence over judicial matters was not a
new source of friction – following the 1967 riots the Hong Kong government had faced
pressure from the metropole to release prisoners implicated in the disturbances, for the
purposes of securing the release of a British political prisoner in Beijing and normalising SinoBritish relations.20 In 1973, the FCO had ordered that the death sentence of a convicted
murderer be commuted in line with the British abolition of the death penalty in 1965. Public
opinion in Hong Kong was in favour of the execution, and sought by the colonial government
on this basis. The other case related to Peter Godber, a chief superintendent of the Royal
Hong Kong Police Force, who fled to Britain whilst under investigation for corruption. At this
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stage, the British government was not able to extradite him due to a discrepancy between
Hong Kong and British corruption laws.21

According to the foreign secretary, the controversies stemmed from ‘the fact that ‘Hong
Kong is a modern industrial society in its own right, but without any hope of constitutional
advance’.22 Whilst Hong Kong’s highest officials were not elected in the colony, they
nevertheless tended to prioritise their responsibilities to Hong Kong over the interests of
their sovereign power. For some observers from the metropole, that the colony’s officials
affiliated more closely with Hong Kong also accounted for the discord between the two
governments. Following a visit of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry to Hong
Kong in October 1973, the Chamber’s president Sir Patrick Reilly told an FCO official that:

It was an interesting experience to find British officials and businessmen in Hong Kong
entirely identifying themselves with Hong Kong so that “we” was Hong Kong and “you”
was Britain. I got the impression that they were often highly critical of Britain and
H.M.G., sometimes indeed almost to the point of being positively anti-British.
Someone described the position of Hong Kong as “undeclared UDI [unilateral
declaration of independence]”.23

The Hong Kong government’s decision in late 1973 to negotiate with a Japanese rather than
an Anglo-Italian consortium – the latter was formed following the collapse of an all-British
consortium in August – for the construction of the colony’s underground railway system was
one example of the government’s rejection of colonial convention. The British government,
which placed a high priority on British investors winning the contract for both economic
reasons and matters of prestige, believed that political loyalties would trump the lower price
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proposals of their Japanese competitors, and had pressed the Hong Kong government to
pursue a single contract approach with this rationale.24

In response to the material consequences of drift between Hong Kong and Britain, the British
Trade Commission in Hong Kong identified a public relations problem for Britain in Hong
Kong; they noted that perceptions of British economic decline were particularly prevalent in
the colony.25 This was a reflection of attitudes in the metropole itself, where inflation,
industrial decline, and excessive public borrowing were identified as indicators of a general
downward trend. One economic historian comments that ‘by the beginning of the 1970s the
notion that Britain was suffering from a secular economic decline was well established across
the political spectrum’ and identifies journalists in particular as involved in ‘scaremongering’
about the state of the British economy, and of British political and cultural “decline” more
broadly.26 This view of Britain was widely held in Hong Kong according to a senior trade
commissioner, who claimed that ‘the prevailing attitude is a skeptical, if sad, reconviction
that Britain is going down the economic drain’.

27

Another attempted to explain this

phenomenon, reporting that:

The quite proper preoccupation in the British press with Britain’s economic problems
is faithfully reflected here, but against the background of Hong Kong rather than
Britain itself. The result is an impression, at least in some quarters, that Britain is a
depressed, run down country. For instance one writer in a Chinese language
newspaper who had just visited Britain recently expressed surprise at the prosperity
and standards of technology.28
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In a monthly publication by Britain’s overseas information service, therefore, British travelers
were provided with a series of ‘talking points’ which were ‘intended to present the positive
aspects of Britain’s economic performance, which are often overlooked, and might help to
correct unduly pessimistic views’. It contained claims about improved confidence in sterling
and statistics relating to improvements in production, inflation, industrial unrest, balance of
payments, growth and the performance of certain industries.29 Hong Kong’s economic
performance, on the other hand, stood in sharp contrast, and as will be discussed, the
outcome of the Hong Kong governor’s attempt to persuade Britain and the rest of the EEC
membership to soften their demands for enhanced trade restrictions should be understood
in this context. Furthermore, the apparent success of the Hong Kong economic model in
comparison to that of Britain fueled depictions of Hong Kong as representing a favourable
alternative.

2. Trade and Social Policy

The tenure of Governor Murray MacLehose is typically characterised as encompassing a new
departure for social policy and state-society relations in Hong Kong. By some accounts, the
colonial government’s prior reluctance to dedicate significant resources to the provision of
public goods or engage in other forms of social intervention was replaced in this period by a
more proactive approach.30 Developments included the introduction of social welfare
provisions such as work relief – in this instance initiated prior to MacLehose’s arrival – and a
special needs allowance. Furthermore, the Ten Year Housing Plan introduced in 1972 had the
aim of building 180 thousand units a year and rehousing 1.8 million people – mostly in New
Kowloon and the new towns of Tsuen Wan, Shatin and Tuen Mun. The colonial government
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also undertook educational and health reform: the 1971 Education Ordinance introduced
universal primary education, whilst a 1974 white paper on ‘The Further Development of
Medical and Health Services in Hong Kong’ sought an expansion and improvement of
healthcare provisions.

Nevertheless, welfare provisions were far from comprehensive – child benefit, for example,
remained absent. More significantly, the government’s commitments to housing, education
and healthcare provisions were not all realised. The number of housing units produced fell
far below those pledged in 1972, whilst non-government organisations and charities
continued to fill a significant deficit in the availability of public healthcare. Whilst three years
of secondary education were made compulsory in 1978, the quality of the education on offer
faced criticism, and there remained a lingering reliance on the private sector.31 Although far
from representing the establishment of a British-style welfare state in the colony, these
provisions nevertheless appeared to represent the colonial government’s inclination to seem
more responsive and reform-minded than in previous decades. Reform in the civil service,
the creation of City District Officers, and ramped up anti-corruption measures culminating in
the creation of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974, represented
attempts at enhancing the legitimacy and responsiveness of the colonial regime, and its
efforts in community building.

The shift has been attributed to the individual traits of MacLehose himself, and facilitated by
the extensive power and influence of the governor position.32 Others place more emphasis
on the 1967 riots and their aftermath as precipitating a change in public policy. In these
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accounts, although the colonial government regarded the disturbances as a spillover from
China’s Cultural Revolution, widespread disorder was interpreted as a sign that the
government should seek to prevent future unrest through social reform, and to capitalise on
the legitimacy obtained through the restoration of order.33 Different interpretations
emphasise that the social interventions under MacLehose in the 1970s – and, crucially in
these readings, those initiated by his immediate predecessor David Trench – were rooted in
a more long-term recognition of ‘governance problems’ in the colony.34 Finally, it has been
argued that the impetus stemmed from the metropole in the form of the FCO. From this
perspective, MacLehose was a ‘reluctant reformer’ whose designs for Hong Kong were
regarded as inadequate by the FCO. Until their increased pressure from the mid-1970s,
which was resented by the governor, the pace of reform in the colony was sluggish.35 These
two latter interpretations share the view that the prospect of future negotiations with China
weighed heavily on the minds of the colonial and British governments respectively, as both
thought that Hong Kong’s social stability and the confidence of the colony’s population in
their government would place the British side in a move favourable position.36

Despite the reforms that were instigated during this period, the colonial government faced
continual scrutiny and was met with accusations that insufficient progress was being made in
social provisions and regulation. Despite the passage of the 1968 Employment Ordinance,
and the 1975 Labour Relations Ordinance, labour conditions and the use of child labour in
particular faced questioning and criticism from politicians, in newspapers, and from other
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observers such as academics.37 The colonial government were cognisant of what appeared
to be Hong Kong’s declining reputation in Britain; one GIS report on Hong Kong’s image in
Britain listed certain ‘misconceptions’ there relating to the colony’s economic life:

Laissez-faire attitude – everyone looking for quick return on investments – a tax haven
– a sweat shop producing goods to be produced in Britain – in short, heaven for the
rich and devil take the hindmost, including the poor.38

A report several years earlier claimed similar attitudes were prevalent in many countries in
Europe.39 The Labour Party’s return to power in 1974 saw an increase in pressure on Hong
Kong to rectify these issues; in the words of Denis Bray, who became Hong Kong's
Commissioner in London in 1977 and was therefore responsible for managing the colony's
image in the metropole, the Labour government 'did not really like our successful corner of
unbridled enterprise in the empire' as it 'really was a place that flew in the face of much of
what these men and women believed in’.40 Although, as this thesis has shown, the
management of public relations in Britain had been a consistent feature of colonial
government policy since the late 1950s, the year Labour returned to government the GIS
formulated a plan to ‘step up Hong Kong’s information effort in the U.K.’ and listed ‘the
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antipathy of some Labour M.P.s towards Hong Kong’ as among the reasons necessitating the
measure. At the same time, MacLehose personally requested the production of a publication
that emphasised Hong Kong’s progress in social interventions and the eradication of
corruption.41

As this section explores, when Hong Kong was forced to negotiate an agreement on
restrictions with the EEC prior to the renewal of the MFA in 1977, the arguments made to
defend Hong Kong's position reflected this new political backdrop. On one hand, the colonial
government attempted to draw on its new reformist ethos to create a more sympathetic
image, and on the other, the Governor argued that the initiatives were dependent on
sufficient government revenues, which harsh textiles quotas would erode. Furthermore,
depictions of Hong Kong as a free market enclave – a rhetorical strategy that had been
utilised in previous defences of the colony’s right to export freely – were made both
inappropriate in light of domestic disapproval of the colony’s approach to economic and
social matters, and less powerful in the wake of a changed geopolitical climate. In 1971,
Britain and China had exchanged ambassadors following a low-point in Sino-British relations
during the Cultural Revolution, whilst the visits to Beijing of Henry Kissinger in July 1971 and
President Richard Nixon the following year were landmark moments in rapprochement
between China and the US. At the same time, the US lifted their embargo on China, bringing
to an end a policy of economic isolation towards China. Finally, on 25 October 1971 the
General Assembly voted for China’s admission into the United Nations.42 These
developments diminished the utility of arguments about Hong Kong’s strategic and symbolic
importance as a Western outpost.
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Although European governments had opposed initial attempts by the US to create an
international regime restricting MMFs and wool products, the bilateral restrictions the US
had negotiated from East Asian exporters had the effect of diverting the supply of their
goods to European markets. In 1972, therefore, the EEC supported an investigation by the
GATT administration into the international trade of MMFs and wool. The outcome was the
MFA, agreed at the end of 1973 to be implemented at the beginning of 1974 for four years.43
The MFA was readily accepted by Hong Kong’s government and industrialists on the basis
that its framework improved upon the LTA in several aspects; the DC&I perceived the
agreement as preferable to the LTA, given that the voluntary restrictions on non-cotton
textiles agreed under its auspices were unregulated. The HKGCC concurred; their 1973
annual report called the arrangement a ‘notable achievement’ and ‘more specific and fair in
setting out the conditions in which export restraint can be justified’.44 Its provisions included
the requirement of proof of market disruption by countries demanding restrictions, and the
creation of a Textiles Surveillance Body (TSB) to ‘make recommendations’ in the event of an
‘absence of any mutually agreed solution in bilateral negotiations or consultations between
participating countries provided for in this Arrangement’.45

Under the MFA, Hong Kong quickly reached agreements with the US, Australia, and Sweden
with little complications. Disagreement among EEC members, however, slowed the
transition from members holding individual agreements with numerous exporters, to a
system of community-wide deals compatible with MFA guidelines and agreed upon by all
43
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community members. Whereas Hong Kong’s negotiations with the US were concluded in
four days in May 1974, talks with the EEC involved three rounds spread over several months,
with agreement not reached until June 1975.46 As will be shown, the build-up to the renewal
of the MFA in 1977 proved more problematic still, with negotiations between Hong Kong and
the EEC of central importance. In June 1977 – following long delays resulting from internal
disagreements – the EEC released their demands for an MFA with much more stringent
restrictions, including recognition of a category of “industrialised developing” countries such
as Hong Kong, in addition to lower levels of quota growth permitted across the board.
Finally, they insisted that agreements with exporters should be in place first, before the MFA
could be renewed. Aggarwal attributes the EEC’s capacity to set the terms of the MFA to its
newly-assumed position as the dominant textile marketplace, supplanting the US.47 The EEC
first agreed internally upon an unofficial single ceiling for all exports entering the community
as a whole.48 The commission decided that its aim in the bilateral negotiations should be to
maintain the imports of relevant goods to their 1976 level as a whole; for the major suppliers
– Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan – this was likely to involve a cut below the 1976 level,
which required “reasonable departures” from the MFA. The EEC warned that if agreements
could not be reached to this end, measures would be taken unilaterally, likely through
utilisation of the safeguard clause stipulated in Article XIX of the GATT.49

The EEC Commission’s special representative for textiles Tran Van Thinh informed the Hong
Kong government of their proposals in August. MacLehose subsequently told the FCO that an
agreement comparable with the one reached with the US would be acceptable, or failing
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that, ‘a small cutback in quota possibilities for sensitive items – though such a thing has
never been imposed in the past – might be accepted if the effects could be isolated to trade
with the EEC’. Nevertheless, he argued that such a deal would set a precedent in ensuing
deals, and ‘the effect on Hong Kong would therefore be much more serious than that
intended by the EEC, and would be unacceptable’. Likewise, a cut to the extent envisaged by
the EEC would have ‘an immediate effect on actual exports and on employment,’ and,
combined with the impact of similar restrictions sought by other parties, could ‘add up to an
abrupt shock to employment, the economy, confidence and attitudes to the UK – who I am
afraid would be held responsible for the EEC’s action’. The governor then proceeded to
suggest that resentment towards Britain over the restrictions could undermine potential bids
in large investment opportunities in the colony – citing plans for the construction of a power
station and an extension to the Mass Transit Railway (MTR). Finally, the governor warned
that ‘social progress’ in Hong Kong was at risk.50 At the end of September, the governor met
with EEC Commission Officials, where he reiterated the consequences their proposals would
have for the colony’s social reforms.51

By contrast, the Hong Kong Association had decided that attempting to apply political
pressure on the British government would be ‘counter-productive’ and likely unsuccessful.
John Swire, of the Hong Kong-based conglomerate John Swire and Sons Ltd., told John
Bremridge – who was chairman of the company prior to becoming financial secretary in 1981
– that they ‘have to bear in mind the danger of “crying wolf” once again on Hong Kong’s
behalf’ as Hong Kong has ‘compared with the rest of the world, done very well over the last
two years’.52 Perhaps because of this fact, internal FCO correspondence reveals that the
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governor’s arguments were met with apprehension. The FCO’s interpretation was that
‘MacLehose has overstated the Hong Kong case,’ but that the British government should,
nevertheless, ‘avoid… giving those in Hong Kong who oppose the pace of social reform an
excuse for saying that this pace must be slowed down if there is something of a textile-led
recession’.53 Another memo noted concurrence with the assessment that:

It was difficult to believe that the kind of restrictions on Hong Kong’s imports that
might emerge from the renegotiation of the MFA could significantly affect growth and
that we not disposed to accept that such restrictions would really put the fulfilment of
Hong Kong’s social programmes in jeopardy… The Hong Kong Government is at
present taking only a small slice (around 17%) of GDP and if the size of the cake is
reduced there seems to be no real reason why the Government should not take a
larger slice to compensate. In short, the rate of taxation could be increased in order to
ensure that adequate resources are available for social programmes.

Likewise, the department were not persuaded by the veiled threats about the power station
project, as – perhaps taking the example of the initial MTR contract process as indicative –
they made the observation that ‘at the end of the day price will be what matters’.54 The
colony’s arguments were ultimately insufficient to override the British government’s
alternative priorities for the MFA, and their obligations as an EEC member. The British
Labour government were themselves in favour of a more stringent MFA, and were
disinclined to press for the colony’s preferential treatment. Having already agreed with the
community decision on global quota ceilings, the FCO recognised that ‘the making of a
special case for Hong Kong would therefore involve more generous treatment for her at the
expense of other suppliers’. Instead, the British government had agreed to seek preferential
treatment only for ‘the poorest developing countries, e.g. India and Pakistan’. On the other
hand, they reasoned that ‘the Commission would not understand why the UK, which all
along, with the French, has taken the lead in demanding stringent protection, should
suddenly be asking for more generous treatment to the Community’s largest single textile
53
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supplier’. Finally, it was noted that ‘no other Member State has much sympathy for Hong
Kong,’ and giving them and other “super competitive” territories preference at the expense
of the ‘poorest countries’ and ‘newcomers to the Community’s textile market’ would not win
much support.55 Nevertheless, the British government acknowledged that some flexibility
should be exercised, otherwise Hong Kong ‘may otherwise be provoked into a refusal to
cooperate’ and recognised ‘important British commercial interests’ in the colony that they
wish to avoid compromising.56

In October, negotiations between the EEC and textile producing nations were initiated in
Brussels. Owing to the EEC’s demand for cuts in all categories of goods below 1976 levels,
negotiations between Hong Kong and the Community were heated. Different quotas for
separate categories were calculated using complex formula, relating to their level of “import
penetration,” and the cuts the colony faced ranged from 5.5 to 33 per cent across different
categories.57 Chief trade negotiator for Hong Kong, Lawrence Mills, dismissed the offer for
“group 1” category goods – meaning the most sensitive – as ‘totally unacceptable’ and
‘offensive in its emphasis on import control as opposed to export control’. He told them that
‘Hong Kong could agree to [reasonable] departures from the MFA, but for some important
products the offer presented would mean that by 1982 Hong Kong would not even be close
to the level of trade in 1976’. Whilst Mills ‘said that Hong Kong had come to Brussels to
negotiate, not to be dictated to,’ Tran told him that Hong Kong ‘could “take it or leave it”’.58

By early November, the EEC had reached agreements with Singapore, the Philippines, Macao
and Colombia. Hong Kong’s opposition to special provisions for India and Pakistan – that
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were not enough to prevent India challenging the entire legal basis of the EEC proposals –
were shared by South Korea.59 In light of the stalling negotiations, on 4 November Tran held
a press conference announcing that Hong Kong and India were attempting to sabotage the
negotiations, telling Hong Kong that they must reach agreement by 10 November, and that
unilateral restraints would be imposed from 1 January in the event of failure.60 MacLehose
described the speech as ‘extraordinary’ due to the use of the EEC representative’s ‘illfounded accusations and naked threats’.61 Following the EEC’s rejection of a compromise
package proposed by the Hong Kong delegation, which among changes to the figures, sought
to adapt the category system developed by the EEC to avoid altering the colony’s quota
infrastructure, the negotiations by the EEC were suspended and the Hong Kong negotiating
team were recalled on 11 November.62

The Hong Kong delegation returned to the negotiations in late November. The colony’s
limited bargaining strength given the importance of the EEC market to Hong Kong, and the
EEC’s threat to take unilateral action, forced the delegation to accept cutbacks from 1976
levels. A final stumbling block occurred in the form of the EEC’s request for further “sublimits” on certain categories; Mills reacted fiercely to the request and withdrew the
negotiating team from the room.63 Finally, after a joint decision was made to postpone a
decision on sub-limits, agreement was reached on 5 December 1977.64 The quotas for 1978
represented an 8 per cent cut from 1976 in terms of value. Although representing a slight
improvement on figures suggested in August, the news was met with dismay in Hong Kong.65
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In an announcement, Acting Governor Denys Roberts stated that ‘we have accepted this
outcome very reluctantly and with many misgivings’ and ‘we were faced with the very real
possibility that the community would be prepared to impose import restrictions on us,
regardless of the consequences’. He claimed that the EEC had ‘no intention of acknowledging
obligations under the MFA which did not suit their increasingly protectionist policies’.66
Britain was charged with much of the blame; with 70 per cent of the EEC quota going to
Britain, and British officials unwilling to provide Hong Kong with too much information, there
was a belief on the Hong Kong side that it was Britain pushing for the low figures. In the
words of one official, ‘it is not just the Hong Kong delegation in Brussels who feel that the UK
are leading the EEC pack… there is a general feeling in the Hong Kong business community
that the UK is doing the dirty on Hong Kong in Brussels’.67 Dissatisfaction with Britain’s
culpability for the restrictions was also made in subsequent LegCo proceedings.68
Furthermore, as the following section will show, the outcome of the negotiations had further
implications. The renewal of the MFA resulted in the most stringent restrictions on Hong
Kong to date, and led to a heightened demand in the colony for the colonial government to
abandon its commitment to non-intervention in industrial matters and assist Hong Kong’s
protectionism-threatened industries.

3. Non-Intervention Prevails

Although the social reforms of the 1970s demonstrated that the colonial government was
willing to depart to some degree from fiscal conservatism and non-intervention in public life,
a belief in free market principles as the basis of Hong Kong’s economic success was still
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professed by the government and used to advertise the colony to foreign investors. The 1976
GIS publication Hong Kong: Your Manufacturing Base – whilst demonstrating how
government works provide the necessary infrastructure for enterprise to develop, such as
through land reclamation, the building of roads and the newly begun construction of the
MTR – declared that:

The Government believes in the profit motive; it considers that only profitable
business will benefit the economy and that business with their own capital at risk will
take decisions leading to the greatest profitability if untrammelled by Government
direction or interference.

Nevertheless, despite its business-friendly framing, the government’s philosophy also
precluded forms of intervention that the private sector favoured. According to the same
publication, ‘on the other hand – and this clearly follows as a concomitant of this policy –
there are no tax concessions or other special incentives offered to any particular sector of
industry or the community’.69

As has been shown for the 1950s and 60s, the colonial government’s faith in free trade and
free market principles more generally was not always shared by members of the business
community. Likewise, in the international economic climate of the 1970s, the colonial
government faced demands for greater government assistance to industrialists. This was
partly fuelled by a global recession in the early 1970s. Whilst Hong Kong itself managed to
avoid recession, economic growth slowed from 14.7 per cent in 1974 to 5.7 per cent in
1975.70 Protectionism in textiles and competition from South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore
also fuelled calls for intervention.71 In 1974, the CMA responded to a call by Haddon-Cave for
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views on the topic of public finance. Whilst they argued that the government should ‘where
appropriate, cut down expenses and secure new sources of revenue’ – i.e. by relying on
private enterprise for large projects or public housing and land development – they thought
that Hong Kong’s reserves could be used in ‘schemes to assist industrial and trade
development,’ and that the government should ‘formulate a policy to encourage industrial
investment in sophisticated industries and raw materials’.72 The textile agreements reached
by Hong Kong with the EEC in December 1977 were met with increased calls for greater
government intervention, particularly amongst the Chinese language press.73 According to
Sing Pao, ‘in the past, the Government’s laissez faire policy for industry were clever moves.
But today, industrialists need the Government’s support and assistance’. The paper argued
that ‘the Government should now play a leading role and set up plans for industrial
development’. Another newspaper even called for free trade to be discarded, calling for
‘retaliatory measures against the EEC’ through restrictions on their imports or an ‘appeal to
residents to use Hong Kong products only’.74

Business groups were not the only voices inside the colony calling for Hong Kong’s departure
from a laissez-faire approach to economic activity. Whilst trade unions in the colony were
primarily occupied with seeking improvements in pay and conditions from employers, they
also called on the government for intervention. In January 1969, for example, the Hong Kong
and Kowloon Trades Union Council (TUC) called for legislation to restrict the number of
hours worked by ‘employees serving Chinese owned establishments in Hongkong’.75
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Following the 1967 riots there had been an expansion of trade union membership in Hong
Kong. By one estimate, total membership in the colony increased from 131,000 in 1967 to
189,580 in 1972.76 Whilst this to an extent correlated with the expanding workforce, Joe
England and John Rear also attribute this increase to ‘a general awakening of interest in
trade unionism’ and the opportunism of the right-wing TUC to ‘promote unions which would
take advantage of the weakness of the communist unions in the post-confrontation
period’.77

The riots had escalated from a labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works
factory in San Po Kong, Kowloon. In April the company had introduced harsh new conditions,
and at the end of the month, dismissed hundreds of workers from its San Po Kong site and
from its other factory on Hong Kong Island. On 6 May, following a series of demonstrations
over the preceding days, riot police clashed with workers blocking the removal of goods from
the factory, arresting twenty one. The Hong Kong and Kowloon Rubber and Plastic Workers
Union and the pro-CCP Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) politicised the event as one of
colonial repression, as did left-leaning newspapers in the colony. The small-scale industrial
grievance thus escalated into large-scale strikes, anti-government protests, rioting, and by
July, bomb campaigns and other violence. On 15 May, Beijing had expressed support for the
movement and condemned the Hong Kong government for their “fascist” and “imperialist”
treatment of workers and dissidents, and made a series of demands including the release of
those arrested.78

An official account of the disturbances, which had subsided by late 1967, downplayed the
extent to which the disturbances reflected worker discontent. A GIS publication claimed that
76
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‘the origins of confrontation stem directly from the cultural revolution in China, which has
been inculcated among its adherents a fervent patriotism and an intense adulation of
Chairman Mao Tse Tung and his teachings’. On the other hand, the leaflet claimed that
industrial disputes ‘had either been artificially inspired by the communists or were the result
of deliberate political exploitation of a genuine industrial grievance’.79 Furthermore, the
violent actions of rebels in the colony alienated much of the population, and the
government’s forceful repression was for the most part met with approval.80 Nevertheless,
according to two scholars, the strikes and other unrest had ‘shattered the complacency of
the government and management about labour relations and revealed that ideology could
escalate apparently trivial labour disputes into a major political confrontation’.81 The leftist
unions eventually recovered from a post-67 decline in fortunes, as membership of FTUaffiliated unions more than doubled from 1968 to 1978.82

Yet by most accounts, the capacity for organised labour in Hong Kong to exert any influence
on government policy or gain substantial concessions from employers remained extremely
limited.83 The Trench administration passed a series of measures – most prominently the
1968 Employment Ordinance which protected wages and other employee rights – and a
number of amendments in 1970 which provided for maternity protection and entitlement to
rest days. Yet, as noted previously, workers’ rights and employment conditions in the colony
continued to receive criticism from observers inside and outside Hong Kong.
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Despite membership growth, Hong Kong’s unions were unable to exert much influence for a
number of reasons. The percentage of workers unionised was still low, with only unions in
certain sectors – such as the civil service – able to represent a high proportion of workers.
Leung and Chiu report that in 1975, for example, according to declared figures the
proportion of workers unionised across the whole colony was 23.9 per cent. Yet civil service
unions – with around ten per cent of the total declared membership – claimed to have forty
per cent of workers on their books. On the other hand, the percentage of workers in the
manufacturing field unionised was unlikely to have surpassed 10 per cent at any time during
the decade.84 Multiple reasons for low union uptake both overall and in certain industries
have been proposed: structural explanations point to the highly mobile and casual nature of
employment across many small industrial establishments, whilst others suggest that a
culture of self-reliance and a ‘Neo-Confucian’ acceptance of workplace hierarchy were
inimical to organised labour.85 In addition to membership difficulties, the division of unions
along political lines – pro-communist, pro-Guomindang, and neutral – was a barrier to largescale co-operation between different unions. Fragmentation was also a consequence of
unions being industry, region, and even company specific.86 More significantly, the FTU and
affiliated unions represented the bulk of unionised workers in the colony, yet given its
political leanings it had no official contact with the colonial administration from 1950 to
1981.87

Finally, Trade Unions were hamstrung in their formation and activities by employer hostility
and limited government support for their activities. In a paper at a seminar held by the
International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation, Hong Kong’s representative
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Leong Fook Kee, commenting on the weakness of labour in the colony, asserted that ‘most
employers in Hongkong refuse to recognise trade unions or participate in setting up
machinery for bargaining’. He also claimed that ‘perhaps the greatest obstacle to improve
labour-management relations and to the development of collective bargaining is the fact
that there are no laws in Hongkong which positively seek to promote them’. According to
Leong:

Hongkong’s concern with economic success is so dominant that labour relations are
not allowed to interfere with individual efforts to make profit. Systems of law and
order, labour legislation and trade unionism are all subordinated to the primary
economic concern.88

Unions with political leanings could be dismissed on this basis, whilst other bodies such as
the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee – another vocal proponent of government
legislation to reform working conditions in Hong Kong during this period – were ‘liable to be
dismissed as locally “unrepresentative,” whenever it spoke up’.89 Bodies representing the
interests of industrialists in the colony held a higher position of influence in the colony, and
resisted attempts by the government to intervene on the side of workers with the claim their
competitiveness was at stake.90 Given their limited instruments for winning concessions from
employers, and their lack of political influence, unions focused on the provision of welfare
and social services to their members and did little to push for policy changes on these
issues.91

Whilst the Hong Kong government were ultimately unwilling to radically alter their stance
towards private enterprise, they recognised that reliance on a narrow range of manufactures
88
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made the colony vulnerable – textile and clothing products still represented almost half of
Hong Kong’s total exports in 1977, despite growth in other sectors such as electronics.92
Their response was to create an advisory committee on diversification, featuring business
executives, industrialists, and economists, and chaired by Haddon-Cave. Its report was
released in December 1979, and made forty seven recommendations, many advocating a
greater role for government institutions such as the Hong Kong Productivity Centre and the
colony’s Standards and Testing Centre, and encouraging the establishment of new ones such
as a primary standards library and industrial development board.93

The report was broad and suggestive, however, and by the time of its release was outdated
due to the shift in economic fortunes provided by China’s market reforms – a phenomenon
explored in the following chapter.94 Overall, the textile restrictions and other challenges to
the colony’s economy were not enough to convince the colonial government to depart from
its faith in the principles of non-intervention. One FCO report claimed that the committee’s
‘lack of progress’ prior to the release of its final report was rooted in the influential financial
secretary’s preference for limiting its scope.95

The Hong Kong government also remained reluctant to intervene in other sectors of the
colony’s economy – particularly finance and services. The 1970s are often regarded as the
decade in which Hong Kong’s status as an important regional and international finance
centre was realised. As Catherine Schenk has established, however, in as early as the 1950s
and 60s Hong Kong was able to benefit from freedom from exchange controls and currency
stability conferred by membership of the Sterling Area to become an important market for
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foreign exchange, gold, and insurance.96 Although the 1964 banking ordinance provided
tighter regulations for the issuing of bank licenses, limited banking regulation continued
despite the growth and complexity of banking services and the securities market during the
1970s.97 Likewise, with no central bank, one critical account of the colonial government’s
approach to monetary policy and its banking and financial regulation, reports that an
‘effective monetary policy came into being only after the 1983 currency crisis and the
adoption of a linked exchange rate’.98

4. An Exemplary Model

Hong Kong colonial officials, rather than departing from their economic ideals in the face of
internal and external challenge, instead continued to maintain that these principles were
most appropriate for the colony and – rather than intervention – were most effective for
overcoming economic difficulties. Haddon-Cave, in an introduction to the edited volume The
Business Environment in Hong Kong, argued that ‘the Hong Kong Government’s economic,
budgetary and fiscal policies are both a consequence of the economy’s external dependence
and a contributory factor in the economy’s ability to achieve growth through trading and
other external transactions, the vast bulk of which cross the exchanges’. It is this ‘external
dependence’, he argues, that made intervening in the economy ultimately futile.99

Whilst posited as the only model suitable for the colony, as had been the basis for arguments
against protectionism, by this point the political economy of Hong Kong was also discussed
increasingly by officials in terms of its intrinsic value and as a sign of good governance
regardless of the colony’s particularly constraints. In 1978, Denys Roberts, now chief
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secretary, listed one reason for Hong Kong’s status as ‘one of the leading traders in the
world’ as being the colonial regime’s ‘conviction that a government should live within its
means’. The speech addressed the renewal of the MFA, and also made a case against
protectionism’.100 The restrictiveness of the new regime had prompted Hong Kong’s
representatives to publicly rally against protectionism in more general terms. In doing so, the
argument made was not just that Hong Kong was reliant on free trade, but that a
commitment to free trade should be universal. David Jordan, director of trade, industry, and
customs,101 whilst speaking to the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong on
protectionism, stated that ‘the case for it [protectionism] is weak; It does not work; and so
the costs are more than the apparent benefits are worth’. He continued:

I am not against protectionism just because it can damage Hong Kong but because I
believe that a more enlightened attitude would in the long run benefit everybody, in
the developed countries and the developing, whereas protectionism benefits only a
minority even in the countries that practise it.102

In maintaining a critique of protectionism and Hong Kong’s dedication to free trade values,
the colony’s officials and business representatives were able to assume the role of
spokespeople for free trade. In the context of the decision by France to introduce unilateral
restrictions on imports of watches from Hong Kong, Governor Edward Youde proclaimed that
‘we believe strongly that it is in the interest not only of Hong Kong but of the world trading
system that open market policies would prevail’.103

In 1981 the MFA was due for renewal, and the US and the EEC were both pressured by
domestic lobbies to push for a more restrictive regime, including such measures as level of
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demand the determining factor for access. Hong Kong and other exporters pushed for a
removal of the “reasonable departure” which according to the colony’s industrial
associations had ‘been exploited by the developed importing countries to such an extent
that it has often made the basic provisions of the MFA almost meaningless’.104 Hong Kong
took a central role in opposing the changes sought by the US in a white paper released in
February 1979.105 Nevertheless, negotiations lasted from June until December 1981. A
product of compromise between the EEC and the US, the outcome was ultimately a vaguely
worded and “weak regime” which left decisions on cutbacks to bilateral negotiations that
followed.106 Lydia Dunn, member of ExCo and chair of the TDC, subsequently oversaw the
publication of a report titled In the Kingdom of the Blind: a Report on Protectionism and the
Asian-Pacific Region. In addition to a critique of the GATT administration and the use of
protectionism by developed Western nations in the pursuit of self-interest, the report
pointed to Hong Kong and other East Asian territories as providing model trade policies that
should be adopted by Western powers. It also called for ‘the market-oriented countries of
the Asian-Pacific region… to play a positive role in arresting and, ultimately, reversing
protectionist trends’ by working in ‘the framework of multilateral cooperation to strengthen
adherence to the principles and rules of the [GATT]’.107 Representatives from Hong Kong
were not alone in espousing the colony’s exemplification of free trade principles. A group of
British economists writing in the Midland Bank Review, critical of the MFA and calling for an
end to trade discrimination, wrote that ‘the trade regime of Hongkong comes closer to the
liberal ideal than that of any Western country’.108
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Hong Kong’s political economy as a whole was also lauded by advocates of nineteenth
century liberal economics, and cited as a successful example of these ideals in practice. This
was not a new phenomenon during this period; as Mark Hampton has written, ‘following the
creation of the post-1945 British Welfare State, embattled capitalists could look to Hong
Kong as a sort of colonial “world we have lost”, in which taxes were low, profits were high,
labour was quiescent, and the State’s reach was limited’.109 Hong Kong’s exemplification of
laissez-faire principles took on greater significance during the 1970s. The collapse of the
Bretton Woods international monetary system, oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979, and
stagflation in Britain, the US and other developed economies undermined the prevailing
economic consensus – one of demand-side economic management as espoused by John
Maynard Keynes, and belief in the merits a comprehensive welfare state. These
developments ‘created a policy vacuum into which neoliberal ideas flowed,’ as a return to
nineteenth century economic liberalism as espoused by figures such as Friedrich Hayek and
Milton Friedman gained currency.110

In 1978, at the general meeting of the influential Mont Pelerin Society, founded by influential
economists of the Austrian and Chicago schools, Haddon-Cave was able to brief the
attendees on the colonial government’s approach to policymaking. He rejected the laissezfaire label, preferring ‘realistic pragmatism’ or ‘positive non-interventionism,’ but affirmed
his government’s belief that ‘it is futile and damaging to the growth rate of the economy for
attempts to be made to plan the allocation of resources available to the private sector and to
frustrate the operation of market forces’.111 Friedman, who was present, did not need
briefing on the colony’s adherence to free market principles; he had already visited Hong
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Kong several times, and frequently pointed to its exemplary free market credentials. In a
1980 documentary broadcast by the Public Broadcasting Service in the US called Free to
Choose, Friedman calls Hong Kong ‘an almost laboratory experiment in what happens when
government is limited to its proper function and leaves people free to pursue their own
objectives’. He declares that ‘if you want to see how the free market really works, this is the
place to come’.112

Hong Kong’s high level of growth during this period, and the manner in which it appeared to
be achieved, made it a prominent counterpoint to the stuttering economies of the US and
Western Europe. In one 1977 article in the American libertarian magazine Reason, Hong
Kong is described as ‘an economy that should be studied by every economist and included in
every free-market economist’s course as the best – and probably only – living example of
what he is talking about’. Likewise, it is called ‘a place whose very existence should call into
doubt most of the political myths of our time’. Nevertheless, admirers of the colony’s
economic philosophy were under no illusion that Hong Kong was a textbook model. The
article cites government ownership of housing, rent controls, government monopolies, and
rising taxes as illustrations of undesirable government intervention, and from a libertarian
perspective, points to social conservatism as a barrier to other forms of freedom beyond the
economic. Despite these flaws, the author claims that when in Hong Kong ‘one quickly
forgets the restrictions and interventions that do exist’.113

A larger study which contrasted Hong Kong’s political economy with what the author calls
‘today’s increasingly interventionist, regulated and heavily taxed world’ was American
political scientist Alvin Rabushka’s Hong Kong: A Study in Economic Freedom, which was
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adapted from a series of lectures given at the University of Chicago in 1976-77. He calls Hong
Kong a ‘fascinating Gladstonian dream world,’ and attributes the colony’s ‘swift recovery
from the 1973 oil crisis’ to the responsiveness of its economy to ‘external price changes’,
owing to the free movements of goods and services, and its labour flexibility.114
Nevertheless, he writes that it would ‘be wrong to say that government adheres
dogmatically to a laissez-faire style of management in all of its public economic activities,’
with the extensive provision of public housing given as one example of several government
interventions, and the description of the government as ‘ground landlord’. He suggests this is
justified, to some extent, by the exceptional challenge the colony faced from mainland
refugees and land shortages.115

In addition to shifts in attitudes towards political economy internationally, Hong Kong’s
relationship with Britain, and the British government’s attitude towards Hong Kong’s political
economy, underwent a significant transformation as a consequence of regime change in the
metropole. Following labour unrest and strikes in the “Winter of Discontent” of 1978/79,
Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan lost a vote of no confidence, forcing him to call a
general election in May 1979. Margaret Thatcher’s victorious Conservative government had
campaigned on the basis that Keynesian economic policy was to blame for British “decline,”
and whilst in opposition had formulated a new economic strategy based on free market
principles, monetarism, and trade union reform.116 For many influential politicians in the
new government, unlike their Labour predecessors, Hong Kong was not a regressive
anachronism in need of thorough economic, social and political reform, but was evidence of
the virtue of their policies and something Britain should aspire to replicate. Trade secretary
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John Nott, speaking to the HKGCC in early 1980 applauded Hong Kong for its free trade
credentials and told them:

Here in this small territory you set all nations an example. I do not claim that we in
Britain today will equal your economic achievements. But we shall strive, from the
profound belief which the modern Conservative Party shares with you in the virtues of
free enterprise, to come as close to your achievement as we can.117

In June 1978, Geoffrey Howe, then shadow chancellor of the exchequer, put forth an idea for
enterprise zones in areas of economic hardship in Britain, that would offer reduced planning
regulations, freedom from rent controls, and certain tax exemptions. In doing so, he
referenced a suggestion by town planner Peter Hall to ‘recreate the Hong Kong of the 1950s
and 1960s inside inner Liverpool or inner Glasgow’. Howe claimed that ‘Hong Kong and
Singapore have been entirely free to make themselves magnets for enterprise, with
generally benevolent tax and customs regimes, freedom from exchange control and an
absence of unnecessary regulations and of heavy social or other obligations on commerce
and industry.’118 In a similar fashion, one Conservative peer in the House of Lords pointed to
Hong Kong’s tax system, which he alleged ‘enables any individual or any company to create
wealth as a direct result of his, her or its own hard work and expertise’ and was thus a lesson
for Britain.119

Conclusion

Although the Hong Kong government were faced with internal and external pressure to
depart from non-intervention as the basis of government policy – through calls from the
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metropole for improved social reform and demands for industrial assistance from within the
colony respectively – they were able to refrain from any significant departure from their
fundamental ethos. Despite the fact that the MacLehose administration introduced a
number of new reforms, the governor was a ‘reluctant reformer’ responding primarily to
pressure from the FCO, and in spite of their interference, the governor was able to exercise
significant pushback.120 Furthermore, not all of the pledges for housing, education, and
housing reached fruition. Likewise, although the colonial government committed resources
to investigating how to assist the colony’s industries to diversify in response to adverse
circumstances, there was to be no state-managed economic restructuring. Whilst appeals to
the virtues of non-intervention could be made to justify reluctance to expand welfare
expenditure, claims from the private sector for government assistance could be rejected on
the same basis.121 Besides, as the following chapter will demonstrate, the impact of China’s
modernisation programmes on the colony’s economy diminished the need for any significant
intervention from the government.

By the 1970s, according to many accounts, a more distinct Hong Kong identity had emerged:
Steve Tsang writes that a previous ‘sojourner mentality’ owing to the transient nature of
Hong Kong’s population prior to 1949 faded as generations brought up and educated entirely
in Hong Kong felt a greater sense of belonging in the colony.122 Furthermore, the prosperity
of the era enabled new forms of popular culture to flourish, which contributed to the
shaping of a distinct local identity. With greater affiliation to Hong Kong among the populace
came new forms of activism and demands from the colonial state, though the policy stance
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of the government avoided any serious challenge in a period of political stability.123 Ambrose
King has alleged that the colonial government maintained the status quo and retained
political legitimacy by ‘co-opting emerging leadership groups’ and building an ‘elite
consensus’ in the process.124 At the same time, the Hong Kong government’s approach was
vindicated by the growing affluence of its populace. According to one account, attitudes
towards the colonial regime reflected a “market mentality” – ‘as long as the administrative
state was able to uphold law and order and the legal framework, and to attend to the basic
needs of the local population… local people were happy to be left alone’.125

Finally, although processes of decolonisation in the colony appeared to accelerate as the
interests and ideologies of Hong Kong and Britain diverged, by the end of the decade, the
imperial dimension would be once again brought to the forefront. In his 1979 address,
MacLehose had lauded ministers from the new Conservative government for visiting the
colony ‘so soon after taking office’ and, noting a favourable trade balance for Britain, he
claimed that the relationship between Britain and Hong Kong should be a ‘two-way affair,
based on a commercial as well as political relationship which is felt to be both welcome and
mutually beneficial’. The governor, perhaps in reference to the tumultuous nature of
relations during his tenure and the arrival of a new government in the metropole, also
claimed that ‘we are all accustomed to saying that Hong Kong stands on three legs―its own
prosperity and cohesion, co-operation with China, and the support of the United Kingdom,’
but that the colony had been ‘apt to take the third for granted’.126 Yet to Lydia Dunn, the
issue of Hong Kong’s future political status and Britain’s responsibility for securing an
acceptable outcome outweighed other aspects of their relationship with each other as well
as China. In response to the governor’s address, she declared that:
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Emphasis on the tripartite relationship between China, Hong Kong and Britain,
sometimes tends to overlook that it is the future of this community of 5 million people
and more which is at stake… Your Excellency laid stress on the importance of
developing a mutually beneficial commercial relationship between Hong Kong and
Britain. I agree with this, but let us not forget that H.M.G. does have, in view of
Britain’s constitutional responsibility for Hong Kong, an obligation to this city no
matter in whose favour is the balance of trade.127

The following chapter will demonstrate how the British government exercised this
obligation, when the time came to negotiate with China over Hong Kong’s future.
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Chapter 5

Preserving the Free Port: Negotiations over Hong Kong, 1979-1984

Introduction

This chapter will show that the prospect of the New Territories lease expiring in 1997, and
Hong Kong’s potential reversion to Chinese sovereignty as a result, brought to the forefront
debates about the underpinnings of Hong Kong’s economic success. For the British and Hong
Kong governments, and for many of the colony’s elite, Hong Kong’s prosperity was owed –
albeit not exclusively – to British colonial rule and was dependent on administrative
continuity. Nevertheless, as this thesis has demonstrated, Hong Kong’s growth was achieved
under considerable autonomy from Britain. Hong Kong’s elites, unlike the British prime
minister, were less concerned with retaining British sovereignty, and more with safeguarding
Hong Kong’s internal political and economic system. For them, the British connection was
valued for the guarantees it provided against undue change to the Hong Kong model. Even
though the Chinese government pledged to make Hong Kong a Special Administrative Region
(SAR) with autonomy intact, there were doubts that this held the same assurances as the
status quo. The British side first insisted that sovereignty should be unchanged after 1997,
but China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was unyielding in his assertion that Chinese
sovereignty beyond that date was a non-negotiable certainty, and that British administration
would terminate as a result.

Section one will explore the impact of China’s modernisation programmes on Hong Kong’s
economy, and how they influenced speculation about Hong Kong’s future. China’s embrace
of market reforms stemmed from a reaction against the communist development model
following the Cultural Revolution, subsequent power shifts within the CCP, and
rapprochement and eventually close cooperation with the US. Whilst they had begun to
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manifest since the early 1970s, especially in the south, they accelerated at the end of the
decade under Deng’s leadership and a policy of reform and opening from 1978.1 China’s
emergence into the global capitalist economy reinvigorated Hong Kong’s supply of re-exports
to the mainland, and facilitated the colony’s economic integration with Guangdong. The
transfer of capital from Hong Kong was aided by the establishment of Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) from 1980, and facilitated Hong Kong’s growth into a financial and service hub.
These developments – in combination with Deng’s assurances to Governor MacLehose in
1979 that investors in Hong Kong had nothing to fear – were enough to convince some in the
colony that Hong Kong’s economic future was secure.

The second section deals with Thatcher’s visit to Beijing to meet Deng, and her discussions
with representatives from Hong Kong. The prime minister was adamant that Hong Kong’s
prosperity and stability was dependent on British administration – defined as ‘ultimate
control from London through a Governor responsible to HMG but with a large measure of de
facto autonomy’.2 She doubted that the Chinese government could effectively manage Hong
Kong directly given that its economic model was so alien to their core ideologies, nor did she
believe that autonomy under Chinese sovereignty would have the same guarantees as its
present status. Whilst elites in Hong Kong shared similar views, they were more willing to
concede sovereignty for the sake of administration. Deng and Zhao Ziyang, however, claimed
that sovereignty was non-negotiable and indistinguishable from administration, and that
Hong Kong’s economic welfare was of secondary concern. They also denied that sovereignty
and administration could be distinguished. Section three will demonstrate how the British
side felt forced into making significant compromises, and eventually conceded both
sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong to China. The stalling negotiations had resulted
1
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in growing uncertainty in Hong Kong, which was reflected in economic indicators. The British
government were convinced by the Chinese leadership’s claim that damage to Hong Kong’s
economy would not alter their position, and so felt compelled to yield for the sake of
preventing the talks from breaking down. The final section will discuss the process of
reaching agreement on what would become the Sino–British Joint Declaration, in which the
key components of Hong Kong’s free port status would be assured.

1. Integrating Empires

The possible implications for Hong Kong of China’s re-emergence into the global economy
were made pertinent by the normalisation of US-China trade relations after 1971, following
President Nixon’s lifting of the embargo that the US had imposed on China since 1950. Whilst
there were predictions that the step would prove detrimental to Hong Kong, as China could
in time erode the colony’s share of the US market in manufactures, other observers focused
on the possible boon China’s increased international trade would bring to Hong Kong as a reexport hub and centre for finance and service industries.3 The early 1970s had been the ‘low
point of China’s relations with the world economy,’ as imports and exports amounted to just
5 per cent of the country’s total GDP.4 The CCP, however, sought to emulate the success of
Hong Kong and Taiwan in manufacturing, and by the late 1970s China imported large
quantities of raw materials, technology, and semi-manufactures with this purpose.
Consequently, the percentage of Hong Kong’s re-exports taken by China increased from 1.8%
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in 1977, to 6.6% in 1979, and 19.3% in 1981.5 China also opened to foreign investment,
which from 1978 facilitated deep economic integration between Hong Kong and Guangdong
province in the south of the country. The process of enabling foreign investment started
there and in Fujian, where “export-processing” contracts between Hong Kong and Chinese
firms were permitted. The process was accelerated with the opening of the SEZs from 1980,
beginning with sites in Fujian, Guangdong, and encompassing the whole of Hainan province.
SEZs permitted duty-free imports of goods involved in the production of exports, and
encouraged investment through low taxation and minimised bureaucracy.6 Hong Kong
quickly emerged as by far the largest source of investment in China – especially in
Guangdong – in manufacturing, tourism and infrastructure.7 Investment flows went both
ways; Chinese investment in Hong Kong likewise grew more substantial and diverse after
1979.8

It was in this context that serious consideration in both Britain and Hong Kong was given to
the colony’s future political and economic status, and in which negotiations between Britain
and China to this end eventually took place. The 1967 riots are regarded as a turning point in
Britain’s attitude towards the long-term persistence of British administration in the territory;
the disturbances and Beijing’s uncertain role throughout were taken as a demonstration of
the colony’s indefensibility and precariousness, and by the end of 1970 the FCO regarded the
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future of Hong Kong as out of their hands.9 Nevertheless, the British government had no
intention to broach the issue with China whilst the Hong Kong question appeared to be a low
priority for the Chinese authorities, and whilst the political climate in China appeared
unfavourable. In early 1973, Prime Minister Edward Heath was told that recent official visits
‘have clearly shown that the Chinese do not want either to take Hong Kong over now or to
initiate immediate negotiations about its future’. Heath agreed with the suggestion that the
British government should ‘continue to watch for a moment at which it might be propitious
to initiate discussions with the Chinese authorities, with a view to gaining some security of
tenure beyond 1997’.10 A 1975 FCO paper also emphasised that waiting for a leadership
change in China would be preferable, as ‘there seems little point in seeking some permanent
understanding with Mao and [Premier Zhou Enlai]’. At the same time, it argued that ‘no
meaningful dialogue with any other Chinese leaders will be possible until their
disappearance from the scene’. The paper, however, pointed to the dangers of not achieving
‘clarification by the early 1980s,’ as ‘foreign investment may well decline swiftly with serious
effect on stability’. It recommended, therefore, making an approach to the Chinese
authorities ‘as soon as economic uncertainties in the Colony start to appear.’11

Later in the decade, China’s economic trajectory worked to offset uncertainty about the
colony’s political future, as did informal reassurances from the mainland that prosperity in
Hong Kong would not be undermined.12 Although there was still some trepidation in Hong
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Kong towards competition from a newly-industrialising China, the country’s modernisation
programmes and opening to trade and investment fuelled optimism and recognition of the
opportunity to restructure the colony’s economy away from industries facing the twin-threat
of protectionism and competition.13 Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative
Councils (UMELCO), however, citing the alleged impact political uncertainty had on mortgage
lending by Hong Kong’s banks and businesses engaged in long-term investment, raised the
issue of Hong Kong’s future with Governor MacLehose.14 The governor’s forthcoming visit to
Beijing in late March 1979 was accordingly recognised as an opportunity to undertake
“informal soundings” on the Chinese leadership’s attitude towards the expiry of the New
Territories lease. British diplomats regarded China’s reform and opening process under the
‘rational and pragmatic’ Deng as representing a more favourable climate in which to broach
the issue.15 According to one report, ‘economic development and accelerated
industrialisation have replaced the pursuit of egalitarianism as the primary aim of State
policy,’ and Hong Kong’s economic relationship with Guangdong and the colony’s role in
China’s modernisation attempts provided a suitable context for discussion of Hong Kong’s

clear: China wants to capitalise on, not offset, Hongkong’s achivements in finance and industry.’
Nevertheless, the article still mentioned the impact uncertainty over Hong Kong’s political future might
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future.16 MacLehose discussed the former with local officials in a visit to Guangdong en route
to Beijing on 26 March, and with senior government officials in the capital.17

On 29 March, MacLehose met with Deng at the Great Hall of the People. The Chinese leader
was first to raise the issue of the lease expiry, and according to a record of the meeting,
made it clear that ‘any solution of the status (of the New Territories) would have as its
prerequisite that Hong Kong was part of China,’ but that China would ‘respect the special
status of Hong Kong’.18 In response, MacLehose proposed a scenario: the Hong Kong
government could continue selling land in the New Territories on fifteen-year leases, which
would eventually span beyond 1997. Deng did not engage fully with the proposal; instead, he
told the governor to ‘ask investors to put their hearts at ease’. MacLehose reiterated the
suggestion but was told by Deng that it was ‘best to avoid wording which mentioned
continuing British administration’. Instead, Deng assured him that ‘in this century and in the
beginning of the next century… Hong Kong would be continuing with a capitalist system,
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while China was continuing with a socialist system’. Although he told the governor that ‘by
1997 China might take over Hong Kong,’ he claimed ‘this would not affect her economy’.19
Consequently, MacLehose informed the FCO that in the short term, ‘no move of any sort is
contemplated’ by the Chinese government, and that they ‘were vague as to whether one
might be made before or after 1997’. More importantly, he reported that ‘in the long term –
and this is new – Deng sees Hong Kong’s future as being under Chinese sovereignty and with
some political change, but with its economic life and security of investment assured by a
special status’.20 For MacLehose, meetings followed with Huang Hua, China’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and Liao Chengzhi, Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress. Huang, expanding on the outline given by Deng, told MacLehose
that ‘investment and local autonomy’ in Hong Kong ‘would be respected,’ and that ‘no
immediate change was contemplated’. He stated that the Chinese government ‘would study
MacLehose’s proposal for leases beyond 1997’.21 The British government were later
informed by their Chinese counterparts that the scheme would not be acceptable.22

The proposal and its rejection were not made public, and Deng’s statement that investors
should “keep their hearts at ease” worked to reassure the Hong Kong business community.23
By late 1981, however, Hong Kong had entered a ‘gloomy phase’ in the words of one
businessman in Hong Kong.24 The causes were the prospect of the lease expiring in less than
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fifteen years – a significant time span because of fifteen-year mortgages in the colony – and
the delayed announcement of MacLehose’s successor following his scheduled retirement in
spring 1982. One member of UMELCO told Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington on his trip to
the colony that there was ‘growing commercial and middle-class concern over Hong Kong’s
uncertain future’ and ‘growing pressure from overseas interests and prospective investors’.25
One SCMP editorial held the Chinese government responsible for a lack of progress, accusing
them of not appreciating ‘the increasing note of apprehension emerging in Hong Kong’.26

In Hong Kong, the absence of any known progress by the British government regarding the
lease, and unawareness of Beijing’s intentions for the colony, fuelled speculation that was
highly influenced by the processes of economic reform in China. To some, it offered
reassurances that Hong Kong’s capitalist model would not be compromised, whilst at the
same time, provided clues about how Hong Kong might operate as part of China politically.
Fung King-hey, an influential businessman, was optimistic with his observation that ‘at
present, China’s economy is practical and progressive, and she adapts an open attitude
towards foreign trade’. As long as Hong Kong maintained its usefulness to China, he saw its
prosperity and safety as secured.

27

Others also linked Hong Kong’s stability to China’s

modernisation, and called for government assistance to the colony’s industries to ensure
their continuing value to the mainland.28 Mary Lee, writing in FEER, suggested that China’s
reforms had shown that it would allow ‘external capitalistic forces to participate in its
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economy,’ and that ‘the creation of SEZs in China has raised the possibility that the territory
could evolve as a special zone, perhaps separate from Guangdong, retaining its own
currency, and legal and administrative authority’.29 To Lawrence Kadoorie – an influential
industrialist whose company China Light and Power was pursuing a joint-venture with the
Guangdong Electric Company for the building of a nuclear power plant – increasing economic
integration with China was indicative of Hong Kong’s future. According to a report of his
conversation with Lord Privy Seal Humphrey Atkins:

He saw a phenomenon developing which could be described as a reverse takeover in
the expansion of the special economic zones in China to the north of Hong Kong. Given
time, Hong Kong could become the main city of a major industrial area much bigger
than the Territory itself.

To Kadoorie, substantial Chinese investment in Hong Kong was reassuring, as ‘most people
saw [Hong Kong]… remaining in practice as a “free economic zone” of China’.30 As the
following section will demonstrate, however, the British government and members of the
colony’s political elite did not regard the SEZs, and related capitalistic developments in the
mainland, as sufficient evidence of China’s ability to administer Hong Kong.

Whilst the SEZs provided one potential blueprint for Hong Kong’s future under Chinese rule,
another parallel emerged in the form of Beijing’s plans for Taiwan. In this instance, however,
it was the Chinese government who drew the comparison in top level diplomatic exchanges.
In 1978, the CCP had adopted a “peaceful unification” approach towards Taiwan, in contrast
to the hostile stance that had been maintained since the nationalist Guomindang evacuated
to the island in 1949, following their defeat in the civil war. The Chinese government ceased
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their shelling of islands in the Taiwan Strait, and in September 1981, a nine-point plan for
unification was proposed, in which Taiwan would maintain ‘a high degree of autonomy as a
special administrative region’.31 Deng, during MacLehose’s visit, was the first to indicate that
the plans for Taiwan were of relevance to Hong Kong; he had told the governor that Britain
‘would also be aware of China’s policy towards Taiwan,’ and that ‘the Chinese Government
has often said that the return of Taiwan would involve respecting the special status of
Taiwan… Taiwan could still enjoy a special status and local autonomy’.32

Beijing’s plans for reunification with Taiwan were ultimately frustrated, and their focus
consequently shifted to Hong Kong. For the Chinese government, Hong Kong would also test
the model formulated for Taiwan, as unification remained a long-term objective.33 The
comparison was also made in subsequent high level exchanges between British and Chinese
officials. In a visit by Humphrey Atkins to Beijing in January 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang had
referenced the Taiwan model and emphasised ‘the importance of Hong Kong’s continuance
as [a] free port and commercial centre’. 34 Finally, during a visit of former Prime Minister
Edward Heath in April, Deng went a step further and asked whether the two sides could
continue with the Taiwan plan as a framework.35 The British government did not respond to
the offer; as the following section will demonstrate, British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher was intent, initially, on retaining British sovereignty over Hong Kong, and she would
visit Beijing herself in September 1982.
31
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2. The British Connection

Over the summer of 1982, Thatcher discussed the position to take in Beijing with FCO
diplomats and officials, and sought the opinion of representatives from Hong Kong. There
was broad agreement that British administration in the colony, on which ‘confidence’ in
Hong Kong and its subsequent prosperity supposedly depended, should continue. Thatcher
claimed that the Chinese proposals so far had shown that ‘there appeared to be a
fundamental lack of comprehension on the Chinese side as to what was needed to maintain
confidence in Hong Kong’. British ambassador to China, Percy Cradock, concurred that the
Chinese leadership ‘did not understand the mainsprings of Hong Kong’s success’.36 Cradock
was a sinologist and long-serving diplomat in China, who during the Cultural Revolution had
experienced the ransacking of the British diplomatic offices. In other correspondence, he
described Deng and other top-level officials as ‘elderly men with rigid views, blinkered by
dogma and national pride and deeply ignorant of how a place like Hong Kong works’.37
Nevertheless, he had a record of favouring conciliation and compromise with the Chinese
government, and was more prepared to concede sovereignty over Hong Kong for the sake of
retaining administration.38 Governor Edward Youde – he assumed office in May 1982, and
was Cradock’s predecessor as ambassador – took a similar view. He asked ‘whether British
administration was linked so closely to British sovereignty that the one could not exist
without the other,’ and argued that if ‘we began by dismissing any possibility of a concession
on sovereignty we should make no progress’.39
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In early September, Thatcher discussed the issue with members of Hong Kong’s political and
economic elite, who despite pressing to her the importance of British administration
continuing, took a flexible approach to the issue of sovereignty. S. Y. Chung, a successful
industrialist who led UMELCO in a visit to 10 Downing Street, regarded the group as the true
representatives of Hong Kong’s Chinese population during the negotiations.40 He said of
some ‘expatriate mandarins’ in the colonial government that ‘their commitment to Hong
Kong was suspected, perhaps tenuous, since the majority of them eventually retired to the
United Kingdom or Australia’. On becoming Senior Chinese Unofficial Member in ExCo, he
said ‘the duty for representing the local Chinese to the highest echelon fell with a thud on
my shoulders’.41 UMELCO had opposed the 1981 nationality bill, which changed the status of
the majority of Hong Kong’s residents from “citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies” to
“citizens of dependent territories”, with reduced rights of abode in Britain; Chung’s
dissatisfaction at its passing was still felt going into the Sino-British discussions over Hong
Kong.42 Youde told Thatcher however that the group ‘had no emotional attachment to British
sovereignty’ and ‘approached the problem realistically’.43 With regard to the colony’s future
post-1997, the organisation had decided as a group to favour the status quo, and in a
statement to the Prime Minister Chung cited surveys suggesting that over 90 per cent of
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Hong Kong people held the same view.44 Whilst they felt that the forthcoming trip ‘would
not be an appropriate time’ to discuss the issue of sovereignty, they claimed nonetheless
that the ‘people of Hong Kong… would be willing for this to be conceded if that is the only
way to secure continuing British administration’.45

To the prime minister, however, sovereignty was crucial, and in July she argued that if Britain
‘abandoned sovereignty’ there would be ‘no insurance for the future’.46 To her:

The concession of any sovereignty would open up the possibility of Hong Kong having
to live under a different system. It was clear to us that the maintenance of confidence
required the continuation of British administration and law and of the free enterprise
system.47

Thatcher’s uncompromising stance towards the legality of the treaties, which had ceded
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon to Britain, has often been attributed to the confidence she
gained from British victory in the Falklands War, following Argentinian surrender in June
1982.48 Prior to her trip, she told British ministers that ‘the most she was prepared to
envisage was that China wold obtain merely titular sovereignty over Hong Kong’.49 Her first
meeting in Beijing, held on 23 September, was with Zhao Ziyang, and she was accompanied
by Cradock and Youde. She opened the discussion, and in her statement asserted that British
administration had ‘provided efficient and consistent government policies, and without them
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Hong Kong would not have developed the way it has’. She told the premier that Deng’s
outline would have a ‘disastrous’ effect on confidence in Hong Kong. In response, the prime
minister was told that the treaties had never been recognised by China, that sovereignty was
non-negotiable, and that China would recover sovereignty over all of Hong Kong in 1997.
Zhao reiterated the proposal that Hong Kong would become a ‘special administrative zone
administered by local people,’ in which ‘its existing economic and social system and style of
life could remain unchanged’. In response to Thatcher’s insistence that prosperity and
stability depended on British administration, Zhao made it clear that ‘if it came to a choice
between the two, China would put sovereignty above prosperity and stability’.50

The following day’s discussion between Thatcher and Deng covered much of the same
ground. The British prime minister sought to separate sovereignty and administration, and
deal with administration first in forthcoming negotiations. Deng instead dealt only with
sovereignty, reaffirming that there was ‘no leeway for China: sovereignty was not a matter
which could be discussed’. For the Chinese leader, the only scope for dialogue between the
two countries was on ‘how to avoid turbulence in Hong Kong between now and 1997 and
how to maintain prosperity thereafter’. He also gave two warnings: the first was that if no
agreement was reached within one to two years, China would announce their intention to
reclaim Hong Kong. The second was that if there were ‘very large and serious disturbances in
the next fifteen years, the Chinese Government would be forced to consider the time and
formula relating to the recovery of its sovereignty over Hong Kong’.51 Nevertheless, Thatcher
maintained the position that Hong Kong’s prosperity was dependent on British
administration; according to Chi-kwan Mark, her defence of this position stemmed from the
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fact that Hong Kong’s political and economic principles aligned closely with her own. The
communist philosophy of the Chinese government stood in sharp contrast, and the prime
minister sincerely doubted their capacity to manage a complex capitalist economy. On the
other hand, she had ‘underestimated the force of Chinese nationalism’ – Deng’s fixation on
sovereignty above all else was fuelled by Chinese enmity at US arms sales to Taiwan, and the
subsequent breakdown of the peaceful reunification strategy.52

Following Beijing, the British prime minister stopped in Hong Kong to meet with government
officials, UMELCO, and influential businesspeople in the colony. Although she did not divulge
the Chinese leadership’s position, she spoke of the need to persuade them that continued
British administration in Hong Kong was vital. She was met with broad agreement; one
UMELCO member commented that ‘it would take a long time to get the Chinese to
understand what made Hong Kong work’.53 Thatcher was convinced that an information
effort to this end was required, and instructed the FCO to consider the means of
implementation. They concluded that if ‘local Hong Kong people… of influence in business
and the professions could be persuaded to make this point to the Chinese their views would
probably be most effective’. Also considered were governments and organisations with good
relations with China, who could ‘put over their view on the basis of confidence in Hong Kong
and how this should be preserved’. The FCO felt that any campaign would need to be
sensitively handled, as it was a ‘very difficult message to get across both frankly and without
causing offence’.

54

Governor Youde, however, thought that supplying information about

Hong Kong to the Chinese government would be redundant, as they already had ample
supply from ‘the Bank of China, NCNA [New China News Agency] and mainland commercial

52

Mark, “To ‘educate’ Deng Xiaoping in capitalism,” 17-18.
TNA, PREM 19/788, “Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minster and Unofficial Members of
the Executive Council held at the UMELCO Chambers at 0945 on Monday 27 September in Hong
Kong,” 28 September 1982.
54
TNA, PREM 19/791, R. B. Bone (FCO) to Coles, 11 October 1982. Attachment. “Future of Hong
Kong”.
53

190

organisations’ in Hong Kong. The governor also had concerns about the message to be
communicated. He argued that ‘we should not be on sound ground in arguing that Hong
Kong Chinese could not run Hong Kong successfully’ as ‘they could and would be doing so
now if independence had been an option’. He thought they should concentrate instead on
showing ‘that there would be no confidence in an autonomous Hong Kong within China’.55 A
key distinction, therefore, was whether British administration was necessary because of the
capabilities of a British colonial government in contrast to a Chinese counterpart, or because
colonial status came with guarantees that sovereignty under China might not. The FCO
regarded the latter as the more salient point, given the Chinese government’s plans for
preserving Hong Kong’s autonomy:

The key point is not that the British have expertise in administration which the Chinese
lack – there is much common ground between us and Peking that the bulk of
administration could be left to Hong Kong people to run. The reason why the
connection is valued is an insurance against interference from Peking on major
domestic and external issues.56

In this vein, Thatcher had argued that China’s ‘turbulent past’, its ‘different political system’
– one without accountability or with freedoms ‘that did not derive from the state’ – and
nascent modernisation programme did not provide the same certainty as would be offered
by British administration beyond 1997, even if the Chinese government planned to grant
Hong Kong comparable autonomy.57 Likewise, one businessman argued that British
administration was ‘essential’ because ‘stability required laws and English law worked,’
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whereas ‘laws could change overnight in China’. Another pointed out that Hong Kong may no
longer be ‘insulated from political trouble’ if ‘the Chinese were in control’.58

Although the prime minister had framed her argument to Deng as one of ensuring
confidence, her comments elsewhere suggest that she also doubted the Chinese
government’s ability to directly administer Hong Kong successfully – sentiments that were
shared by many she met with in the colony. She told UMELCO that ‘the Chinese leaders had
a very limited understanding of what a free society was… they thought they could run a
capitalist society but they did not know what it meant’. This was rooted in the ideology of
the Chinese leadership; she argued that Deng’s ‘pragmatism counted for little compared to
his Marxist-Leninism’.59 In her view, therefore, Beijing would not make a success of Hong
Kong ‘if they sought to substitute Chinese for British rule’. Likewise, by drawing allusions to
market reform projects in mainland China, both the prime minister and figures in Hong Kong
made it clear that China’s ability to run an advanced capitalist society – one which ‘allowed
full scope to business enterprise,’ in the words of one businessmen – was also pertinent.60 In
a meeting with UMELCO prior to her trip to Beijing, Thatcher had asked whether the SEZs
were relevant to the issue. One member commented that they ‘were not successful,’ whilst
another said that ‘conditions in the Zones were chaotic’. Youde, in turn, had stressed that it
would be ‘unwise to suggest that the failure of the SEZs to make more progress was relevant
to the Hong Kong problem,’ and that the Chinese side would point to the fact they were
newly established. Another member argued that by the time their effectiveness was known,
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however, ‘Hong Kong could be finished’.61 Although Thatcher herself did not suggest that the
SEZs were indicative, she pointed instead to economic liberalisation in Shanghai. Given
Shanghai’s history as a treaty port, and the expulsion or takeover of British businesses there
by the Chinese authorities after 1949, she regarded it as a fitting parallel.62 For political
reasons, Shanghai was inflicted with a disproportionate burden in the command economy of
the Maoist period, and following the introduction of market reforms in China from 1978,
Shanghai had not enjoyed the same privileges granted to the SEZs and lagged behind their
growth and productivity.63 At a meeting in March 1983, the prime minister said that:

It was her impression that the Chinese believed that they had made a success of
running Shanghai and that they could therefore run Hong Kong in the future. But
events in Shanghai, accompanied by much cruelty and oppression, suggested quite the
opposite.64

The prime minister was not alone in making the comparison; one pessimistic article in
Institutional Investor, commenting on a suggestion that China’s record in Shanghai proved it
could manage Hong Kong, called it ‘ironic that the Chinese mention Shanghai, whose
effective demise thrust Hongkong to the fore as a truly international city’ as ‘in Shanghai
there has been virtually no new building; everything has been patched up and multilet under
the pressure of increasing population’. The author, Kevin Rafferty, claimed that whereas ‘life
in Shanghai is still controlled to an extraordinary degree by Beijing,’ the ‘extraordinary
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freedom in Hongkong, on the other hand, stands in marked contrast’. The article also quoted
Ronald Li, chairman of the Far East Stock Exchange, who declared that ‘if China wants to
show that it can run a free enterprise zone, let it open up Amoy or Shanghai and do its
experiments elsewhere rather than muck it up here’. 65 As it became clearer that the Chinese
government were pursuing a policy of transforming Hong Kong into a special administrative
zone with extensive autonomy, their ability to run Hong Kong themselves lost relevance. As
Youde told Thatcher in response to her Shanghai comparison, the Chinese government ‘had
always said that the former would have to be a Socialist city, whereas they had frequently
stated that Hong Kong would be allowed to retain a Capitalist system’.66 Nevertheless, the
question of Hong Kong’s future status had brought forth debate about the foundations on
which Hong Kong’s prosperity rested. One editorial in the ‘communist’ New Evening Post
emphasised that Hong Kong’s ‘growth as a trading port and financial centre were dependent
on China,’ and therefore ‘discussion of stability and prosperity could only be on the premise
that China’s sovereignty was recognised’.67 Yangcheng Evening News, a paper published in
Guangzhou and available in Hong Kong, had also reportedly published an article claiming
that ‘Hong Kong’s present prosperity is due to the hard work of its people and the support of
China rather than to the British connection’.68 The SCMP published its own editorial as a
rejoinder, which claimed that whilst ‘no one would dispute’ that ‘the success of Hongkong is
the success of its people,’ sought to draw attention to what ‘Britain has done for Hongkong’:

[Britain] has provided through the local administration, the basic constitutional and
economic framework in which the colony has been able to develop and prosper. It has
provided political stability and internal security, a widely respected system of law and
justice, and above all it has ensured the basic freedoms in which Hongkong
businessmen of any nationality have been able to operate with minimum redtape, low
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taxation, and a high level of infrastructure, communications and commercial support.
It has provided a stable and respected currency, fully backed by reserves.69

The Chinese leadership were less interested in the debate; Deng and Zhao had made it
emphatically clear that investor confidence and prosperity were secondary to matters of
principle. As the following sections will demonstrate, the unwavering position of the Chinese
negotiators ensured that the British side – more concerned with economic consequences
and keen to avoid a breakdown in the talks – would make a series of significant concessions.

3. Britain Concedes

By November 1982, it was clear to the British side that China’s information effort was
proving the more successful. Youde told the FCO that:

Concern is becoming increasingly apparent in all sections of the community,
particularly in Hong Kong Chinese business and professional circles. The principal
cause is the Chinese campaign to spread knowledge of their plan to recover Hong
Kong and to maintain its stability and prosperity by making it a capitalist enclave
within China run by Hong Kong people. This campaign has been marked in the past
few weeks by a series of increasingly detailed and authoritative statements from the
Chinese; by supporting articles in the Communist press appealing to the patriotism of
local people; and by widespread “briefing” activity in Peking and by local Communist
officials.

According to the governor, the Chinese government’s plan was to ‘build up the impression
that the diplomatic talks in Peking are intended only to fill in the details of a plan whose main
elements have been determined by the Chinese leadership’.70 Over the summer, the Chinese
government had invited delegations from Hong Kong to Beijing to impart to them details of
their plan for Hong Kong after 1997. The visits has been organised by a working group
headed by state councillor Ji Pengfei, and had reportedly included the publisher of Ta Kung
Pao, the vice chairman of the CGCCHK, the head of the Hong Kong Federation of Trade
69
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Unions, and the general manager of the Bank of China.71 Late November visits included
Heung Yi Kuk – an influential body representing interests in the New Territories, the Real
Estate Developers Association, the Hong Kong Factory Owners Association, and a group of
assorted professionals.72 Youde feared that some in Hong Kong are ‘beginning to come
round to the view that the Chinese plan would work,’ whilst others believed that the Chinese
might implement their plan unilaterally.73 On the other hand, the prime minister was
dissatisfied with the effort on their side to convince the Chinese leadership that British
administration was required. Chung told her in response that representatives from Hong
Kong ‘found it difficult to say to Chinese leaders that they would not be able to run Hong
Kong’. On the plus side, Thatcher reported that ‘the press line in Hong Kong was changing’
and that ‘the argument for continued British administration was now being put more
strongly’.74

In the bilateral talks, no progress had been made by early 1983. The Chinese leadership
refused to proceed until the British conceded that any detailed negotiations were based on
the premise of Chinese sovereignty after 1997. In considering how to go forward, the FCO
identified a number of alternative strategies for further dialogue with China, and outlined
what would constitute a favourable outcome. For the latter, their report indicated that the
British government needed to: take into account ‘the protection of our economic and
commercial interests in Hong Kong, South-East Asia and the Far East’; maintain ‘our relations
with China’ and ‘the United Kingdom’s commercial and economic interests there,’ and give
‘assistance to the interests of our allies in the area’. It also spelled out the British
government’s ‘strong obligation to secure a solution acceptable to the people of Hong Kong,’
and the ‘indefensibility of the territory against Chinese attack or sustained pressure’.
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Britain’s options, therefore, were to continue pressing for the necessity of British
administration aided by a propaganda campaign; to continue with the same objective, whilst
possible ceding sovereignty and trying to remove 1997 as a decisive juncture, and finally,
acceptance that ‘sovereignty and administrative control must be vested in China in 1997 and
begin talks on matters of detail with a view to seeking the best possible deal for Hong Kong
after 1997’. 75

The prime minister, meanwhile, had enquired about a number of other more radical
possibilities, such as taking ‘Hong Kong fairly rapidly down the path towards independence’ –
albeit stopping short of full independence – through democratic reform. Her rationale were
that the move would bolster more vocal support for British administration in the colony, and,
in the likely event the Chinese government would oppose constitutional reform, it would
‘illustrate the hollowness of the Chinese pledge to let Hong Kong run its own affairs’.76
Cradock regarded such ideas as ‘explosive,’ and argued instead that they should try to ‘avoid
confrontation’. He ultimately came up with a solution he thought would pave the way for
negotiations to continue: ‘by finessing the sovereignty issue’ without conceding it outright.77
He referenced the prime minister’s statement to Deng, in which she had stressed her
inability to bestow sovereignty herself, but that she could ‘consider’ broaching the question
of sovereignty to parliament if ‘concrete arrangements on administration and control’ were
in place.78 Cradock was able to convince her that providing the Chinese leadership with a
firmer statement along these lines was a way to ensure progress without substantial change
in their position. In a letter to Zhao, she told him she was disappointed that ‘although six
75
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months have elapsed since my visit no real progress has been made… and we have not yet
been able to begin substantive talks on this vital issue’. Her offer was that:

Provided that agreement could be reached between the British and Chinese
Government on administrative arrangements for Hong Kong which would guarantee
the future prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and would be acceptable to the
British Parliament and to the people of Hong Kong as well as to the Chinese
Government, I would be prepared to recommend to Parliament that sovereignty over
the whole of Hong Kong should revert to China. 79

The letter to Zhao proved successful in paving the way for negotiations, and the first session
was held on 12 July 1983. The previous month, Thatcher had won a decisive victory in the
British general election, and in a cabinet reshuffle, Geoffrey Howe replaced Francis Pym as
foreign secretary. Chief negotiators for China and Britain were vice-foreign minister Yao
Guang and Cradock respectively. Hong Kong’s presence at the talks, in the form of Governor
Youde, was accepted only reluctantly by the Chinese side. They maintained that the talks
were a matter for the two sovereign governments – foreign secretary Lord Belstead’s
declaration that the negotiations should be a ‘three-legged stool’, made during a visit to the
colony in December 1982, was rebuked by the Chinese government and in left-wing Hong
Kong press.80 From their point of view, Hong Kong people were in sovereign Chinese
territory, and therefore represented by the People’s Republic in the talks. Although Youde
attended the talks, he was cognisant of not presenting the Hong Kong government as a ‘third
party,’ and would be there as part of the British delegation. He had previously given a public
comment that he was at the negotiations to represent Hong Kong people, and had been
reprimanded by assistant foreign minister Zhou Nan. Finally, GIS director Peter Tsao, who
was scheduled to assist the governor, was refused a visa.81 The issue would be a recurring
one – attempts by members of UMELCO to give Hong Kong a say in the outcome were met
with similar sentiments.
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In his opening statement at the first round of talks, Cradock persisted with the premise that
Hong Kong’s prosperity was dependent on British administration. He also presented the
openness of Hong Kong’s economy as underpinning the importance of confidence, arguing
that:

The human and capital resources which are essential to Hong Kong’s success are highly
mobile. Hong Kong places no restrictions upon the movement of capital, and the skills
of Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs, managers and professionally qualified people are easily
marketable elsewhere.82

Yao countered with the assurance that ‘special conditions prevailing in Hong Kong would be
fully taken into consideration and special policies to maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity would
be pursued’. He also told Cradock that ‘the development of the mainland was the sole
guarantee of the prosperity of Hong Kong’.83 Following the session, Cradock reported on the
necessity to ‘lead them to see that the running of Hong Kong is a complex business quite
different from anything in their experience and something which China is ill-equipped to take
over’.84 Despite Youde’s prior assertion that the Chinese government did not require further
information on Hong Kong, after the second round of talks on 25-26 July the British side
decided to provide their Chinese counterparts with four detailed papers produced in Hong
Kong. They were divided into four topics: law, the ‘economic system,’ monetary system, and
finance. Whilst the FCO claimed they were ‘intentionally of a factual nature and do not
attempt to argue the need for the continuation of British administration,’ they nonetheless
emphasised the important of ensuring international confidence and the autonomy of Hong
Kong, and refuted suggestions that Britain gained financial advantage from the colony.85 The
paper on the ‘economic system of Hong Kong’ was designed to illustrate the specificities of
82
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Hong Kong’s externally oriented economy and its dependence on trade, and how this
‘constrains the range of economic policies that are feasible’. The importance of Britain to
Hong Kong’s ‘freedom in the management of its external economic relations’ – such as its
membership of the GATT through Britain – was also emphasised.86

During the first round of negotiations, the Chinese side had been unwavering in their
assertion that sovereignty and administration could not be separated, and that both were
non-negotiable.87 The lack of identifiable progress by the British side in the talks – given that
the details remained confidential, and were now on hiatus until 22 September – resulted in a
drop of confidence in Hong Kong. Economic indicators were identified as demonstrating a fall
in confidence. The Hong Kong dollar fell to a low of 7.62 to the US dollar in early September
– the culmination of a steady decline since a high of 5.69 in July 1981. Declining investment
in the colony was reflected in the Hang Seng stock market index, which over this same period
was down from 1810 points to 928. The property sector showed particular slowdown, which
had a knock-on effect on government revenues through the sale of land. Capital outflow,
however, was not yet regarded as significant, though the exchanging of Hong Kong dollar
deposits into foreign currencies was taken to suggest preparation for a movement of funds
away from the colony.88 Meanwhile, the NCNA and the pro-Beijing press in Hong Kong
continued to transmit China’s plans for the colony.89 Youde reported that doubt over the
continuation of British administration was spreading as a consequence, but that abandoning
the objective would be ‘traumatic’ for ExCo. He claimed that some of its members ‘would
advocate brinksmanship’ in the negotiations rather than soften their stance.90 The British
government thought that continuing to argue for administration after 1997 was now likely to
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lead to a breakdown in talks. Other options touted by the FCO were to persevere with
administration as a goal, but ‘to remove elements of “colonialism” and to make the system,
particularly the position of the Governor, more palatable to the Chinese’. The other option
would be to abandon administration as a goal, and negotiate for ‘effective safeguards for
autonomy for Hong Kong without an authoritative political link with the UK’.91

As will be demonstrated, the British side would ultimately settle for the last objective. At this
stage, however, they recognised that abandoning British administration as a goal would be
vehemently opposed by UMELCO and, if it became public, would cause a crisis in confidence
in Hong Kong and worsen its currency and investment troubles. For the second round of
talks, therefore, British officials decided to maintain their current position until they had
discovered the Chinese side’s reaction to the papers presented at the end of the last round.92
Their response was negative; Cradock described Yao’s tone during the resumed talks as
‘intransigent and threatening’. The Chinese team were dismissive of the reports, and Yao
alleged that Britain’s ‘insistence on administration’ was ‘out and out insistence on colonial
rule’. 93 Furthermore, Cradock was given with a September 1984 deadline: if no agreement
was reached between the two sides by that point, China would announce its plans for Hong
Kong unilaterally. Yao also denied that the decline of the Hong Kong dollar was a
consequence of uncertainty stemming from the talks, and refused to issue a joint statement
of reassurance.94 Given the Chinese side’s uncompromising position regarding British
administration, the ambassador surmised from the talks that ‘there are, in essence, two
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paths which we can follow, that of confrontation, or that of seeking to negotiate the best
possible arrangements for Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of China’.95

On 7 October, the prime minister held a meeting with Youde and unofficial members of ExCo
(UMEXCO). The latter insisted that the objective should not change, and emphasised that
‘most of the people of Hong Kong wished to maintain the current state of freedom and rule
of law and had no faith in Chinese Communist Government’. They thought that the economic
repercussions of the deadlock occurring in Hong Kong ‘would force Chinese to soften their
position,’ and were willing to risk a breakdown in the negotiations. The dollar continued to
fall, and in October, the Hong Kong government decided to peg the currency to the US dollar
at a rate of HK$7.8 to US$1. The prime minister, however, recalled Deng’s assertion that the
prosperity of Hong Kong was of secondary importance. She ‘reminded the Unofficials that
the Chinese had once said that they would rather have sovereignty over a poverty-stricken
Hong Kong than a prosperous Hong Kong over which they had no sovereignty’. Thatcher also
placed a high priority on preventing a breakdown in the negotiations. Once again, Cradock
was successful in formulating a proposal and securing the prime minister’s approval. He
persuaded her to support a statement, in which the British government would agree to
‘explore further the Chinese ideas’ about the future administrative status of Hong Kong,
without surrendering their view that British administration was the most favourable
outcome. The draft statement referenced suggestions made by Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian
to Geoffrey Howe in a New York meeting on 27 September: Hong Kong’s autonomy after
1997 would last for at least fifty years, and Britain could have ‘a continuing important role’ in
Hong Kong. Thatcher was able to persuade UMEXCO that the statement offered the best
way forward, and Chung, on their behalf, accepted that it ‘represented an excellent position
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in its attempt to get the Chinese to present their view without conceding elements of our
own position’.96

The statement provided a temporary breakthrough, and the talks resumed on 19 and 20
October. By November, discussion turned to the specifics of Hong Kong’s administration
post-1997. Yao provided a twelve-point plan, which outlined both matters of principle and
the basic features of SAR status. The points included broad statements that Hong Kong’s
‘current social and economic systems would remain unchanged,’ and affirmed that Hong
Kong would ‘remain a free port and a separate tariff area’. Under the name “Hong Kong
China,” it was proposed that Hong Kong could ‘maintain and develop economic and cultural
relations and sign agreements with foreign countries’.97 Nevertheless, requests for
elaboration from the British side were met with claims that details were for the SAR
government to consider. Furthermore, Cradock’s enquiries about the role Britain would play
after 1997 were met with suspicion. Cradock, therefore, described the talks on 14-15
November as ‘discouraging’, and claimed that ‘prospects of achieving a satisfactory package
look worse than we had hoped’.98

Cradock knew that with the statement in October, although the offer had been conditional,
Britain had effectively conceded that British administration would not be in place after 1997.
Yao had pressed for an explicit statement of this fact, and Cradock was willing to provide
one. He asked for permission to ‘make it clear’ that the British side do not wish ‘to make any
proposal on links between Britain and Hong Kong, which conflicts with the premise that both
sovereignty and the right of administration over the whole of Hong Kong should revert to
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China in 1997’.99 The British leadership agreed on the basis that this had, in effect, already
been conceded. UMELCO were more reluctant, but their ExCo contingent had already been
persuaded by Thatcher that a breakdown in the talks would be damaging for Hong Kong, and
they accepted that the Chinese position left little alternative. Nevertheless, they could not
accept that ‘Chinese assurances’ would be enough to ensure autonomy, and would continue
to press for an agreement that was legally binding.100 In early December, with the Chinese
government now satisfied that British administration was out of the equation, the two sides
entered detailed discussion on the parameters of Hong Kong’s autonomy. Furthermore, the
Chinese side announced that from September they wold begin drafting the Basic Law – the
document that would define Hong Kong’s relations with the mainland from 1997.101

4. Agreement Reached

Cradock had been due to retire from his ambassadorship in October, but had agreed to stay
until December for the sake of the negotiations. Having rescued the talks from collapse, he
was replaced in January as ambassador and chief negotiator by Richard Evans. At the same
time, Zhou Nan replaced Yao Guang as chief negotiator on the Chinese team. In sessions on
25 and 26 January, the two sides discussed working papers created by the British. The British
side reported that:

It is evident that on the monetary system, lifestyle, freedoms and rights of the
individuals, the economy, and the legal system, their ideas are broadly in line with
ours… Whether they will be prepared to specify this autonomy in a binding bilateral
agreement in sufficient detail to retain confidence in Hong Kong remains to be seen.102
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Furthermore, there were still areas of serious contention to be overcome. The Chinese
government had divulged their intention to station troops in Hong Kong after 1997, which
the British vehemently opposed. Likewise, issues relating to aviation rights, citizenship,
constitutional arrangements, and the presence of foreign nationals after 1997 revealed deep
differences between the two parties.103 There was also the matter of timescale: the Chinese
side sought a final agreement by September 1984; Youde and Chung hoped for an interim
arrangement only by that date; and Howe, Evans, and Cradock all favoured abiding by the
Chinese deadline.104 The latter view prevailed, and with the prospect of a binding agreement
being signed in the near future, thoughts turned to informing the Hong Kong public of the
likely outcome.105 The progress of the negotiations, as well as the concessions made by the
British side on both sovereignty and administration, had thus far remained confidential.
Howe now posited giving ‘some indications’ publicly in Hong Kong, possibly in a ‘ministerial
statement in late spring or early summer’.106

It was UMELCO, however, that decided to make the first move in bringing the issue into the
public sphere. In March, Youde had reported Chung’s anger at the fact that the British side
‘had gained nothing from the process of negotiation and had been forced into constant
retreat’.107 With the surrender of both sovereignty and administration, UMELCO saw their
remaining responsibilities as being to ‘mobilize public opinion on the terms of the SinoBritish Agreement’ and to ‘make known Hong Kong’s views to both the British and Chinese
Government’. In February, Roger Lobo, senior member of LegCo, tabled a motion stating that
‘we deem it essential that any proposal for the future of Hong Kong should be debated in the
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Council before any final agreement is reached,’ and a debate was held on 14 March.108 Zhou
saw the move – one he alleged was supported by the Hong Kong and British governments –
as an attempt to reintroduce Hong Kong as a third party into the negotiations, and a breach
of their confidentiality.109 On 9 May, UMELCO also visited London, with the intention of
influencing a scheduled debate in parliament on Hong Kong. They produced a statement,
which asked whether the agreement would be legally binding, and whether it should be
ratified before ‘the details of the basic law are known’. Finally, it asked: ‘should not the
British government insist on a mechanism which will ensure that the agreement is faithfully
implemented?’110 Howe told Youde that the statement becoming public would be highly
damaging, and although he did not want the governor to forbid its release, implored him to
‘explore with [Chung] the possibility of at least avoiding the issue of the statement to the
press.’111 The statement was made public regardless, and met with hostility from the Chinese
side in the negotiations – Zhou again insisted that the British and Hong Kong governments
were involved.112 In London, UMELCO met with the All Party Hong Kong Parliamentary
Group and other MPs; Chung was angered by instances of opposition to the trip from those
who thought it would endanger the negotiations.113 Nevertheless, UMELCO felt vindicated by
SCMP opinion polls indicating public support for their actions.114 They were less successful in
June, when Chung and two other UMELCO members accepted an invitation to Beijing. The
visit received extensive press coverage, and at their public reception, Deng rejected their
claim to be there as official representatives of Hong Kong, leading to reports that the
Chinese leader had snubbed the delegation. In their private meeting – the proceedings of
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which were later made public – Deng also denied the group’s claim that the colony faced a
crisis of confidence.115

Meanwhile, the British team had been preparing a draft agreement, which they wished to
submit to the Chinese side before a visit by Howe to Beijing in April. The draft was designed
to be ‘maximalist’ – it sought to achieve the ‘greatest degree of continuity’ after 1997.116
Zhou subsequently rejected it as ‘trying to turn the future SAR into some sort of independent
political entity’ and ‘a deliberate attempt to confuse the distinction between independence
and autonomy’.117 Deng and Howe met on 18 April, and the meeting had mixed results for
the British: on the one hand, Deng agreed that the agreement to be signed in September
would be a draft, giving time for parliament to assess it and give approval by the end of the
year. On the other hand, Deng was unequivocal that a Chinese garrison would be maintained
in Hong Kong – this was not new however, the Chinese side had already made their position
on the issue clear in the negotiations.118 More significant was Deng’s reluctance for the
agreement to be legally binding, and his intention to establish a joint group – what would
become the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group – in Hong Kong for period prior to the transition
of power in 1997.119 The latter stemmed from his mistrust towards Britain’s actions in Hong
Kong once the agreement was sealed. A declaration by Jardine Matheson the previous
month that the company would redomicile to Bermuda was met with criticism from the
Hong Kong press as suggesting a lack of faith in Hong Kong’s future; Deng referenced the
decision as evidence of capital flight, and likewise suggested that increased government
expenditure, or a sell-off of government land, could leave Hong Kong in an undesirable state
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after the handover.120 He also repeated the warning he made to Thatcher: if the colony was
subject to ‘disturbances’ prior to 1997, the Chinese government would ‘reconsider’ the
timetable for the transfer of power.121 On 20 April, following his Beijing visit, Howe gave a
press conference in Hong Kong that for the first time made public the status of the
negotiations; he announced that ‘it would not be realistic to think of an agreement that
provides for continued British administration in Hong Kong after 1997’.122 Press editorials
and comments by public figures were reported as ‘mostly favourable’ to the statement and
the ‘removal of uncertainty’ it represented. On the other hand, there were accusations that
Britain had abandoned Hong Kong from Sing Pao and in the ‘right wing and pro-Taiwan
press’.123

Whilst the negotiations continued, a significant development in June was the establishment
of a joint working group in Beijing tasked with drafting the Joint Declaration. The British
contingent was led by future Hong Kong governor David Wilson, and the Chinese side by
diplomat Ke Zaishuo. Nevertheless, there were significant barriers to overcome before a
consensus could be reached. In the proceeding rounds, the transitional arrangements
proposed by Deng were debated. The Chinese government’s intention to locate the joint
group in Hong Kong was opposed by both the governor and UMELCO as a tool for
undermining the administration’s authority prior to 1997.124 With the matter proving an
obstacle to progress on other issues, Thatcher wrote to Zhao expressing concern over slow
progress, and asked for the question of location to be set aside in the short-term.125 A
compromise was reached during Howe’s second visit to Beijing in late July, with Cradock
accompanying. In a private meeting with Cradock, Zhou, who was also concerned about the
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approaching September deadline, offered to defer locating the joint group in Hong Kong for
two years after the agreement was signed, and told him that it could continue until the year
2000 – a concession sought by UMEXCO, on the basis that it would provide some scope for
British input following the handover.126 Thatcher and Howe deemed the offer acceptable,
but after telling Cradock to bargain for deferment to 1989, the two sides settled for 1988.127

By August, the two sides were nearing a consensus. In the working group, they had agreed
that the agreement and its annexes would involve a legal commitment. Outstanding
problems included constitutional arrangements, nationality status, land leases, and civil
aviation. In their initial twelve-point plan, the Chinese side had stated that the SAR’s
‘principal officials would be appointed by the Central People’s Government of China on the
basis of the results of elections or consultations held locally’.128 On the other hand, the Hong
Kong governor and ExCo wanted a more direct democratic arrangement.129 Earlier in the
year, Youde had drafted plans for constitutional development in order to create a ‘self
sustaining and representative government structure,’ including the election of LegCo, ExCo
and the governor or ‘chief executive’.130 In July 1984, a green paper on The further
development of representative government in Hong Kong was published pledging substantive
democratic reform. In the end, the stipulations in the Joint Declaration were in line with the
Beijing government’s plan, and would become a topic of serious debate during the drafting
of the Basic Law. For UMELCO, some measure of British nationality after 1997 was a matter
of great importance. The request was adamantly opposed by the Chinese government, who
insisted that Hong Kong residents would be Chinese citizens.131 The final issue to be
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overcome was aviation rights, and on this front, the British were able to secure some
compromise. Britain had maintained aviation rights over Hong Kong to date, and after 1997,
they wanted Hong Kong to have full autonomy in the matter. Although opposed by China’s
Civil Aviation Administration, Deng eventually gave his permission for Hong Kong to retain
control, and on the 26 September, Evans and Zhou were able to initial the agreement in
Beijing.132 The Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed by Zhao and Thatcher on 19
December, following its approval by China’s National People’s Congress in November, and
the British House of Commons.

Conclusion

The Joint Declaration stipulated that ‘the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain
the status of a free port and a separate customs territory’. Furthermore, Hong Kong would
‘retain the status of an international financial centre, and its markets for foreign exchange,
gold, securities and futures will continue’ with ‘ free flow of capital’ and the Hong Kong dollar
‘freely convertible’. Finally, Hong Kong was to continue managing its own external
commercial relations: according to the text, ‘using the name of "Hong Kong, China", the
[SAR] may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude
relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations’.133 In
comparison to other aspects of Hong Kong’s post-1997 political and economic structure,
these stipulations were uncontroversial. Despite the Chinese leadership’s assertion that
Hong Kong’s prosperity was of secondary importance to matters of principle –an effective
strategic posture – the Chinese government clearly placed a high priority on not jeopardising
its economic well-being, given its importance to China.
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Once the colony’s political and business elite had adequate assurances that Hong Kong’s
autonomy and economic model would remain intact, they were accepting of Hong Kong’s
transfer to China. They had initially clung to British administration not out of sentiment or
belief that only the British could run Hong Kong, but because the British connection had
provided insulation against events in recent Chinese history, and had allowed – for the most
part – for Hong Kong to govern itself. The stipulations of the Joint Declaration and the
implication that the agreement was legally binding were therefore well received. On 15
October, S. Y. Chung told LegCo that ’the agreement, in our opinion, does meet substantially
our major requirements’ and that ‘what we have today is the best agreement possible and
one which we, the Unofficial Members of the Executive Council, can commend to the people
of Hong Kong in good conscience’.134 It also appeared to appease Hong Kong’s industrial
community; the CMA reported that ‘it provides assurance for the preservation of the current
economic system and liberal economic and free trade policies, while Hong Kong's free port
status as well as the people's life style will also remain unchanged… On this understanding,
the Draft Agreement/Joint Declaration is generally acceptable’.135

There have been suggestions, on the basis of recently declassified cabinet proceedings, that
the prospect of enhanced commercial opportunities in China may have influenced the British
side to take a more conciliatory approach in the negotiations than they may have
otherwise.136 In a cabinet meeting on 2 August 1984, when agreement over the Joint
Declaration was near, a point raised in discussion was that the period following the
agreement, ‘could offer significant commercial as well as diplomatic opportunities’ given the
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level of contact between the two countries the transitional period wold entail.137 Although
this may have factored, as this chapter has shown, Britain had minimal bargaining strength
once China had announced their intentions for Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s successful
development had been accompanied by informal decolonisation from Britain; whilst imperial
ties had contributed significantly to Hong Kong’s growth, these links had diminished, and
Hong Kong had been governed with increasing autonomy. Britain’s only card to play was that
British administration provided a level of confidence that autonomy under China could not,
but they were out-manoeuvred in the negotiations: the Chinese side were resolute in their
insistence that sovereignty and administration were inseparable. With indications that
stalemate was having economic ramifications for the colony, the British side saw no practical
option but to cede both.
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Conclusion

A number of histories of Hong Kong have emphasised its ‘global’ nature, often with
reference to Saskia Sassen’s conception of the ‘global city’.1 In her influential work, she
contends that ‘increased globalization along with continued concentration in economic
control has given major cities a key role in the management and control of such a global
network’.2 Sassen focusses on New York, London, and Tokyo, but studies of Hong Kong have
argued for its categorisation as a global city, not just because of its role in the global
economy, but for its involvement in other aspects of globalisation as well. According to one,
‘after centuries of contact and conflict, the globalism of its citizens is evident in politics,
commerce, mass media, and movement; Hong Kongers have participated in many processes
of globalization over time’.3 Nevertheless, as the last chapter demonstrated, this
‘globalisation’ occurred alongside increasing economic integration with China. Stephen Chiu
and Tai-Lok Lui thus conceptualise Hong Kong as a ‘Chinese global city,’ as ‘instead of Hong
Kong’s economy becoming more deeply integrated into the global economy by a loosening
of Hong Kong’s attachment to the nation-state, its economic development is increasingly
embedded in China’s grander national marketization and “going global” projects’.4 As will be
discussed later, this relationship with China has not been entirely welcomed in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong’s value to China is as a finance centre, free port and tax haven: a position to the
mainland that could be labelled as “offshore”. Ronen Palan describes offshore economies as
‘spatio-juridical enclosures… characterized by “designer rate tax and regulatory regimes”
aimed at harvesting from the world economy’. He argues they represent the ‘bifurcation of
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the sovereign realm’ based on degrees of regulation, and serve the state by ‘reconciling the
growing contradictions between their territorial and nationalist ideology… and their support
for capitalist accumulation on a global scale’.5 Whilst China also created its own ‘specialized
realms’ from the late 1970s – which, ironically, facilitated the movement of Hong Kong’s own
manufacturing offshore – Hong Kong’s networks, expertise, infrastructure, and regulatory
framework meant that it would not be so easily displaced. Whilst the rise of the offshore
phenomenon is usually dated from the 1970s onwards, in its role as a trade conduit, as a site
conducive for industrial manufacturing, and as a finance centre, Hong Kong had assumed a
comparable role since its founding as a British colony in 1842. That many aspects of Hong
Kong’s postwar history can be understood as stemming from the interplay between its
character as a unique economic space in combination with colonial status and its
implications, has been a central premise of this thesis. How this model was preserved in the
face of significant geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts is another.

Colonialism was, of course, at the root of why Hong Kong was the site for this unusual
economic model to begin with. On 27 September 1988, Milton Friedman gave a talk titled
‘Free Markets and Free Men’ at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He told the audience
that he had chosen the title because ‘Hong Kong is such a clear example of free markets
making free men,’ and explained why this presented ‘something of a paradox’:

Taken all in all, whether you measure it by the fraction of the income of the people
that is spent through the government, whether you measure it by the restrictions on
the flows of money or of goods, Hong Kong is certainly in an economic sense one of
the freest countries in the world, if not the freest… And the paradox is, that suppose,
Hong Kong’s situation had been like that of the other colonies. Suppose you had not
had China here to determine the cause of events. And suppose Hong Kong had been
given political liberty instead of being what I would call a beneficial/enlightened
5
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dictatorship. Suppose that hadn’t happened. Would Hong Kong be as free today as it
is? As I say, I think the answer is pretty clearly no.6

To Friedman, that Hong Kong’s economic freedom had stemmed from sustained political
subordination was highly paradoxical, and had been dependent on specific historical
circumstances. Whilst designating the colonial regime as ‘enlightened’ or ‘beneficial’ might
be contested by some – as would the claim that political liberty would have jeopardised the
colony’s achievements – it is certainly the case that Hong Kong’s paradoxical status was
rooted in certain historical contingencies. This included British colonial rule and a
government that was wedded to these principles, and China’s position of claiming
sovereignty – therefore making independence untenable – whilst allowing an imperial
presence on its border to continue for pragmatic reasons.

I have argued that the continuation of this model – which faced challenges from inside and
out – reveals a great deal about the nature of British imperialism; the imperial system,
especially in its latter stages, was one which gave scope for Hong Kong’s officials to govern in
a manner they saw as most appropriate for the colony. That their approach was often at
odds with that in the metropole, as Friedman notes, is further proof of this fact. The colonial
regime’s attempts to safeguard this model by asserting Hong Kong’s autonomy contributed
to a decolonisation process despite the continuation of colonial status. Britain’s successful
attempts to obtain restrictions on Hong Kong’s textile exports from the late 1950s indicated
a divergence in their economic interests, as did efforts to enter the European Economic
Community from 1961. With British entry into the EEC in 1973, Hong Kong’s preferential
access to the British market came to an end. Yet Hong Kong’s own economic priorities were
also changing: as Hong Kong’s trade links diversified, the importance of the colonial
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connection weakened. Hong Kong’s increased trade with the EEC and the US made entry into
their GSP schemes a primary objective

This thesis has demonstrated that these diverging economic interests represented the
dissolution of Hong Kong’s imperial ties with Britain, as did the colonial government’s
conscious pursuit of greater autonomy in order to safeguard distinct interests. During the
1960s, Hong Kong expanded its publicity channels and engaged in commercial public
relations, with the intent of preventing the sort of protectionism which had been imposed by
Hong Kong’s own sovereign power. Furthermore, negotiating the textile restrictions
themselves imbued Hong Kong with a degree of commercial autonomy on the international
stage.

However, as trade relations between Hong Kong and Britain indicated, the winning of
autonomy and processes of decolonisation ebbed and flowed – either because the imperial
connection in Hong Kong was still valued, or because the colony’s constitutional status
necessitated representation by Britain in certain instances. Nevertheless, as the last chapter
showed, the importance of imperial ties was sufficiently diminished to lessen the impact of a
prospective transfer to Chinese control. The build up to the Sino-British negotiations over
Hong Kong raised debates about the nature and importance of Britain’s role in Hong Kong’s
economic success. The British negotiators failed to persuade their Chinese counterparts that
the British connection was vital, because its importance had eroded. It is for this reason we
can talk about decolonisation in Hong Kong, prior to a transfer of sovereignty to China.

Furthermore, this thesis has demonstrated that protectionism aimed at Hong Kong’s exports
of textiles had a significant impact on how narratives of Hong Kong’s industrial development
were constructed, and how these came to rationalise the governing principles of the colonial
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state. Hong Kong’s government and business representatives argued that the colony’s ability
to trade in manufactures unimpeded was of paramount importance, as the colony’s
exceptionality precluded other forms of economic activity. Likewise, the colonial government
maintained that free trade and free enterprise were the most appropriate policy positions as
a result of Hong Kong’s externally-oriented economy, and had been vindicated through the
colony’s successful development.

Economist Ha-Joon Chang would argue that in positing industrial manufacturing as the
consequence of laissez-faire policies contributes to what he calls the ‘myth of free trade’ –
the narrative perpetuated by free market advocates that rich industrialised nations achieved
their level of development through open economic policies, whereas in practice, he argues,
this resulted from the protection government provided to infant industries. He describes
Hong Kong as ‘the exception that proves the rule’ as ‘it became rich despite [emphasis
added] having free trade and a laissez-faire policy’.7 Chapter one showed that, in fact, there
was a degree of government assistance to industry following the Second World War, but the
point remains that this was lost in the narratives that followed, and manufacturing was a
feature of the colony’s economy much earlier. The business community as a whole were not
always convinced that non-intervention in industrial matters was the only option available,
but for instrumentalist reasons its representatives still co-operated in projecting
conceptualised images of Hong Kong that helped to embed these principles as core values of
the colony. That the Chinese government shared the belief that Hong Kong’s continued
prosperity was dependent on these same foundations ensured they would outlast British
rule.
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1997 And Beyond

Whilst the Joint Declaration ensured that Hong Kong as a free port would continue, the Basic
Law would enshrine its free trade principles in the territory’s constitutional document. In
June 1985, the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) was appointed by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC), and chaired by Ji Pingfei of
the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO). As the document codified the SAR’s
relationship with China, Britain had no part in the drafting process; on the other hand, Hong
Kong would now be representing its own interests. Although mainland Chinese made up the
majority of the BLDC, it had a substantial Hong Kong component – twenty three of the fifty
nine members. The mainland representatives were government officials from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the HKMAO, and the NCNA, and a number of lawyers, academics, and other
professionals. For the Hong Kong contingent, Beijing operated a “united front” strategy,
which were tactics designed to ‘secure allies, win over those who were neutral, and fight
opponents, with the ultimate aim to increase the number of China’s supporters’.8 Hong
Kong’s business leaders were the primary target, but as part of the united front strategy, the
membership also included pro-democracy campaigners Martin Lee and Szeto Wah. The Basic
Law Consultative Committee was more representative: the advisory board was composed of
180 members from diverse quarters of Hong Kong society.

That the Basic Law ultimately 'elaborated in detail the rights and freedoms of business,' and
'pledged commitment to unrestricted capitalism and the most conservative budgetary
policies' has been attributed to the high representation of business representatives in the
committee, and the high priority the Beijing government placed on maintaining Hong Kong’s
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economic status quo.9 Article 115 of the Basic Law stipulates that ‘the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall pursue the policy of free trade and safeguard the free movement
of goods, intangible assets and capital’. Other articles pledge fiscal conservatism, low taxes,
and freedom from exchange controls.10 Leo Goodstadt argues that the other articles in the
Basic Law showed that the Chinese government actually intended for the SAR government to
‘be involved more extensive in economic management than its British predecessor,’ but
were hamstrung by these core tenets.11

The Basic Law was to also ratify Hong Kong’s international status for the purposes of its
external commercial relations. According to Article 116:

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, using the name "Hong Kong,
China", participate in relevant international organizations and international trade
agreements (including preferential trade arrangements), such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements regarding international trade in
textiles.12

As this thesis has shown, Hong Kong was only able to enjoy de facto autonomy within the
GATT under British membership, leading to convoluted arrangements in multilateral
meetings. Britain had been reluctant to sponsor Hong Kong for full contracting party status,
on the basis that China would have opposed the move. Hong Kong’s continued participation
in the GATT had been agreed during the Sino-British negotiations, and was a matter for the
Joint Liaison Group. In April 1986, Britain submitted a declaration to the GATT stating that
Hong Kong as a separate customs territory with full autonomy in commercial relations was
eligible to become a contracting party. At the same time, China submitted a statement of
endorsement, and stated that Hong Kong would operate in international affairs as ‘Hong
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Kong, China’. Hong Kong’s full membership was necessary because China was not yet a
member – their own membership bid was launched the same year. The Republic of China
had been one of the original signatories to the GATT in 1948, but after the civil war, the GMD
had relocated to Taiwan and withdrawn their membership. The PRC’s membership bid was
arduous: existing members were wary of China’s export capacity; the process of becoming
compliant with GATT protocols was made difficult by the extensive state intervention in the
Chinese economy; and the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 led to a two-year break in
the negotiations.13 China had failed to join by the time the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
was established in 1995, absorbing the GATT, but following bilateral agreements with the US
and European Union (EU), China was eventually admitted in December 2001.

During the 1980s, Hong Kong was subject to continuous restrictions on textiles. The MFA
expired at the end of 1981; negotiations for its renewal were held in November and
December that year, and it was renewed for another four years. The US had wanted to
reduce the growth allowances for Hong Kong and South Korea, whilst the EEC sought lower
growth, cutbacks on certain quotas, and numerous other concessions. The result was a
vaguely worded document that left scope for cutbacks in subsequent bilateral agreements.
The exporting countries were nevertheless able to gain some concessions, including the
removal of the “reasonable departures” clause from the MFA, which had given scope for
stricter restrictions than was advocated in the text of the agreement.14 The diversification of
Hong Kong’s industries also resulted in protectionist measures against goods other than
textiles. In 1982 the colony made a formal complaint to the GATT about quantitative
restrictions imposed by France on radios, toys, and watches. The GATT administration
advised that restrictions were not in-keeping with GATT protocols, and France lifted the
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quotas in 1987.15 Throughout the period, the colony also faced accusations of dumping –
selling goods below cost of production – from the EEC in particular. GATT article VI contained
provisions for imposing anti-dumping duties, and by 1989, the EEC had initiated antidumping action against a wide range of Hong Kong’s exports, including ‘audio and video
cassettes, televisions, cellular telephones, tungsten, silicon, photograph albums and cotton
denim cloth’.16

Elsewhere in the GATT further advances were made in the liberalisation of international
trade – the Tokyo round of negotiations from 1973 to 1979 had resulted in large tariff cuts,
with industrialised countries agreeing to reductions in their import duties of around one
third.17 Ronald Reagan’s presidency from 1981 stimulated a renewed commitment to free
trade from the US government; in 1985 Reagan vetoed the Textile and Apparel Enforcement
Bill – or Jenkins Bill – which would have introduced strict quotas against exporters including
Hong Kong.18 At the launch of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in 1986, members
agreed that the MFA should be brought in line with GATT rules. A lack of agreement on the
method and timeline of the integration made the process a slow one, and the MFA was
renewed again in 1986 until 1991. In 1989, a group of developing clothing and textile
exporters put forth a number of proposals for phasing out the MFA restrictions. The EEC
followed with its own plan, which contained ‘mechanisms to monitor progress; and a
transitional safeguard provision, on lines similar to that of the MFA, to avoid market
disruption during the liberalization process’. The EEC also wanted strengthened GATT rules
to compensate for the loss of the MFA, whilst the US proposed a ten-year phase out. GATT
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members eventually settled on a four-stage phase-out over ten years, starting from the point
in which agreements made during the Uruguay Round came into force in 1995.19

This thesis has made a number of claims about how colonial autonomy was shaped not only
by constitutional arrangements and government policy at the centre, but by the complex
nature of interaction between the metropole and periphery, which was shaped by a number
of factors and subject to change. These arguments have a number of implications for
thinking about Hong Kong’s autonomy in the post-handover period. The Basic Law outlines
Hong Kong’s constitutional relationship to Beijing and codifies its autonomy; whether the
Basic Law is upheld is therefore an important indicator of the sanctity of the territory’s
autonomy. Controversies relating to constitutional development and legal jurisdiction in
Hong Kong have fostered doubts over the sanctity of the ‘one country, two systems’
principle. In March 2015, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons
published a report titled The UK’s relations with Hong Kong: 30 years after the Joint
Declaration, which reported that ‘the belief that China is eroding Hong Kong's autonomy is
strongly held by many people in Hong Kong, reflecting an intertwined combination of legal
and political developments and questions of changing identity, language and culture’. It also
made reference to perceived erosions of free speech and free assembly, and noted that ‘the
restrictive terms of the [NPCSC]’s decision on the method for electing the Chief Executive in
2017 were cited almost across the board as evidence that China was unwilling to grant Hong
Kong the “high degree of autonomy” promised in the Joint Declaration and Basic Law’.20
Protest at the decision took the form of the occupy movement or “umbrella revolution” in
2014.
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Yet as others have argued, using the degree of China’s adherence to the Basic Law as a
barometer for judging Hong Kong’s present autonomy overlooks the nuances in relations
between the centre and periphery, and the extent to which autonomy can be exercised or
constrained in an informal capacity.21 This thesis has given particular attention to the
willingness and ability of Hong Kong’s colonial administration to press for what they believed
were the colony’s best interests, even if these priorities clashed with London’s. Likewise,
Hong Kong’s executives were prepared to resist interventions or oversight they perceived as
unwarranted, and preserve the colony’s unique economic model. I have argued that the
divergent economic interests between Britain and Hong Kong were key to these exchanges,
and provided the scope for the colony to assert its autonomy both in relation to Britain, and
on the international stage.

This begs the questions if and how Hong Kong’s economic relationship with mainland China
alters this dynamic. As chapter 4 explored, fierce protectionism, growing competition, and
global economic slowdown during the 1970s encouraged the colonial government to
investigate how to stimulate diversification of the colony’s industries. Yet in the words of
Stephen Chiu and Tai-Lok Lui, despite these pressures, there was little done ‘collectively to
prepare for the process of economic restructuring’ as whilst ‘technology and product
upgrading, as well as diversification, sometimes occurred… these were more in the nature of
individual responses than collective efforts to enhance the long-term competitiveness of
industry through implementing major organizational changes’.22

Into the 1980s, the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s labour-intensive industries was also
undermined by rising wages relative to Taiwan and South Korea in particular, and increasing

21

Ray Yep, “Understanding the Autonomy of Hong Kong: Looking Beyond Formal Institutions,” in
Negotiating Autonomy in Greater China, ed. Ray Yep (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies,
2013), 5.
22
Chiu and Lui, Hong Kong: Becoming a Chinese global city, 31.

223

costs relating to land scarcity. Industrial restructuring in Hong Kong was shaped ultimately
more by external than internal forces. As chapter five showed, China’s process of economic
reform though opening to trade and investment was a fortuitous development that
reinvigorated Hong Kong’s re-export trade and provided opportunities for investment for
Hong Kong firms. By 1985, the value of Hong Kong’s trade with China exceeded that with the
US, and Hong Kong’s manufacturing industries shifted their production sites across the
border to take advantage of the lower costs of production. As a consequence, Hong Kong
experienced rapid deindustrialisation; from 1986 to 1996, the number of workers in the
manufacturing sector fell by 94 per cent.23

During the transition period, therefore, Hong Kong’s economic integration with China
continued to deepen, and had a fundamental impact on the nature of Hong Kong’s economy.
The process accelerated after 1997, as a result of the Beijing government’s deliberate policy
objectives.24 Following a series of economic downturns in Hong Kong – the first following the
1997 Asian financial crisis, the second after a global economic downturn in 2001-2002, and
the third resulting from the SARS outbreak in 2003 – the Chinese government established a
bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) in 2003, in the form of the Closer Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA). The intention of the agreement was to ‘eliminate the major trade and
investment barriers between the Mainland and Hong Kong,’ and in doing so provide some
stimulus to the Hong Kong economy. Furthermore, CEPA provided a step forward in China’s
efforts to meet the requirements of WTO accession, through the liberalisation of its own
economy.25 Around the same time, China relaxed restrictions on Guangdong residents
travelling to Hong Kong with the introduction of the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS), followed
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by the adoption of multiple entry permits for residents of Shenzhen in 2009 – the numbers
of mainland visitors travelling on the IVS rose from 0.7 million in 2003 to over 31 million in
2014 as a result.26 Further steps for the economic integration of the Greater Pearl River
Delta, which encompasses Hong Kong, Macao, and Guangdong’s Pearl River Delta Economic
Zone have been taken with the under-construction Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge, and
proposals for a free trade zone encompassing the entire area.

There have been suggestions that this high degree of economic interdependence offers
reassurances for Hong Kong’s autonomy. One scholar rejects pessimistic diagnoses that Hong
Kong’s autonomy is under immediate threat, arguing that ‘because of Beijing’s economic
dependence on Hong Kong, the fortunes of China’s leaders are linked to preventing Hong
Kong’s full political integration and sameness with the mainland’.27 Even if this is the case,
the possibility remains that Hong Kong’s economic integration with the mainland could limit
the territory’s autonomy in other ways. Hong Kong’s economic dependence on China offers
Beijing substantial leverage with which to influence policy-making in the territory, if they so
choose. Likewise, given the scale of Hong Kong investments in the mainland and vice versa,
China’s government has the ability to assert its will through the business sector. The reelection of Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in 2002, despite his lack of
popularity across Hong Kong, has been attributed to the strong presence of business elites
with mainland interests on the election committee.28 Given the degree of Beijing’s influence
in the selection of the Chief Executive, their willingness to safeguard Hong Kong’s autonomy
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from Beijing’s interference and defend local interests has been suspect, fuelling further
demand for suffrage.29

Social disquiet and resentment towards both the mainland and the SAR government has also
resulted from what many Hong Kong observers point to as the social and cultural
consequences of the integration process. A recent example concerns instances of protest at
“parallel trading” by Shenzhen residents, in which multiple entry permit holders purchase
tax-free goods in Hong Kong for resale in mainland China. Hong Kong protesters argue that
the practice causes inflation and product shortages in Hong Kong, and puts undue strain on
local infrastructure; the Chinese government placed limits on the scheme in 2015 as a
result.30 Their complaints should be viewed against widespread perceptions that Hong Kong
is undergoing a broader process of “mainlandisation”; in addition to economic
encroachment, a steady supply of immigration from the mainland has been blamed by
opponents for increased property prices and job market competition, whilst perceived
cultural differences have also fostered resentment towards the incomers.31 Furthermore, the
increased usage of Putonghua or simplified Chinese characters, rather than Cantonese and
traditional characters, in an official capacity and in schools has fostered a sense of cultural
absorption and the loss of a distinct Hong Kong identity as a consequence.32

This leads to a final point about the different approaches of the two sovereign powers:
Britain and China. This thesis has demonstrated the importance of Britain’s changing
29
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strategic and domestic concerns to the development and exercise of Hong Kong’s autonomy.
During the final decades of colonial rule, Hong Kong was a political anachronism –
occasionally an embarrassing one – and the scope of metropolitan interest or interference
was limited mostly to attempts to bring Hong Kong in line with British welfare and
employment standards, or to lessen Hong Kong’s competitive edge over Britain’s domestic
textile industry. By contrast, Beijing’s perception of China’s national interest and Hong
Kong’s relative place within it may have entirely different consequences for the parameters
of Hong Kong’s autonomy. China’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong was part of a
project of national unification and independence, and therefore important for the CCP’s
legitimacy in the eyes of its population.33 Dissent or instability in Hong Kong would
compromise this narrative, and it is widely believed that the success of the Hong Kong model
is a means of demonstrating to Taiwan the feasibility of unification.34 Given that Hong Kong’s
compliance is necessary for these grand designs to be realised, and that geographic
proximity and technological advances allow for a greater degree of central government
oversight, the territory’s scope for dissent or manoeuvre now and in the future may be
greatly diminished.
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